Abstract

The view that prime matter possesses extension as an essential feature offers one way to explain the traditional role of prime matter while avoiding the twin charges of incoherence and vacuity. In this paper, I show that attributing extension to prime matter as an essential feature is not a viable interpretation of Aristotle, and indeed, is at odds with the concept of extension in his physical works. Nonetheless, one need not entirely reject Aristotle’s commitment to prime matter; I suggest that the paradoxical nature of prime matter is not problematic, so long as the role of prime matter is restricted.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 523-546
Launched on MUSE
2016-11-03
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.