The Theory of Democracy—Part IV—The Principles of Justice: Constitutionality

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY PART IV THE PRINCIPLES OF JusTICE: CoNSTITUTIONALITY (Continued) IN THE preceding sections of Part IV, we defined the principle of constitutionality in government and thereby expounded the essential distinction between Royal and Political regimes or, what is the same, between the absolute (non-constitutional) and the limited (constitutional) government of a civil community. This, moreover, we showed to be a distinction between two just forms of government. Absolute civil government need not be always and necessarily unjust, i.e., it may not be despotism in the sense of that word which signifies the unjust subjection of men to absolute rule; nor need it be tyranny, for absolute governmental power may be benevolently exercised for the common good. Furthermore, even when absolute power is despotic, it need not be tyrannical; it can still be quasi-benevolent. This last point indicates an essential part of our argument which must be reiterated here, namely, that despotism and tyranny are quite distinct elements of injustice, the one consisting in an unjust subjection of men who should be ruled as equals, not as inferiors; the other consisting in an unjust enslavement of men who should be served as ends, not used as means. The fact that these two elements of injustice are separable and cumulatively combinable -the fact that there can be simple tyranny, benevolent despotism, and despotic tyranny or tyrannical despotismmakes it impossible to deny another fact: that there are distinct elements of justice which, as separable and cumulatively combinable, place the Royal and the Political regime in a mora] hierarchy, the one intrinsically less just than the other, even as despotic tyranny is more unjust than benevolent despotism. 692 THE THEORY OF DE]dOCRACY 693 To demonstrate the proposition that, absolutely speakhg, the Political regime is more just than the Royal is prerequisite to the demonstration that, within the sphere of constitutional government, the Democratic form is, absolutely speaking, more just than the Republican. Only thus can we establish the proposition which is to be proved-that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government. As we have already indicated, the analysis of the essential distinction between Republican and Democratic government, and the demonstration of the latter's superiority in justice, will be undertaken in Part V to foHow."84 But we have not yet completed the demonstration that constitutional government is more just than an absolute regime. We have only taken the first step in that direction , by showing that each is just relative to certain circumstances .385 What remains to be shown, from the very nature of these circumstances, is that the Political is absolutely more just than the Royal regime.386 The :relative justification of diverse :regimes according to diversity of circumstances arises from the fact that civil justice and injustice have their foundation in conditions of equality and inequality among men associated together in the communal life of a state. As radical inequality in power justifies the mastery of natural slaves, so radical inequality in habit justifies an absolute or Royal regime over subjects, whereas radical equality in habit demands, in justice, Constitutional government exercised by office-holders over actively participating citizens."87 ••• Vd. Part IV, Section 1, supra, in THE THOMIST, IV, 3, pp. 454-61. ••• Vd. Part IV, Section 3, supra, lac. cit. 886 That second step will be accomplished in Section 6 infra. 887 We shall not argue here whether there are any facts to justify natural slavery. That will be done in Part V to follow. Here it is sufficient to proceed hypothetically, by determining the facts which must be supposed if natural slavery is to be justified, namely, that defect in power which prevents a man from achieving all the virtues and, through them, the natural happiness which is the specific end of man, the end commensurate with his nature and proportionate to the acquired virtues as means. Because of such defect, and the consequent inferiority of the good which such a man can achieve, it is supposed that he can be justly used as a means to the end of his natural master who can attain the higher good of specifically human happiness. The mastery of a...