The Evolution of Canadian Aviation Policy Following the First World War

The Evolution ofCanadian Aviation Policy Following the First World War WILLIAM J. McANDREW Air Power, like Sea Power, to be effective and permanent, must be based on a sound economic development for Peace uses. On any other basis, its maintenance in Canada must be artificial and burdensome in time of Peace. J.A. Wilson The First World War ushered in the air age and "in four bloody years of combat aviation evolved froin an oddity to a military necessity."I Inevitably, war diverted aviation away from otherwise usual processes of civil invention, design and production which remained in limbo for the duration, and the full dimensions of the new era were still only dimly perceived at the Armistice. The challenge in 1918 lay, not only in continuing to improve military capabilities, but in converting the well-demonstrated aeronautical potential to productive peacetime use.2 Canada's particular conversion problem was made more difficult by the nature of its wartime policies. Marked by a "posture of colonial dependency,' '3 Canadian participation in the air war had been individual, not institutional ; derivative, not original. A major aircraft assembly plant was constructed at Toronto, but its American-designed machines produced for the Imperial Munitions Board were for use primarily by the training establishment set up in Ontario by Britain's Royal Flying Corps. A Canadian Naval Air Service was authorized in the last summer of the war, but too late for it to reach operational status; the few patrols from hastily built bases at Dartmouth and North Sydney were flown by crews of the United States Navy. Most significant was the direct enlistment of thousands of Canadians into the British flying services, the RFC and the Royal Naval Air 86 Service (after April 1918, the Royal Air Force). As individuals, and colonials, however, they were completely integrated in a greater imperial whole, unable to express any collective national identity as had, for instance, the militia with its distinctive Canadian Corps. The formation of an autonomous air arm overseas was not realized until the final months of the war when events overtook the fledgling, two-squadron Canadian Air Force (CAP). It finally assembled for training in Britain while the Allied Armies were moving into Germany as occupation forces.4 Canada's piecemeal wartime aerial policy left a badly fragmented inheritance, with no single Minister or agency responsible for its preservation. As Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, the Chief of the General Staff, lamented: "Everybody 's business is nobody's business. Nearly every Departme~t of State is concerned but no one Department is charged with aviation."5 In short order the scattered resources accumulated for war were disposed of as casually as they had been acquired. The IMB sold off its industrial assets and the RAF disbanded its training organization - except, fortunately, for its extensive facilities at Camp Borden which were turned over to the Department of Militia and Defence. The mandate of the CNAS lapsed and recruiting ceased. The possibility of revival was left open, though, and its skeleton staff assumed control of the Nova Scotian bases as well as twelve Curtiss HS2L flying boats from the United States Navy. The airmen in Europe- Canada's principal legacy of the air war - were repatriated as they were released from their RAF squadrons with the result that "every month sees the dissolving and diffusion of this valuable manpower, which has cost millions to consolidate, and will cost millions to re-create at a later date. "6 The first object of any post-war policy was to arrest the drift and create institutions with sufficient authority and vision to "re-create" the scattered resources in an appropriate peacetime form. In the process the place of military aviation in the country's post-war defence structure had to be determined, and a suitable relationship between aviation's civil and military sectors defined. But it was not a promising time Revue d'etudes canadiennes Vol. 16, Nos. 3&4(Automne-Hiver1981 Fall-Winter) for setting long-term aviation policy. Precedents were scarce and few Canadians knew much about it. When one airman discussed post-war development with a number of Ministers and parliamentarians he found "with one or two exceptions that...