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334 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW final threeessays covermoredisparate topics:ChurchillandRoosevelt aswartime strategists, Truman's expansion of presidentialpower in the field of nationalsecurity, andtheconcept ofvictoryin modernwarfare. Two essays are particularlynoteworthy.Chapter 9 discusses the United Statespenchantfor usingdiplomaticrecognition as a surrogate for military force.During the nineteenthcenturyAmericanpresidents, amongthem John Quincy Adams,JamesMonroe, and Andrew Johnson, withhelddiplomatic recognition in hopesof extractingconcessions or internalchanges from various Latin Americangovernments. ThusWoodrowWilson's morecelebrated attempt to coercethe Huerta government throughnonrecognition represented onlyan elaboration of earlierpractice, nota distinct innovation in Americandiplomacy. Asa toolfor Americanpolicy,O'Connorfeelsthat 'nonrecognition hasdemonstrated its usefulness as a non-militarysanctionto further the diplomatic objectives of thenation' (p. i 13). The concluding essay reviewsdefinitions of victory,noteshow peacefinally camein several modernwars,and endsby listingsomeof the conditions that influencethe termination of hostilities.Among theseare the attitudesof the warring populations, the will and prestigeof the greatpower,the avoidance of humiliation,the willingness to compromise, and the acceptance of the convictionthat 'a continuation of combatwould not servea usefulpurpose'(p. x59) . Although Fred Ikl•'s recentstudy (Every War Must End [New York I97Il) carriesthis problemmuchfurther, O'Connor'sessay, firstpublished in x969,is depressingly germaneto an understanding of the difficulties encounteredin negotiatingan end to United Statesinvolvement in Indochina. Collectionsof essays possess somealmostinescapable weaknesses. Usually diverse in subjectmatter,composed overtime for differentaudiences andwith varyinglevelsof analysis and documentation, essays seldom makea neatwhole. This workis no exception. Written duringthe lastdecade, andin several cases onlya few pageslong,theseessays wouldhavebenefitted from updatingand somerevision.The openingchapteron force in Americandiplomacywould havebeenmorevaluablehad theauthorcontrasted it (firstpublished in i963) with more recentAmericanattitudes,postVietnam, on the useof military force,while the memoirsof Dean Acheson and GeorgeKennan would have strengthened the sectionon Truman and nationalsecuritypolicy.Still, the essays posesome helpfulanalytical categories andstimulate a rethinking of the failuresof the interwarperiod.Further,thoseportions originallypreparedfor the United StatesArms Controland Disarmament Agencyserveto emphasize the part historians canplayin illuminatingcurrentpolicyissues. SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON, JR University ofNorth Carolina,ChapelHill Rise to Globalism.STEPHEN E. AMBROSE. London, PenguinPress[Toronto, Longnmn], x97x.Pp.35•.$14.oo. Anyonewantinga relatively briefhistorical account of thegrowth,sincex938 , of America's far-flungempireneedlookno furtherthan thisvolume.Professor REVIEWS 335 Ambrose,an editor of the Eisenhower Papersand author of severalvolumes of militaryhistory, hasproduced a stimulating survey of United Statesforeign policyfrom the period prior to Pearl Harbour to the late •96os,when the Vietnam War dramatized the terribledilemmas of globalism. Considering the scopeof Americanactivitiesduringthesetumultuousyears,Ambrosehasdone a commendable job of providingbasicinformation(hisbookis pitchedat the generalreaderaswellastheacademic)andof describing thesources of policy. While scornfulof Cold War pietiesand criticalof muchof Americanpolicy sincethe Second World War, he stops shortof radicalrevisionism. Mindful of economic considerations, henonetheless regards themasonlya single ingredient in a policy'mix' which includes racism,a sense of destiny,anti-Communism, and disenchantment with appeasement. If Ambrose fitsany category, it is that of a moderaterevisionist, but onemustbe cautious in labellinghim, sincein somepartsof the book,notablythe first three chapters, he is more orthodox than revisionist, whereas in otherpartshisrevisionism is morepronounced. Of the book'stwelvechapters, onedealswith entryinto the SecondWorld War, two with wartimediplomacy, onewith the beginning of the Cold War, threewith thepolicyof theTrumanadministration from •947onward,andthe remainingfivewith the extension and modification of that policyunderEisenhower , Kennedy, and Johnson.The chapter on entry into the world war contains no surprises. Rejectingthe old-style revisionism of Beardand Tansill, Ambroseadoptsa hawkishposturetowardsNazi Germany,faultingRoosevelt for histimidityandindecision, andraises noserious questions abouttheconflict with Japan.He is alsofairly conventional in describing wartime diplomacy and military strategy,only occasionally makinga concession to the revisionist point of view,asin hisdiscussion of the atomicbomb,whichdrawsuponGar Alperovitz'sAtomic Diplomacy.Wartime diplomacy,as he perceives it, was characterized by drift and inconsistency and was dominatedafter •94• by militaryconsiderations, the primeobjective beingthe defeatof the Axisrather thanthe curtailmentof Sovietexpansion. It is in the chapteron the beginningof the Cold War that Ambroseveers towardsrevisionism. He recognizes that Americanpolicy-makers, because of their opposition to Sovietdominance in EasternEurope,their sense of power, their confidence in the bomband the nation'seconomic might,and their antiSoviet attitudes,contributedto the breakdownof the wartime coalition and the development of theColdWar. Trumanemerges asthechiefvillainin this and the followingthree chapters,for it was under his guidancethat the government adopteda toughanti-Communist programme whichput thenation on a Cold War footingat homeand abroad.It is in describing the evolution of thisprogramme that Ambrose ismostcritical,nowhere moresothan in his chapteron Korea, in whichhe...


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