Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti by Philippe R. Girard (review)

Book Reviews 165 Clinton in Haiti: The 1994U.S. Invasion of Haiti. By Philippe R. Girard. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004,p. 245, $59.95. Professor Girard has written an excellent study about President William J. Clinton’s decision to return Jean-Bertrand Aristide as Haiti’s presidentfollowinghis overthrow by a military junta in September 1991. In a well-researched book, Girard has examinedarchivecollectionsin Haiti as well as those in Washington D.C.’s CIA and OAS archives. These sources plus interviews with important individualsinvolved in Haiti add to the published documents and secondary works to provide vital details about Clinton’s motives for threatening to invade Haiti in September 1994 and the consequences of his decision for Haiti. Although Girard finds that Clinton had no economic interests for acting to restore Aristide, he identifies five reasons for Clinton’s decision to intervene. First, Clinton wanted to restore his presidential credibility with the international community, especially after having been humiliated in 1993 when he pulled away from an invasion after U.S. and Canadian peacekeepersaboard the U.S.S. Harlan Country were threatened by paramilitaries from FRAPH (Front Revolutionnaire pour 1’Advancementet le Progres Haitiens). Second, he wanted to prevent Haitian boat people (refugees) from trying to reachAmerican soil in the future (AppendixIn providesI m m i grationData , p. 173).Third, the presidentsought to retain support from key political groups in Congress, such as the 40members of the Black Caucus who were Aristide’s most consistent supporters . Fourth, Clinton was greatly influenced by lobbyist for whom Aristidehad spent millionsof dollars (seeAppendixV for Haitian Lobbying, p. 177). Fifth, Clinton’s idealism favored Aristide because he had been elected democraticallyin 1990. Using these five motives, the author provides detailed information about Clinton’sactivities. First, on September 15,Clinton told a national television audience about the military junta’s human rights abuses in Haiti and the need for the U.S.-led multinational forces to invade.Three days later,Clinton’smessagewas revised when his televised address told the audience that he had sent former President James Carter,former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, and Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee Sam Nunn to Haiti. These three men would give General Raoul Cedras and Haiti’s President Emile Jonassint one last chance to surrenderpeacefully. 166 The Latin Americanist Fall 2005 Although well intentioned, the resulting Carter-Jonassaint agreement precluded an invasion and allowed Cedras and other Haitian Army officers to leave Haiti without being penalized for their human rights abuses. The agreement also turned General DavidC. Meade’s 10”Mountain Division intoa forcethat avoided getting bogged down in a hostile country where militants such as FRAPH continued to operate against innocent Haitian citizens. The Carter agreementalsodisappointedthe ready-to-goU.S. Special Forces and paratroopersbecause they would not have to fight and win against Cedras’ Haitian Army. As Girard indicates, this lowered the moral of American forces and within one month of the operationthreeG.I.’s committedsuicideand U.S. psychiatrists “blamed the aborted invasion and subsequent uncertainty for the high suicide rate” (p. 118). Thus, in contrast to the five reasons for Clinton’s decision to invade, Girard believes that the Clinton administration’splan to leave Haiti after six months was too brief a period for Haitians to revive their democratic regime and rebuild their economy. Nevertheless, Girard admits the U.S. military achieved some success after September 1994.First, he cites U.S. forces collaborating with the Haitian Army to create a National Police Force that enabled Haiti to appear to be “secure and stable” (p.127). Second, he indicates there were only five confrontationsbetween U.S. forces and the HaitianArmy. The five fights resulted in four casualties on the U.S. side, including the combat death of Sergeant First Class Dale Cardott. In contrast, at least 14 Haitians were killed in these battles.After the U.S. forces were withdrawn on March 15, 1995,they were replaced by the Brazilian-led UN Mission to Haiti (UNMIH). UNMIH’s most successful effort was to oversee Haiti’s legislative and presidential elections in December 1995. After acceptingthe fact that Haiti’sconstitutiondid not permit his nomination for president, Aristide withdrew from the...