The Particularity of Moral Knowledge

THE PARTICULARITY OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE* IN MANY OF THE Platonic dialogues, Socrates is portrayed as hunting for definitions of the virtues which are acceptable to those participating in the conversation. The prey is courage in Laches, friendship in Lysis, that combination of wisdom and self-restraint called sophrosyne in Charmides , piety in Euthyphro, and above all, justice in The Republic . As Copieston notes, this search for moral definitions serves Socrates's ethical interest in avoiding the relativism of the sophists: "If we can once attain to a universal definition of justice, ... we can judge not only individual actions, but also the moral codes of different states, in so far as they embody or recede from the universal definition . . ." 1 Thus Socrates's search for moral definitions dramatizes a necessary presupposition of morality: the possibility of universal moral knowledge based on the universal claim of morality itself. This same presupposition underlies all moral argumentation. As Macintyre points out, moral arguments always purport to be impersonal: they presuppose criteria of evaluation which are universal, and can therefore be cited as " good reasons " for acting in this way or that, " independently of who utters [them] or even whether [they are] uttered at all." For moral argument " expresses at least an aspiration to be or become rational in this area of our lives," and such rationality demands "objective standards." 2 *This paper is the first product of a research project on tradition and moral knowledge, initiated with financial support from the American Catholic Philosophical Association's summer research grant program. The author wishes to thank the ACPA for its help and encouragement. l Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1962), p. 126. 2 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtu.e (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981), pp. 8-9. Macintyre argues, however, that in our present historical situation our moral arguments are ineffective in producing agreement because there is no consensus concerning wllich criteria of evaluation are, in fact, universal. 66 THE PARTICULARITY OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE 67 But what is the status of these objective moral standards in relation to particular moral actions and the knowledge which guides such actions? Socrates's search for definitions tells us, on the one hand, that these definitions are not yet knownotherwise , no search would be necessary. On the other hand, however, he does expect to make progress toward the attainment of such definitions by reflecting on what is already implicit in the understanding of his partners in conversation. Socrates appears to presuppose, therefore, that something of universal moral significance is already known by moral agents, even though this knowledge is not yet expressed in definitions having universal validity. This paper will argue that moral agents understand universal moral standards in their application to particular actions , even when they do not understand such standards abstractly . This argument will be based on the view that the knowledge which guides particular moral actions can neither be derived from our knowledge of universal moral standards per se, nor be adequately summarized in such standards. The moral knowledge which guides particular moral actions requires a creative moral insight, and not merely a factual insight , into the particular situation as such. This creative moral insight determines the universal moral significance of the particular situation at the same time that it provides concrete normative content to universal moral standards. It will be argued that universal moral standards have no normative content apart from particular situations, and consequently, that universal and particular moral knowledge are interdependent. The paper will conclude by clarifying the implications of this view for natural law theories. * * * Since Plato is responsible for the portrait of Socrates used above, it should be noted that he would strenuously oppose using that portrait to argue for a genuine moral knowledge of particular good actions that is not based on explicit knowledge of what we have called universal moral standards. For Plato, 68 STEPHEN A. DINAN an action is known to be good only if it is known to participate in that universal form which makes it good (justice, piety, courage, etc.). If one lacks knowledge of the universal form, therefore, one lacks knowledge...