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  • Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence by Alex Vatanka
  • Houchang Hassan-Yari (bio)
Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence, by Alex Vatanka. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015. 307 pages. $95 cloth; $32 paper.

Bound together by geography, religion, culture and history, Iran and Pakistan have long-standing interests in each other and their neighbors. In Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence, Middle East Institute scholar Alex Vatanka shows a profound understanding of the complexities and nuances of the relations between these two Islamic republics. [End Page 505]

At the outset, the Vatanka identifies the factors that facilitated a rapprochement between a young Pakistan and well established Iran. The national anthem of Pakistan (written in the Persian language), personal ties and marriages between dignitaries on both sides of the border, the legacy of Persian conquests, cultural connections, religious affinities and the perceived threat of the Soviet Union have solidified the Iran-Pakistan relationship.

Chapter 2 deconstructs the myth surrounding the harmonious nature of bilateral relations between Iran and Pakistan during the 1947–58 period. Difficulties emerged over the process of concluding a friendship treaty. While Pakistani rulers lacked diplomatic skills to write such a document and turned to the British for assistance, Iranians for their part wanted to make sure the former colonial power, Britain, would not see the treaty as a hostile measure. Pakistani leaders were furious when they became aware of Tehran’s consultation with British embassy officials about the feasibility of such an agreement. However, Mohammad Reza Shah’s fervent anti-Soviet stance and the United States’ push to create a regional security belt to contain the Soviet Union helped Iran and Pakistan to patch up their differences and cement their relationship.

Between 1958 and 1965, attempts were made, mainly by Pakistan, to create a confederation of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. However, these efforts failed for various for political, ideological and practical reasons, most notably due to the border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Chapter 4, “1965–1969: The Northern Tier: A Fluid Default Line,” covers the 1965 Pakistan-India war and the limits of a loose anti-Soviet alliance. The position taken by the United States during the war sowed deeper doubts and mistrust in Pakistan regarding Washington’s true intentions. Soon after the war, Pakistan adopted a “multi-faceted foreign policy”: courting Moscow and its revolutionary Arab allies (e.g., Nasser in Egypt and the Ba‘thists in Iraq), as well as the People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, however, Iran remained steadfastly anti-Communist in its foreign policy orientation. The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, coupled with the Nixon Doctrine, propelled Iran into a prominent role in Gulf security; as a consequence, Tehran-Islamabad relations soured. The chapter recounts tense moments for Tehran following the military coup that removed General Ayub Khan from power in favor of General Yahya Khan and the secessionist movement in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Successive defeats in the 1965 and 1971 wars and the subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan transformed Iran-Pakistan relations. From that point on, Pakistan was viewed by Tehran as its junior partner.

The momentous regional turmoil of the 1970s are the subject of chapter 6. Vatanka recounts the political turmoil in Pakistan and the overthrow of Muhammad Zahir Shah in Afghanistan. He shows how ethnic and territorial disputes added new dimensions and depth to the complexity of the Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani relations. As was the case with Ayub Khan, the relations between the Shah of Iran and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan turned soured. The Shah objected to Bhutto’s pro-Arab stand and pan-Islamist discourse. Vatanka sheds light on the roles that “third parties” (e.g., India, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) played in the deterioration of Iran-Pakistan relations during this period. Like his predecessors, Bhutto was toppled by a military coup fomented by Americans, with the approval of the Shah, and was hanged by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.

Chapter 7 covers the crucial period from 1977 to 1988 and the prevailing Islamist ideologies in Pakistan and Iran. The 1978 coup in Kabul followed by the Soviet Red...

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