Aspects of Evil

Oddly dedicated to Henry Kissinger (an evil man, are we to assume, or, ironically, a good one?), Terry Eagleton's book is a dazzling collection of references to philosophers (medieval to modern), modern novels, psychological theories, and theological tracts. Eagleton certainly wears his erudition on his sleeve. Unfortunately his clarity of logical exposition is less evident. He offers us an ontological theory of evil, describing it in terms that he thinks apply to the human condition itself. As such it is inescapable. Not to be equated with simple wrongdoing, nor even wickedness, evil is not, in Heidegger's terms, an ontic condition, and hence variable and contingent; instead it is a part of human being qua human being.

Eagleton, as is well known, is a Marxist. He is also in this book a psychoanalyst— or at least a follower of Freud. Evil is said to be an expression of the death wish, which operates in all of us and is in essence a desire for nonbeing, expressed inwardly toward ourselves and outwardly toward others. Eagleton thinks that evil and its companion, the death wish, have consequences that, while dire and inevitable, nevertheless are avoidable, at least on the social level.

In his introduction Eagleton worries about the problem of determinism. If evil is something that "infects" some people and societies, then how can their evil actions be avoided? Such a "disease" would be a cause of the behavior and would be inevitable, given the laws of causation. In that case it would be improper to hold the perpetrators of the evil actions accountable and responsible. They could no more avoid this behavior than one could avoid the consequences of any medical condition that causes an evil act; they would need to be treated, not punished. In fact such actions would be completely intelligible according to the laws of causation, whereas many have argued that evil is fundamentally unintelligible and mysterious. Nor, Eagleton believes, can evil be said to be uncaused or a "cause in itself," as others have thought. "This," he tells us, "mistakenly implies that an action which has a cause cannot be freely undertaken." Unfortunately he provides us with no good argument for this claim. If causes are necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event, and if these necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an act conspire, how could the act not take place? If Satan or adverse social conditions are what an evil person or society are up against, "then evil would seem to be unbeatable." If the young killers of toddlers, say, are born evil or under the control of demonic powers, then they are innocent. So, Eagleton concludes, "those who wish to punish others for their evil . . . need to claim that they are evil of their own free will." Eagleton sees no problem here; however, for, as he cavalierly remarks, "The truth . . . is that reason and freedom are bound closely together." The many philosophers today who think that reasons are in fact the causes of actions would beg to disagree. Eagleton owes us an explanation of how responsibility for evil actions and causation are compatible.

At this point Eagleton states one of his conclusions: "Either human actions are explicable, in which they cannot be evil; or they are evil, in which case there is nothing more to be said about them. The argument of this book is that neither of these propositions is true." In other words either one can explain evil—as the result of possession by the devil, social conditions, or a simple matter of fact about some people and their character—or . . . what? Evil can be characterized, he thinks, and in some cases it can be dealt with, avoided, or rendered less likely to occur. We can hold people responsible for their evil actions, and we can legitimately punish them for such actions—this in spite of the fact that there are undeniable social conditions that often give rise to evil behavior, or character flaws that can be uncovered, or even possession by the...