The higher study of defence in Canada: A critical review

The higher study of defence in Canada: a critical review ADRIAN PRESTON I The French stateman's aphorism that war was too serious a business to be left to the generals has enjoyed only a temporary validity. Electronuclear energy and revolutionary ideologies have stretched the conventional definition of war to embrace a whole spectrum of conflict, one aspect of which is the balancing of terror and the possibility of nuclear devastation. The most important , perhaps the only, strategic problem facing soldiers, statesmen, strategists and scholars today , is therefore not how to prepare for and conduct war but how best to prevent it - and this business is too serious to be left in the hands of politicians. Rational defence planning today must be undertaken in the light of responsible decisions formed after a world-wide discussion about the correct applications of military power. Yet among the handful of people in Canada who give serious thought to the problems of defence and security, there is a nagging suspicion that official decisions are often taken on the basis of insufficient study and research. Canada is a middle or auxiliary power harboring no pretensions to become a nuclear military power; for under no circumstances could she afford the prodigality of sophisticated weapons delivery and anti-ballistic missile systems and aerospace development projects that have characterised Soviet-American rivalry and resulted in the most costly and seemingly unbridgeable technological deadlock known to history. Canada is a North American power with wide extrahemispheric commitments, a dual role which imposes difficult if not insuperable problems of weapons design and training concept and of a forces structure which will enable her to exert the maximum influence in both spheres. The geopolitical and demographic facts of her existence compel her to maintain close technical and strategic relations with the United States at the exJournal of Canadian Studies pense of some painful concessions of sovereignty. She has displayed commendable initiative in her approaches to the problems of disarmament and arms limitation, techniques for keeping the peace and provision of technical military assistance to underdeveloped countries. Yet, although Canada is involved in three alli~ ance systems and a diverse commonwealth relationship , the past twenty years have witnessed several grim lapses or omissions in the development of an original Canadian defence policy. No fresh Canadian concepts have been advanced in at least four major areas of policy: the strengthening and modernisation of N.A.T.O., the re-examination and re-construction of the North American Defence System, the defence and security aspects of joining the O.A.S., and the negotiation of disarmament and arms control agreements. The Canadian Government has advertised no particular concern for the relationship between Canada's overseas economic interests and the size, structure, composition and role of her armed forces; for the conditions under which Canada might be drawn into conflict against her will; and for the inseparable connection between military affairs and the process of Canadian national development. Neither the Canadian Government nor any officially sponsored organization or person has offered an intelligent critique of the concept of nuclear deterrence or of the MacNamara doctrine of controlled response , in spite of the inescapable implications for Canadian survival. Beyond an excessive if utopian faith in the efficacy of the U.N., no commonly acceptable plan has been worked out to retard or prevent escalation of conflict from one level to another. Finally, three major areas of domestic military politics have been ignored: an analysis of the nature and permanent determinant features of Canadian civil-military relations and their effects upon Canada's projected military posture; the effects of bi-culturalism in an environment of unification; and the definition of a contemporary and Canadian military professional ethic ~ the responsibilities, standards of competence, conduct and loyalty that can sustain its members under all conditions of service. The most serious students of the problem be17 lieve these official failures are closely linked to the general climate of understanding about defence problems in Canada. One can point to the deplorably trivial level on which many parliamentary defence debates are conducted; to the chauvinism, inaccuracy and fulsomeness of much of the press comment; to the lack of sustained interest and involvement...