U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua by Mauricio Solaún (review)

Book Reviews motivated to bring about better living conditions. Life was supposed to be better in every way, economies would grow, jobs would abound, workers of all classes would enjoy well-being and security, inequalities would be reduced and poverty would be alleviated; why is democracy not always associated with progress and prosperity? (285).Instead, why is it that what democracy seems to be bringing is a massive disappointment for citizens who had struggled against dictatorships, lifted their hopes so enthusiastically and waited so patiently for social and economic justice? (236).Smith does not provide answers to these pressing questions (which seems to remain a lacunae in existing literature), but does lay the ground for further analysis on democracies’ transmission mechanisms to advance development. Ambitious in its research design, and holistic in its approach to democratization, this book is valuable reading for political scientists, macroeconomists and development experts for grasping the many faces and facets of democratization in Latin America, as it provides a good overview of many issues. ]air0 Aculla - Aljiiro Queen Elizabeth House/ Department of International Development and St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford U.S. INTERVENTION AND REGIME CHANGE I N NICARAGUA. BY MAURICIO SOLAUN. LINCOLN: UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS, 2005, P. 391 PAGES, $50.96. Despite civil conflict in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, in the spring of 1977, Central America did not appear as an important place on the State Department’s radar screen. Each crisis seemed manageable -so manageable, in fact, that one young State Department desk officer reportedly sought an assignment in a more exciting location according to then New York Times reporter Shirley Chisholm. Mauricio Solaun apparently shared that opinion when a “low level bureaucrat” telephoned him in the spring of 1977 regarding the ambassadorship to Nicaragua. What became of the young desk officer remains a mystery, but Solaun, the first Cuban-American to serve as a U.S. ambassador, marched into a hornet’s nest in Managua. Whether he understood the depths of Nicaragua’s problems at the time of his arrival is unclear because his discussion of the Somoza dynasty is based largely upon the family’s harshest critics. For sure, Solaun was at odds with President Jimmy Carter’s non-interventionist policy. Solaun arrived in Managua in September 1977as the point man for Carter’s human rights policy based upon a ”fragmented process” and apparently ignorant of local conditions that doomed the policy to failure from the start. The bulk of the book covers the period from the summer of 1978 through January1979and provides themost in-depth discussionavailable to date of the efforts to bring the feuding Nicaraguan factions to the peace table, including The Latin Americanist, Spring 2007 the failed attempt at mediation by representatives of the Organization of American States (OAS). Solaun concludes that the stubbornness of each faction contributed to the failure of a pacific settlement. For his part, Somoza did not recognize the depth of the opposition to him, believing that, as in the past, he would be able to out-maneuver his rivals. He refused any agreement that terminated his presidency before its constitutionally mandated end in 1981. Somoza also insisted that the National Guard be included in any government that succeeded him. In their efforts to bring about a settlement, the United States and the OASfocused upon the Freizte Anzplio Opositor (FAO) that largely represented Nicaragua’s upper classes. The FA0 insisted that Somoza first step down and leave the country before a new government could replace him. Each side refused to budge from its position. Initially, the United States gave minimal attention to the Frente Sandinista de Liberacidn Nacional (FSLN). Despite its fractured leadership, the FSLNs strength and confidence grew with time, prompting it to resist any compromise. In this atmosphere, Solaun concluded that only direct U.S. political intervention, a step that Carter refused to take, could have saved Nicaragua from the chaos that followed the collapse of the OAS mediation efforts in December 1978. A frustrated Solaun returned home in February 1979and five months after that the Somoza dynasty collapsed. While some may quarrel with Solaun’s interpretation, this is an important contribution to the historical literature because complete...