The Structures of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary Questions

THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON: TRADITIONAL THEORIES AND CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS ' ] ] HIS ARTICLE sets out to establish some grounds or dialogue between what may be called the "basic uman goods " method of moral reasoning and some other opposed theories. A fundamental point is the way in which practical reason is construed. In exploring this matter, particular attention will be given to the ground-breaking work of Professor Germain Gri,sez. The proposals of this author will be investigated against the background of traditional accounts of practical reason. The clarifications which emerge will suggest openings to dialogue with authors such as Bruno Schueller.1 I shall take up the following issues. 1 For a valuable collection of relevant studies see Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1, Moral Norms and Catholio Tradition, ed. by Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). For Grisez's own theory see Contraoeption and the Natural Law (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 46-75; and· also, "The First Principles of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965) : 168-201. It is not clear how much of this article should be taken as an expression of Grisez's own ethical theory. It should, at least, not be taken as a summary of Grisez's own ethics. See John Finnis and Germain Grisez, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," Amerioan Journal of Jurisprudenoe 26 (1981): 21-31, p. 21. However, it serves admirably to raise the important issues, and in this respect it will be referred to in the present article. The other source for Grisez's basic theory is to be found in, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities and the Arguments (New York: Corpus Books, 1972), c. 6. But this does not explore the basic structures of practical reason. The theory is also outlined in Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 358-371. The two basic sources will be referred to henceforth as CNL and FP. 417 418 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.SS.R. 1) What is the specific truth of practical reason? fl) What is the nature of the requirement of practical reason ? 8) Does the requirement of practical reason ha.ve an imperative quality? Where it is appropriate, I will seek to explain the wider implications of these questions for ethical theory. What is the Specific Truth of Practical Reason? The meaning of this question could be expressed in other words as follows: what is the criterion of truth of practical reason? This could lead to a fuvther question: does practical reason have its own peculiar " logic " and if so, what is this "logic"? 2 The question could also be related to a further matter which is dealt with 'specifically by Grisez, namely, the proposal that the knowledge of the natural law at the prephilosophical level is an altogether special kind of knowledge. This issue is not of central importance, hut it will serve to clear the ground before we take up the more fundamental points. Maritain argued that this "... kind of knowledge is not clear knowledge through concepts and conceptual judgments; it is obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or congeniality, in which the intellect, in order to hear judgments, 2 This question arises in the context of the modern debate about "ought " and "is." Some have suggested that besides the deductive and inductive logic with their respective canons of inference, there may be a third kind of logic for use in reasoning about normative matters. Cf. William K. Frankena, "'Ought' and 'Is' Once More," in Perspectives on Morality, ed. by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976): 133-147, p. 138. During the 1950's some invoked the distinction between the truth of the speculative intellect and the truth of the practical intellect to argue for a form of situation ethics, i.e. an ethic rejecting the deductive application of universal objective principles to particulars. Cf. J. Naus, S.J., The Nature of...