Φαντασία in the Philosophy of Aristotle

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: TnE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017 VoL. XXXV JANUARY, 1971 No.1 iPavra(J"'ia IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE IF WE WISH to make an exact delineation of the way in which Aristotle speaks about imagination, we must clearly distinguish between the explanation he gives concerning the imagination considered in itself in the De Anima on the one hand (and this will be the object of the first part of our study), and, on the other, the allusions he makes regarding the role of the imagination in various human activities or in the vital functions of perfect animals. To insure greater respect for the problem of chronology in Aristotle's writings, in the course of the second part of our study we shall distinguish what he says on this matter in the De Anima from what he says in his other treatises. I. Analysis of the Third Chapter of the Third Book of the DE ANIMA. In the history of philosophy this study of the imagination in the De Anima has the unique position of being the first philosophical study on this matter, since, although Plato spoke 1 M.-D. PHILIPPE about the imagination and sought its precise relations with sensation and opinion, he never dealt with the imagination itself. Independently of its content, which may seem deceptive at first sight, the study which Aristotle makes of it in the De Anima, then, has the merit of being the first study. In approaching this study, we do not find it useless to recall the philosophical perspective in which it is elaborated.1 In the De Anima Aristotle aims for a precise definition of the soul. Hence, after recalling the various opinions of previous philosophers concerning the soul, he begins to tell us, in the Second Book, what it is. He commences by defining its most common A6yo~, that is, 1 In an article entitled " The Aristotelian Use of avraavrapove'iv) and the fact of sensation (To ala0avea-8at) are " one." Ernpedocles states: " Intelligence develops among men according to what is offered to their senses." And Aristotle cites Horner [Odyssey XVIII, 136] in this sense). All these philosophers suppose (1nro:Aap.{3avovaw) that the act of thinking, like the act of feeling, is something bodily (awp.anKov) and that one feels and thinks like by like (TO op.owv) . But Aristotle reproaches them for not having dealt with error (7} chrarYJ), which is more habitual (olKetoTepov) among animals and "constitutes that in which the soul spends more time." 2 It follows from this confusion either that all appearances (cpatvop.Eva) are true, or that error is in contact with the unlike inasmuch as it is contrary to knowledge of like by like. But one ordinarily admits that, in the case of contraries, error, like knowledge, is one and the same.3 Having listed this question among the problems to be solved (chropias), Aristotle cannot admit this identification. So here again he states: It is clear that feeling and practical thinking are not the same, since all animals share in the former, whereas only a few share in the latter.4 Even less so is thinking the same as feeling, inasmuch as the experience of proper sensibles is alwa~:s true and belongs to all animals, whereas discourse (8tavo£i:a6at) can be false and never belongs to any animal lacking reason (A6yo>) .5 • De Anima, TII, 3, 427b 2. 8 Ibid., 427a 17; 427b 2-6. •To voe!v involves being-right and being-wrong. Being-right includes p{JV'Y/IrL~, l:rnlrT~JL7J, and o6;a d:Jv,IJ~~; being-wrong includes their contraries (427b 9). • De Anima, III, 3, 427b 6-14. iPavrauta IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE 5 This distinction between feeling and foresight is taken here only on the basis of extension. The fact is that feeling belongs to all animals, whereas foresight does not. This, however, does not explain the difference between feeling and thinking. Hence, to give a better demonstration of the impossibility of this identification, it is necessary to discern...