IntroductionGaps between Formal and Informal Practices in Southeast European States

The analyses in this selection shed light on some of the central characteristics of informality in Southeast Europe, while also intersecting with some basic theoretical discussions in the study of informality generally. Some of the central characteristics of Southeast European states that make them especially interesting as sites for the study of informality include: frequently low levels of institutional density, repeated experience of "fundamental" structural change inspired from outside and imposed from above, and complex interaction between formal institutions that are consolidated to varying degrees and requirements for reform generated through external processes (in particular, through pursuit of the goal of integration with the European Union). It might be said that these states are seeking, and partially succeeding, in establishing democratic systems, having emerged from a period in which they pursued, with partial success, the establishment of socialist systems. The gaps left by ambitious efforts to construct society-transforming political systems left ample space for the development of compensatory informal practices, some of which developed into stable forms of corruption, while others made it possible for everyday needs to be met in dysfunctional institutional environments. Additionally, as some of the states of the region are new states which have recently experienced violent conflict, the issues of institutional functionality and trust in institutions become more prominent.

A core issue is raised in the contribution by Đinđić and Bajić on Serbia, where the accelerated pace of EU accession has contributed to a rush in adoption of legislative reforms proposed solely for the purpose of compliance with the acquis communautaire, and frequently passed through the parliament without debate or substantive consideration. The labels proposed for these are apt: "fabricating reforms" and "reform simulation." They describe a situation in which legal resolutions are adopted by states which have neither the intention nor the capacity to implement them. Similar to the way that Verdery¹ described a formally socialist economic system masking feudalist and capitalist practices on the ground, the adoption of liberal policy in the postsocialist period is marked by a disjunction between the world as it is described by official policy and the world that is confronted by citizens in their everyday experience. Contemporary research describes this as a gap between formal and informal practices, which appears to be growing as states hurry to generate legal and regulatory frameworks that do not respond to actual conditions.

We are then confronted with the question of what kinds of things enter into the gap between formal and informal practices. One explanation relies on path dependency. In her analysis of power networks in Bulgaria, Toneva-Metodieva demonstrates ways in which currently functioning relations of influence preexist the contemporary institutional order and use informal channels based on knowledge and experience to preserve privileged positions that developed under a previously existing set of political arrangements. A second set of explanations draws on cultural tendencies and proclivities, and is explored by Zhllima et al. in their interrogation of relations between cultural values, as well as economic and structural factors, and corruption. An implication is that some cultural and material environments may be more receptive to corrupt practices than others, though the analysis indicates that privatization of public activity, while it may derive in part from a perceived obligation to provide "help," is structured principally by the constraints and incentives that derive from the organization of formal systems.

Less fully explored in many discussions of informality is the role played by external actors in promoting and consolidating informal practices. This dimension is frequently obscured by self-promoting stereotypes that view outside actors as bringing the rule of law to recalcitrant political actors who resist it. This perception is explicitly contested in two of the contributions to this selection. Markovikj and Damjanovski draw on research from the INFORM project on leadership meetings, noting them as instances of "the imprecise nature of the EU's political criteria as a source of numerous inconsistencies ranging from vague conditions that are not based on EU wide standards to contradictory application." The facilitation of short-term agreements through "leadership meetings," bypassing the elected decision-making institutions of...