Le Presunzioni Legali Del Consenso Matrimoniale Canonico in Un Occidente Scristianizzato by Piero Antonio Bonnet (review)

264 the jurist LE PRESUNZIONI LEGALI DEL CONSENSO MATRIMONIALE CANONICO IN UN OCCIDENTE SCRISTIANIZZATO by Piero Antonio Bonnet. Collana di Facoltà di Giurisprudenza Università degli Studi di Teramo, Nuova serie 30. Milan: Dott.A. Giuffrè Editore, 2006. Pp.ix-247. Since matrimonial consent is an internal act of the will, it is not susceptible to direct observation. Judgments about the existence or adequacy of such consent must rely on indirect forms of proof. To prevent subjectivism from running riot, the Church’s matrimonial jurisprudence has long relied on certain critical presumptions to maintain order. These include the presumptions that a properly celebrated marriage is valid, that the internal intention of the parties corresponds with the external words or signs they used in the celebration of marriage, and that those who have reached the age of puberty enjoy sufficient knowledge of the substance of marriage to contract it. These presumptions have always ceded to contrary proof, of course, but there have been few challenges to the soundness of these presumptions themselves until recently. In this important study, the well known Italian canonist Piero Antonio Bonnet has raised serious questions about the continued reliability of some of these presumptions as guides for tribunal practice. Bonnet begins by examining the notion of “presumption” in canon law and the favor of the law enjoyed by a marriage legitimately celebrated. He then asks whether the traditional presumption that the spouses’ intention corresponds to the words and signs they employ when celebrating marriage remains plausible in the secularized culture of western Europe and North America where traditional Christian forms have been retained but with their Christian content eviscerated. After considering sociological data about what people in Western societies actually think about marriage and exploring how people can in good faith, say one thing while intending something radically different, Bonnet concludes that the traditional presumption can no longer be sustained. While secularized people in Western societies may mouth the traditional wedding vows, they are often in deeply rooted error about the indissolubility and sacramental dignity of the matrimonial bond they appear to be contracting. Bonnet concedes that the abandonment of this presumption would ease the way to declaring unions invalid, but only if rigorous proof is available that the parties’ views of marriage were profoundly at odds with the teaching of the Church. Bonnet also challenges the presumption that, by the age of puberty, young people possess sufficient knowledge for marriage. On the basis of a careful analysis of the requisites for intending and willing marriage that has emerged in Rotal jurisprudence in lack of due discretion cases, he argues that, in the western world, the knowledge required for marriage is usually required only toward the end of adolescence, around the age of eighteen for men and sixteen for women. Those of us who live and move and have our being with late adolescents in their late teens and early twenties would be inclined to think that Bonnet is overly optimistic about the age at which maturity dawns. English-speaking canonists will not find Bonnet’s challenges to these traditional presumptions particularly novel. Nor will they be impressed by the social science data he brings forward in support of his arguments. They can, however, be grateful that the insights about what young people are really thinking when they enter marriage, which have become commonplaces of our tribunal practice, are finally being taken seriously in Italy. John P. Beal School of Canon Law The Catholic University of America Washington, DC book reviews 265 ...