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Fictional Objects, Future Objectives: Why Existence Matters Less Than You Think
- Philosophy and Literature
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 39, Number 1A, September 2015
- pp. A1-A15
- 10.1353/phl.2015.0023
- Article
- Additional Information
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The set of problems typically grouped under the designation “paradox of fiction” raises questions about our emotional responses to nonexistent entities and events. Colin Radford challenges the rationality of these responses. Kendall Walton proposes that our affective reactions are quasi emotions rather than emotions simpliciter. Other philosophers distance our responses to fiction from our attitudes toward the world. Many such intuitions seem to be based on a cognitivist approach to emotion that has stringent requirements for epistemic and metaphysical respectability. Contra Walton, Radford, and others, we claim that fictions can activate beliefs about the world, and can activate obligations.