Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of Nuclear Revolution (review)

The end of the Cold War was a cause for celebration among those who regarded the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ronald Reagan's "Evil Empire") as the triumph of liberal democracy (substantiating Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History" claim). Above all, it meant we could stop devising those "Day After" scenarios that had sprung from the collective nightmare of nuclear exchanges between the two superpowers. We could all take a deep breath and bid farewell to the fear of a nuclear Armageddon. But not so fast, Goldstein's book warns: the nuclear sword of Damocles still hangs over us all. After all, the nuclear club is anticipated to grow because of the enduring attractiveness of nuclear weapons as useful deterrents in the post-Cold War era. The interest in weapons of mass destruction has been rekindled since September 11, 2001. This book is therefore a useful summary of past research into nuclear strategies, showing why states have opted for nuclear deterrence in the past and why they might do the same in the future.

Goldstein's theoretical framework is based on neorealism and strategic studies, and he substantiates his framework with case studies on three second-ranking nuclear powers: China, Britain, and France. Goldstein argues that the attractiveness of nuclear deterrence and the shortcomings of plausible alternatives during the Cold War era were shaped by a strategic environment that included the "zero-sum" game of bipolar power politics played by the two superpowers, the inherently anarchic structure of the international system, and the availability of nuclear technology. Given the bipolar and anarchic nature of the international situation, no country's forces could become comparable to those of either superpower. Member states of each camp depended on their superpower's guarantee of security to protect their vital interests. States were supposed to be able to take a "free ride" on the superpowers' extended deterrence, although this required the allied states to compromise their foreign policy autonomy. Moreover, allies of each superpower worried whether their protector would really honor its pledge and fulfill its promises. After all, the security needs and vital interests of every country, including each superpower, could vary widely. Superpower protectors might have to downgrade or "sacrifice" the security needs of allies in order to avoid a dangerous superpower showdown or to prioritize their self-interest and their global interests over the parochial interests of allies. The fear of becoming trapped in a war not of its own making, in conjunction with a fear of abandonment, tended to prompt every country to look after its own best interests. As long as anarchy characterized the international condition, superpower protectors could treat alliance security as a private rather than a collective good.

Bipolarity also constrained the flexibility of member states. Although the superpower was required to keep the security pledge it made to its allies, it did not need to make an extra effort to maintain the loyalty of its allies because the very rigidity of bipolarity prevented members from switching sides easily. This put superpower allies in constant stress over how to maintain their own national security. As a hedge against potential threats from immediate enemies, each state had to choose its own credible deterrent. In comparison with conventional forces as deterrents, the nuclear alternative appeared bluntly simple and robust, cost-effective, and loosely constrained by geographic barriers. Any decision maker would immediately have taken notice of the great utility of nuclear weapons in an imperfect world full of uncertainty.

Goldstein takes up three cases to make his points. Britain and France, he argues, could reasonably question the speed and certainty with which the Americans would come to their rescue during a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union, even after the establishment of NATO. Britain worried that it would be dragged into a conflict of a marginal national...