The American Search for Mideast Peace (review)

Volume 10, No.1 Fall1991 145 The author argues that Sadat was excessively inclined toward wishful thinking, often failed to distinguish between personal (social) and state (professional) relations, and was too uninterested and even lazy to deal with detail; high-ranking Egyptian diplomatic figures are quoteq on these last points. One of them, an Egyptian foreign minister Butrus Ghali, expressed matters succinctly to Telhami: "Sadat was a real amateur. He often moved hastily and unpredictably." An important conclusion by the author is that Israel 's bargaining behavior at Camp David more closely corresponded to optimal bargaining than did that of Egypt or the United States. Butrus Ghali, however, concluded that even if there had been a different given optimal Egyptian bargaining behavior the results could not have been substantially different because "'objectively speaking, our relative weakness was out there for the whole world to see.'" While Telhami belabors his methodology and bargaining systems typologies , he has brought forth a well integrated and intellectually sophisticated study that is a worthwhile contribution to the methodological and subject matter fields involved. Scott D. Johnston Department of Political Science Hamline University The American Search for Mideast Peace, by Dan Tschirgi. New York: Praeger, 1989. 294 pp. $49.95. The attempt to make peace between Israel and the Arabs has been a I major feature of international diplomacy for decades and a primary interest of the United States since 1967. During the period since the Six Day War the U.S. has taken the lead in attempting to formulate various plans for resolving the conflict. When Israel and Egypt were finally prepared to make peace in 1977, the U.S. was at first circumvented, but then played a pivotal role in bringing the direct negotiations between the parties to a successful conclusion at Camp David. American involvement in Arab-Israeli matters did not begin in 1967, but that year does mark a turning point and thus an appropriate beginning for this study, which covers U.S. diplomatic efforts from 1967 until the end of 1988. In view of the persistent blockage of the road to peace, it is fair to ask why more results have not been achieved despite all the efforts. There is a deep sense of grievance on both sides, though Tschirgi appears to emphasize the Arabs' grievances to a greater extent than those of the Israelis. Aside from the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, neither side has been prepared to make the 146 SHOFAR necessary concessions for peace. On the contrary, each side demands as a minimum more than the other side is willing to give. Furthermore, the Israelis have been unable to convert their military superiority into political dominance and the Arabs have been unable to convert their political influence into diplomatic success. As a result, the matter has been deadlocked. Obviously the costs of living with the status quo are not yet unbearable to any of the direct parties to the conflict nor to the interested outside parties. A problem that any broker who wants to maintain the good will of both sides faces is whether both views are equally correct. One of the reasons for the critical role of the US. in the process is that it is not perceived by the Israelis to be decidedly in the Arab camp. But given its material and political support for Israel, if it wishes to maintain any degree of credibility with the Arabs, it must go out of its way to appear neutral on the peace process. In examining over 20 years of American efforts, Tschirgi appears to agree with the foregoing assertion, therebysidestepping the questions of whether both sides are equally correct and whether the rights and wrongs ought to be a matter of indifference to the US. By so doing he has shortchanged Israeli security concerns , which have existed since 1948 but have been heightened by the Gulf War. For example, he never explains nor shows evidence of understanding exactly why Israel opposes the creation of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. He also assumes the viability of a peace conference, despite the obvious problems of such a gathering. The bulk of the book is devoted to an extensive...