Balancing Gambits in Twenty-first Century Philippine Foreign Policy: Gains and Possible Demise?

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the global campaign against terrorism gave Manila the opportunity to enlist Washington’s support for the Philippines’ internal security agenda. In the aftermath of its quasi-constitutional seizure of political power in early 2001, the fledgling Arroyo administration sorely needed American military assistance to strengthen the Philippine military’s counter-insurgency and counterterrorism capabilities. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo immediately declared her support for Washington’s war on terror by offering American forces access to the country’s airspace and allowing U.S. Special Forces to conduct training operations with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the southern island of Basilan. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent American-led counterterrorism coalition were powerful impetus for the revitalization of the Philippine-U.S. alliance in the early twenty-first century. President Arroyo’s declaration of support to this global campaign against terrorism pleased President Bush and put Manila back on the radar of Washington’s key policymakers. Consequently, the Philippines became one of the priority countries that received American security assistance and became the site of the U.S. military’s expanded counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, China’s economic and political emergence in the twenty-first century substantially improved Philippine-China relations (mainly in trade and official development assistance). In early 2001, China began expanding its economic ties with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including the Philippines. Consequently, Philippine-China trade relations grew dramatically from US$2 billion in 1998 to US$30 billion in 2007. This considerable increase in the two countries’ trade volume prompted Manila to be more responsive to Beijing’s growing political and strategic interests, leading to a general improvement in the two countries’ bilateral relations.

These two developments provided the Philippines an opportunity to engage the two major powers in a delicate balancing game with the goal of mobilizing external resources necessary to address its primary domestic goal — containing the raging insurgencies in the country. On the one hand, the country’s participation in the U.S.-led war on terror enabled the Arroyo administration to secure millions of dollars in crucial American economic and security assistance. On the other hand, China’s emergence and its efforts to strengthen economic ties with the ASEAN states made it an important market for Philippine exports. Consequently, increasing economic and, later, security ties with China made it possible for the Philippines to broaden its economic and security ties.

This essay, however, observes that the two great powers’ intensifying diplomatic and strategic competition as shown by China’s growing assertiveness with regard to its maritime claims in the South China Sea, and the U.S. efforts to constrain the former’s growing influence and power in Southeast Asia can spell the demise of Manila’s gambit of balancing between Washington and Beijing. It addresses the main question — what current developments are eroding the Philippines’ opportunity to balance between China and the United States? It also raises the following corollary questions: How did the Philippines play this diplomatic gambit between the United States and China? What benefits did the Philippines derive from this diplomatic gambit? And what is the future of this diplomatic gambit in the light of the current developments in East Asia?

The Revitalized Alliance with the Eagle

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent formation of a U.S.-led coalition in the war on terror, Philippine-American security relations improved significantly. Shortly, the AFP was granted access to the U.S. military’s excess defence articles. More importantly, it participated in several large-scale training exercises with American forces. From 2002 to 2004, Washington provided the AFP a C-130 transport aircraft, two Point-class cutters, a Cyclone-class special-forces landing craft, twenty-eight UH-1H Huey helicopters, and 30,000 M-16 assault rifles.¹ Training exercises between the AFP and U.S. Armed Forces generally focused on counter-insurgency and counterterrorism warfare, logistics [End...