Abstract

abstract:

In this paper, I argue that using the notion of intentionality to interpret Reid on conception and object-directedness misrepresents his views on both, and generates unnecessary interpretative puzzles about sensation and consciousness. I develop an alternative, consciousness-based, interpretation of his view of conception, object-directedness, his distinction between sensation and perception, and his overall mental taxonomy. This approach clarifies the continuity of his views of conception and sensation with those of the moderns, especially Locke and Descartes. It also makes clear how Reid uses his notion of object-directedness to save the moderns’ claims about sensation while avoiding the theory of ideas.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 81-105
Launched on MUSE
2019-01-24
Open Access
No
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