Japanese Diplomacy and the "Improvement" in Sino-Japanese Relations

Sino-Japanese relations showed continual signs of "improvement" in 2018. In May, Premier Li Keqiang visited Japan to attend a trilateral summit between Japan, China, and South Korea. In October, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid an official visit to China, and President Xi Jinping is expected to make an official visit to Japan in 2019. Such events signify a revival of relations between Chinese and Japanese heads of state.

Given the worsening of relations between China and the United States, Abe's visit (and the potential strengthening of ties between Japan and China that it has been seen to embody) has received a great deal of attention. Until recently, bilateral relations had been at a standstill, with the most recent state visit being that of Yoshihiko Noda in December 2011 during the Democratic Party of Japan's brief stint in power.¹ This essay argues that, rather than marking a new, warm era in Sino-Japanese relations, Japan's objective has been to return the relationship to the neutral footing it was on prior to its trajectory of decline beginning just over ten years ago.

The essay first examines where the relationship went off track, starting in 2008, with Chinese incursions into the disputed waters of the East China Sea. It then addresses more recent issues in the bilateral relationship, including how the deteriorating Sino-U.S. relationship has affected both Sino-Japanese and U.S.-Japanese ties and how Japan is striking a balance between Chinese and U.S. initiatives for Asia. The essay concludes by examining where China and Japan see the Sino-Japanese relationship heading in the near term and what is needed to establish a stable, constructive bilateral relationship.

The Senkaku Islands: A Catalyst Worsening Sino-Japanese Relations

Perceptions regarding the "neutral" state of relations, and the Sino-Japanese relationship itself, differ between the two countries. Japan, for example, sees China as culpable for the initial breakdown of relations.

The contemporary breakdown originated with two Chinese government vessels that entered Japanese waters around the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) in December 2008. At the time, some of the islands were owned by the Japanese state and some were privately owned. While the Chinese government has maintained since the early 1970s that the islands constitute Chinese territory, no public Chinese vessels had ventured into the area up until this point. In 2010, a Chinese fishing boat operating in close vicinity to the islands crashed into a Japan Coast Guard (the Maritime Safety Agency) vessel, resulting in the arrest of the Chinese captain. This event was reported extensively around the globe, and it led to the outbreak of an anti-Japan movement in China. In Japan, public outcry catalyzed conservative government voices to propose not only an augmentation of island defenses but also further measures in the unequivocal expression of Japanese sovereignty. In 2012, conservative activists sought to purchase and thus privatize the islands to build facilities, such as a lighthouse, as a display of sovereignty. Seeking to circumvent such an outcome, the Noda administration made the decision to place all five islands completely under state ownership and bought back the three islands that hitherto had been privately owned. During this process, Japan conducted talks with China, but perhaps due to the fact that the process coincided with the beginning of Xi's premiership, the Chinese side was fiercely critical of the Noda administration's attempt to "nationalize" the islands. After the buy-back process was set in motion, relations between the two countries' heads of state came to a standstill.

Prior to the December 2008 incident, meetings between the Japanese and Chinese heads of state had been frequent that year. President Hu Jintao visited Japan, and the two countries had signed a joint declaration for a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests that had been initiated during Abe's first term. Notably, the two countries had agreed to begin joint development of resources in the East China Sea. Japan has hopes that the relationship will return to the state it was in during the first half...