The Problem of Ground in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger

THE PROBLEM OF GROUND IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER UKE EVERY philosopher Heidegger wants to get to the bottom of things, indeed not merely to the roots but to the ground in whch these roots are located, out of which they arise. He describes this fundamental realm in many different ways, yet the actual term ground is clearly one of his favorites.1 The term is inherited from tradition and speaks loudly in Leibniz's principle: nihil est sine ratione (Nichts ist ohne Grund) . It comes then as no surprise when in Vom Wesen des Grundes (1928) Heidegger turns to this principle in his search for the essence of ground. What does come as a surprise is that the principle does not seem to be very helpful. One could say that the principle is a statement about a being in reference to something called ground (omne ens habet rationem) . Yet the question -what is this ground-receives no answer. Hence the content of the principle is almost totally irrelevant to the study in hand. Nevertheless the principle is of some help. It points us in the direction of further investigations. It would seem from Leibniz's own words that the principle arises out of the very nature of truth and this allows Heidegger to conclude: The more originally we seize upon the problem of the essence of truth ... the more persistent must the problem of ground become.2 1 Heidegger published two works containing the term ground in their title. This study is primarily based on these works. Vom Wesen des Grundes, (19£8). (Bilingual edition, The Essence of Reasons, tr. T. Malick, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Quotations will be taken from this bilingual edition and hereafter the work will be refeITed to as WG. Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), Dritte unveriinderte Auflage, 1965. Hereafter as SG. 2 WG. p. 18 "Je urspriinglicher wir uns daher des Wesens der Wahrheit bemiich100 'l'HE PROB:t.I!T.M OF GROUNP IN HEIDEGGER lQl :More originally? Yes, for the notion of truth of Leibniz is the truth of assertion, the truth of a predicate belonging to a subject . In Being and Time of the previous year Heidegger had already shown at length that truth understood in this way is based on more original truth.8 The treatment here is basically a repetition. With it we land in the domain of truth and the problem of ground. The principle of Leibniz hardly features any more. What then is truth for Heidegger and how is it related to the problem of ground? The truth of assertion, of agreement between subject and predicate, demands a pre-predicative knowledge of being. It is only when there is a manifestation of being that there is a basis for the truth of assertion. This pre-predicative manifestness of being, called ontical truth,4 is not the result of a judgment or assertion but comes about in our situating ourselves in the midst of being, through our moods and drives, as well as in conative and volitional kinds of behavior toward being that are grounded in the way we find ourselves situated.5 It is immediately evident that the beings we thus encounter are not all of the same kind: a stone is not a man. The particular manifestness of any being is therefore guided by the more basic Being of a being. This disclosedness of Being Heidegger calls ontological truth.6 The ability to recognise this distinction between being and Being (Ontological Difference) is only found in Dasein. Indeed it defines Dasein. It constitutes the very essence of Dasein and receives the name transcendence.7 Thus via truth the quest for the essence of ground becomes the problem of transcendence . tigen, um so aufdringlicher muss