Canada in World Affairs, XIII: 1963–1965 by Charlotte S.M. Girard (review)

220 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW isapresent fromtheSpanish totheFrenchking.In each case thereisanironic twist totheending.Gallantreaches France withhismessage, buttoolatetosave Louisbourg; hehastosacrifice hisbeloved shipEcho towinthegolden Virgin. The novelsmoveaccording to formulaslong established for maritime historical fictions, with Barbarycorsairs, piratesfrom the Spanish Main,and beautifulwomenrescued from themwith impeccable courtesy andhonour. The language isromantically clich•dexceptwhenit dealsknowledgeably with eighteenth-century sailingmethods. In otherwords,Suthrenwritesfictionlikeagood journalist,using language calculated tostirmodernreaders' feelings andproviding themwithaccurately researched informationon something that stirsthemout of theirdull daily lives.One can proceedto the generalization that mosthistorical fiction succeeds temporarilybecause it sees thepastaccording totheemotional needs ofthepresent. Butsince theemotional needs ofthepresent change constantly, historical fictionisalways droppingoutof fashion,whilefictionwrittenin the pastfromthepast's pointof viewsustains itsinterest.Hence,inthelongrun, maritimenovels likeMelville'sWhite Jacket andRedburn, close tothelifeoftheir time, are likely to be re-read when adventure storieslike Mr Suthren's, calculated tofeeda modernnostalgia for atimewhenviolence wasdirectand manto man,havejoinedthenovels of RafaelSabatini andthefilmsof Errol Flynnin their appropriatelimbo. •;EOR•;E WOODCOCK Vancouver Canada in WorldAffairs,xxxx: 1963-1965. CHARLOTTE $.M.GIRARD. Toronto, Canadian Instituteof International Affairs,198o.Pp.xii, 372.$27.00cloth, $1o.oo paper. Professor Girard'scontributionto Canadain WorldAffairsis in no way diminished by beingthe thirteenthin thisseries published by theCanadian Institute of International Affairs. On the contrary, her senseof history, thoroughresearch,and the readabilityof the volume,togetherwith the significance oftheevents dealtwith,makethisanimportant contribution tothe study of Canada's foreignpolicy. Thisperiodfrom 1963to 1965wasdominated bythetension arising from theinternationalism whereby Pearson, withPaulMartin(andhispredecessor Diefenbaker,with Howard Green),tried to adaptCanadianpolicyto the exigencies ofanincreasingly interdependent global society operating through internationalorganizations like the United Nations,and the impactof domestic or regionalhistoricand geographicfactorsaffectingCanadian foreignpolicy. Thesedomestic orregional factors hadtodowiththeproblem ofmaintaining nationalunityagainst thecentripetal forces ofregional cultural andeconomic divergencies. Symbolic remedies liketheB& BCommission and REVIEWS 221 theCanadian flaghelpedtotideoverbutnotsatisfy Quebec particularism. The impact of Americaneconomic andmilitarypre-eminence onCanadawasmore difficulttodealwithin symbolic termsandCanadafounditselfpayinga high costfor keepingitsrelationswith itsoverpowering neighbourin a stateof greaterharmonythan had beenattainedunder the previous Conservative administration. In thisperiodof transition,Pearson and Martin, however,wereableto preserve theroleof 'helpfulfixer'intheinternational community, laterinthe decade tobederidedbyPearson's successor Trudeau.ThusMartinwasableto takeanumberof initiatives inpeacekeeping, suchaslaunching apeacekeeping force to help in the Cypruscrisis,organizinga conferenceof voluntary peacekeepers atOttawa,andusingCanadianparticipation in thei½½ independentlyof growing Americanmilitaryintervention in Vietnam. But the southward gravitational pull of Americanmilitaryand economic power,at that time at its apogeebeforeenteringupon its declinein the seventies, prevailed against theeffortsof Pearson andhisableLiberalcabinet in defenceaswellasin economic policy.The acquisition of nuclearweapons, whichhadprovedsocontroversial under Diefenbaker,wasput throughthe samekind of executiveagreementthat hadbeenusedto authorizeCanada's accession to •om•I•, and for the same reason - American securityof information. Likewise,Walter Gordon's valiant efforts to turn the tide of foreign ownership throughbudgetaryandtaxmeasures wereto succumb tocountervailing pressures intheinterest ofharmonizing Canada-United States relations andthepay-offultimately tooktheformof theAutoPactandtheColumbia RiverTreaty. Hellyer'sWhite Paperon defence,whichinaugurated unificationof theCanadianarmedforcesbutfailedto providea nationalstrategy on defencethattookaccount of theimplications for Canadaof nuclearweapons, helpedtodivertattention fromthesubordination of Canada in defence and economic mattersto continentalhegemony. This waspreciselywhat de Gaullewasnot willing to acceptfor France. President deGaullewasquiteexplicitaboutthispointanditsconsequences for Canada inthepassage citedbyProfessor Girard:'Enoutre,touten•tantl'amie et l'alli•e desEtats-Unis,elle ne sesoumetpash leur h•g•monie ... C'est pourquoi, pendant qu'elle m•mes'en affranchit enEurope, elletrouverait bon qu'existent enAm•riquedes•l•mentsquifassent contre-poids. Elleestdonc oppos•e htouteperspective d'absorption du Canada ...'(LeRenouveau, 253; elle = France).De Gaulle'sapproach wasput to the testin PrimeMinister Pearson's officialvisitto Paris;De Gaulle'swithdrawalfrom the planningand command structureof •ATO,andin his'pasde deux'withQuebec. I agreewith Professor Girard'sargumentthat de Gaullehad a definite policyin relationto Canadawhichfitted into his desireto enhancethe independence of Francefromwhatheperceived asAmerican hegemony, a policy which wasquitesettled andnottobeaffected bytransitory incidents 222 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW suchasCanada's toughstance onnuclearmaterialcontrols or theremarksof JulesL/•gerwhenpresenting hiscredentials (•9o) asambassador to France. The Pearson visit as seen from Paris, where I was stationed at the time as permanentrepresentative to NATO, did nothingto divertde Gaullefrom his predetermined course. Whileit istrue thatPearson did notattemptto actas brokerbetween the UnitedStates and France,he did hopeto persuade de Gaulle that Canadians on the whole did not 'share the fears of some that America willseek todominate theworld;or Europe'(•8•). Mostcertainly he couldnot acceptthat Canadashouldbe usedasa foil to manifestFrench independence of America in foreignpolicy. Twoincidents demonstrated how difficultFranco-Canadian relations hadbecome because ofGaullist prejudices and,perhaps, Canadianinnocence or insensibility. Atthestate banquet attheElysee Palace, President deGaulle, inproposing a toast tohisguest, madethenotable gaffereferredtobyProfessor Girard(• 78) in...