Molotov: Stalin’s Cold Warrior by Geoffrey Roberts (review)

Geoffrey Roberts has undertaken the formidable task of refuting the interpretation of Vyacheslav Molotov as an inveterate Cold Warrior and replacing it with a more subtle picture. Most of the book is devoted to a review of Molotov’s diplomatic career under Iosif Stalin’s heavy hand. This is familiar ground. Roberts passes quickly over Molotov’s life and activities before 1939 while reminding us that Molotov was a faithful supporter of Stalin in all major domestic policy decisions from collectivization to the purges and mass terror. Molotov’s service as head of the Communist International is not touched upon. Nor is much space allotted to Molotov’s relations with Communist parties after World War II. Roberts attributes the decision in 1939 to replace Maksim Litvinov with Molotov as foreign commissar to Stalin’s displeasure over the pace of negotiations with Britain and France on a treaty of alliance. Roberts mentions the differences between Litvinov’s concept of a postwar settlement based on spheres of influence and Molotov’s more open system, but he does not explore the implications. Litvinov’s plans for postwar Europe were based on the assumption that there would not be any revolutionary transformations. Molotov took a different view.

The centerpiece of Roberts’s revisionist view is a thorough and well-documented account of Molotov’s support for the reunification of Germany and the establishment of an all-European collective security system. Roberts stresses how Molotov employed his well-known diplomatic skills—his attention to detail, his tactical flexibility, his persistence, and, what may come as a surprise to some readers, his sharp wit—in pursuance of this “daring policy initiative” (p. 149). Roberts further argues that this was not primarily intended to split Western Europe from the United States or to encourage neutralism in France or prevent the integration of West Germany into a Western bloc, desirable as these ends might have been. Rather, Molotov was committed to resolving the German problem and thus nipping the Cold War in the bud. Roberts accepts at face value Molotov’s stated purpose of achieving through negotiations with the United States and Great Britain a united, “peaceful and democratic” Germany within a security system that would guarantee peace and security for Europe. To be sure, Roberts acknowledges that Molotov remained committed to a Marxist-Leninist worldview and that he envisaged the ultimate triumph of Communism. How did Molotov square the idea of a “peaceful and democratic Germany” (adjectives that had been used before in the Declaration of Liberated Territories at Yalta) with the idea of the ultimate triumph of Communism? Unfortunately, even the abundance of archival material that Roberts has unearthed over the years does not yield any direct answer to this question. One of the most interesting insights in the book is the extent to which Molotov was embedded in the culture of the Foreign Commissariat (Ministry). He often assigned the drafting and reworking of proposals to his subordinates—notably, Vladimir Semenov, Mikhail Gribanov, Georgii Pushkin, Andrei Gromyko, and Andrei Vyshinskii. This working team was held together by professional ties that survived most of the political storms raging around them. When the tide turned against Molotov, they abandoned him and kept their posts. Continuing along these lines, one would have liked to find out more about Molotov’s links with the diplomats in the field. We now have considerable documentation on their reporting. Although Molotov’s public pronouncements emphasized the desirability and feasibility of negotiated settlements over Germany and other questions with the West, the tone of the diplomatic reporting carried a different message. This was reflected in part by the analyses of Nikolai Novikov, to which Roberts gives appropriate importance.

The problem of differentiating Molotov’s views on foreign policy after Stalin’s death from those of other members of the Communist Party’s ruling organs is complicated. Roberts insists that Molotov was from 1953 to 1955 “a partisan of peace” (ch. 5). Molotov was instrumental in negotiating the Austrian State Treaty despite subsequent...