Theism: An Epistemological Defense

THEISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEFENSE IT IS MY PURPOSE in this essay to articulate reasons which seem to me capable of convincing anyone for whom the question is an open one 1 that we are warranted in holding that there is a God, i.e., a Being, at least legitimately thought of as a person, who is the source of all being and value and hence capable of resolving all our moral and epistemic conflicts (which is not to say that he has in fact done so) .2 The strategy of this argument is to employ a version of the moral argument as a springboard from which to develop an analogous argument from the normative character of metaphysical and epistemological principles. I. I begin with a version of the moral argument for the existence of God. Ethics does not merely designate some states of affairs as good or bad; it designates some actions as obligatory or forbidden. To some forms of human activity, which otherwise would be regarded only as less than ideal, it annexes what Roger Casement called an "awful No." The interpretation of such imperatives is an important issue: religious believers tend to interpret them as the commands of God, and this way of interpreting them affects the way believers approach moral issues. I now argue that this interpretation of moral imperatives, while not the only possible one (and in fact somewhat one1 This restriction, of course, is more formidable than it appears. 2 This argument has ancestors at least as far back as Pascal. The present formulation was suggested by Leszek Kolakowski, Religion (New York, 1982), esp. pp. 82-90, 188-197, where he discusses the maxim "If God does not exist, then everything is permitted." Kolakowski, however, reaches an agnostic conclusion. 210 THEISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEFENSE ~11 sided), is at least as attractive as any alternative. If God does not exist,3 some other interpretation of moral imperatives will have to be found: most probably, this interpretation will vary from context to context, and from moral requirement to moral requirement.4 But, if God does exist, it is plausible to interpret moral requirements as divine in origin. And the plausibility of a religious interpretation of moral imperatives gives us at at least some reason for asserting that there is a God. What is distinctive in religious ethics arises from the belief that union or communion with God is the highest good for a human being. Putting this claim at the center of the theistic case has a number of implications. Friendships, loves, and loyalties among human beings are at once sources of obligation , ways of coming to recognize obligations already present, and motives for doing what is right. The same may be said of a human being's relationship to God. The good of God's friendship has a double aspect, as God is believed to be both the source of our existence and our Supreme Good. On the one hand, to stand in a proper relationship with God is to be at peace with oneself; one's relationship to God is in this respect parallel to, though more profound and intimate than, one's relationship with one's parents or one's country. On the other hand, union or communion with God can stand as our highest end-not as our only end, but as an end that, since it takes precedence over all other ends in cases of conflict, can establish an order among goods that would otherwise form a chaos of conflicting considerations. And since God is not only the Supreme Good but also the Creator of all lesser goods, the pursuit and enjoyment of such goods within the limits established by God can be brought into systematic harmony with the pursuit and enjoyment of a right relationship with God. s If there is a God, the supposition of a world without him is an absurdity. But we can still explore the implications of a possibly absurd hypothesis, as is done in the construction of arguments by reductio ad absurdum. (I owe this point to Robert M. Adams in conversation.) 4 For discussion relevant to this possibility, see my essay "Relativism." Monist, July, 1984...