Force and Diplomacy: Essays Military and Diplomatic by Raymond G. O’Connor (review)

REVIEWS 333 evidence frombiographies, autobiographies, andpertinentsecondary literature. If one centralthemerunsthroughoutthe bookit centreson the fact that theRepublican partywasa highlydecentralized organization with little control over stateand municipalcomponents of the party. It showedlittle continuity in officers, or campaigns, lackedany clear-cuthierarchyof power,had few guidelines to follow,and usuallysuffered from a lackof funds.Yet onceevery four yearsthis decentralized, fragmented collection of squabbling individuals had to organizea convention, nominatea presidential candidate,and secure the necessary campaignfundsto supporthim in his bid for election.In the process of carryingout thesethemes, the readerisintroduced to a smallmultitude of politicalfigures.Their rivalries,alliances, obligations, struggles for power, set backs,and achievements are cataloguedat length.Although the menanddetailsvaryfrom campaign to campaign, thesheerabundance of such detailleadsto weariness andfatigue.One isneverin doubtafter readingthese pages whytheauthorintroduced hisbookwith thequotation fromAristotle. The electionof t89fi not only marked the end of a politicalera, but the readable,analyticaltreatmentprovidedhere is a welcomechangefrom the coverage of the four previous presidential elections. Mark Hanna is shownto be typicalof the Republicanbusinessman-president maker of the age. The freedom accorded statemachines bythenationalcommittee washardlyunique, norwasthepursuitof southern delegates, theideaof assessing businessmen for funds,or the generalcampaign rhetoric.What wasuniquewasthe magnitude, speed,and thoroughness of the efforts.Yet this resultedmore from the fear engendered by William Jennings Bryan oratorythan from Hanna'sunquestionedorganizational ability. In shortthisis a scholarly, well-researched, valuablemonograph. Specialists will citeit in bibliographies butit will probably bescanned ratherthanread. NORBERT ¾IACIDONALD University o[BritishColumbia Forceand Diplomacy:Essays Military and Diplomatic.RAYMOND G.O'CONNOR. Coral Gables,Universityof Miami Press,•97•. PP. xii, •67. $to.oo. The useandabuse of forceremainthecrucialproblem of international politics. In this slim volume, Raymond O'Connor showshow successive American governments havesimultaneously used forceto achieve theirpoliticalgoals and led efforts aimedat rendering theapplication of forceunnecessary or less likely. These essays, after reviewingAmerica'slove-haterelationship with military powerand summarizing twentieth-century navalstrategy, focus upontheinterwar effortsby the United States,the Europeanpowers,and the Leagueof Nationsto controlthe useof force.Naval disarmament, theleague's collective securitymechanism, multilateralagreements such as Locarno, declarations outlawing war, andtheformulation of the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition are carefullyevaluated in termsof effectiveness and precedent. The American attempts to curbJapanese activityin the •93osare tracedin somedetail,with HenryStimson's continuing rolethroughout thedecade fullyappreciated. The 334 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW final threeessays covermoredisparate topics:ChurchillandRoosevelt aswartime strategists, Truman's expansion of presidentialpower in the field of nationalsecurity, andtheconcept ofvictoryin modernwarfare. Two essays are particularlynoteworthy.Chapter 9 discusses the United Statespenchantfor usingdiplomaticrecognition as a surrogate for military force.During the nineteenthcenturyAmericanpresidents, amongthem John Quincy Adams,JamesMonroe, and Andrew Johnson, withhelddiplomatic recognition in hopesof extractingconcessions or internalchanges from various Latin Americangovernments. ThusWoodrowWilson's morecelebrated attempt to coercethe Huerta government throughnonrecognition represented onlyan elaboration of earlierpractice, nota distinct innovation in Americandiplomacy. Asa toolfor Americanpolicy,O'Connorfeelsthat 'nonrecognition hasdemonstrated its usefulness as a non-militarysanctionto further the diplomatic objectives of thenation' (p. i 13). The concluding essay reviewsdefinitions of victory,noteshow peacefinally camein several modernwars,and endsby listingsomeof the conditions that influencethe termination of hostilities.Among theseare the attitudesof the warring populations, the will and prestigeof the greatpower,the avoidance of humiliation,the willingness to compromise, and the acceptance of the convictionthat 'a continuation of combatwould not servea usefulpurpose'(p. x59) . Although Fred Ikl•'s recentstudy (Every War Must End [New York I97Il) carriesthis problemmuchfurther, O'Connor'sessay, firstpublished in x969,is depressingly germaneto an understanding of the difficulties encounteredin negotiatingan end to United Statesinvolvement in Indochina. Collectionsof essays possess somealmostinescapable weaknesses. Usually diverse in subjectmatter,composed overtime for differentaudiences andwith varyinglevelsof analysis and documentation, essays seldom makea neatwhole. This workis no exception. Written duringthe lastdecade, andin several cases onlya few pageslong,theseessays wouldhavebenefitted from updatingand somerevision.The openingchapteron force in Americandiplomacywould havebeenmorevaluablehad theauthorcontrasted it (firstpublished in i963) with more recentAmericanattitudes,postVietnam, on the useof military force,while the memoirsof Dean Acheson and GeorgeKennan would have strengthened the sectionon Truman and nationalsecuritypolicy.Still, the essays posesome helpfulanalytical categories andstimulate a rethinking of the failuresof the interwarperiod.Further,thoseportions originallypreparedfor the United StatesArms Controland Disarmament Agencyserveto emphasize the part historians canplayin illuminatingcurrentpolicyissues. SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON, JR University ofNorth Carolina,ChapelHill Rise to Globalism.STEPHEN E. AMBROSE. London, PenguinPress[Toronto, Longnmn], x97x.Pp.35•.$14.oo. Anyonewantinga relatively briefhistorical account of thegrowth,sincex938 , of America's far-flungempireneedlookno furtherthan thisvolume.Professor ...