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  • The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya by Frederic Wehrey
  • W. Andrew Terrill (bio)
The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya, by Frederic Wehrey. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018. 326 pages. $28.

Frederic Wehrey has written an invaluable book on Libya, much of which is based on the time he spent in that country as both a scholar and a US military officer working out of the American Embassy in Tripoli. His first extended stay in Libya began in 2009, three years after Washington agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations with the regime of Libyan strongman Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. As a military officer, Wehrey was involved with an early and limited American effort to assist Libya's deeply dysfunctional army in the hope that it could be used against al-Qa'ida affiliates in the Sahara Desert. During recurring visits to Libya, Wehrey traveled widely, including visits to the front lines, both before and after the uprising that deposed Qadhafi. Consequently his work is particularly insightful in considering Libya's extremely complex and evolving security situation.

Wehrey discusses the 2011 popular uprising against Qadhafi and the NATO intervention that followed as important milestones leading to the end of an odious dictatorship but also helping to create many current Libyan problems. Following the outbreak of fighting, powerful militias, often based on tribal and regional interests, emerged to lead the uprising. These groups frequently viewed other anti-regime militias as competitors rather than allies, with distrust increasing as they struggled for power. A number of tough Islamist fighters also emerged as the conflict developed, and one Islamist leader quickly established himself as the principal commander of the Nafusa Mountains front with military aid from the Qatari leadership. The Qataris viewed Islamists as the most hardened and effective fighters and therefore facilitated the growth of their forces. Other militias from the northeastern city of Zintan and the important western coastal city of Misrata also became significant actors in the [End Page 161] struggle. These latter groups detested each other, and Wehrey maintains that their hostility "would become one of the main drivers in Libya's collapse" (p. 95). Making matters worse, Libya's anti-regime umbrella organization, the National Transitional Council (NTC), was weak and unable to make any progress in reconciling the rivals, despite military progress against the regime. The defeat of the Qadhafi government and the summary execution of the dictator near Sirte in October 2011 ushered in a period of hope but also left the militias as the leading military forces in Libya. While planned national elections were a reason for optimism, the real power remained in the hands of armed groups in the streets.

Then things got worse. In December 2011 the NTC government made what Wehrey identifies as "arguably the most ruinous decision made by Libyans after Qadhafi's fall" (p. 86), when it began to pay militia members as government auxiliaries. NTC authorities saw this as a transitionary measure and hoped that later elections would empower new authorities to disarm these forces and provide their members with other jobs. The ability of the government to conduct successful elections was therefore widely viewed as a promising beginning. Unfortunately such comfort was illusory since the new elected government was unprepared to confront the militias without its own strong and reliable security forces. Efforts to create such a Libyan government "General Purpose Force" (p. 154) to fill this void garnered US and British support but came to nothing. Another disastrous milestone was then reached when parliament passed the May 2013 Political Isolation Law, which critics defined as a "form of collective suicide" (p. 150). This law forbade anyone complicit with the Qadhafi regime from holding public office and defined complicity so broadly that it banned significant numbers of technocrats, military officers, and student leaders, who had considerable potential to help rebuild the country. This law further undermined any remaining tatters of national unity and was widely viewed as an Islamist coup. As the situation continued to deteriorate, Prime Minister 'Ali Zaydan fled to Germany in March 2014 after serious threats to prosecute him for financial crimes.

Out of this chaos...

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