The "Theologism" of Duns Scotus: (Part II)

THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS (Part II) IN the preceding portion of this article, we dealt with the first of the assumptions upon which Prof. Gilson has built his theologistic interpretation of Scotus' natural theology; namely, that for the Subtle Doctor an a posteriori or quia demonstration is not a true demonstration. His second assumption is this; Scotus did not —in fact, could not consistently—regard his proofs for God's existence , unicity, and infinity as strict demonstrations. He writes: "Pourtant quand tout est dit, Duns Scot croit-il avoir atteint des preuves de valeur absolue? Non, car elles ne possèdent qu'une nécessité pour ainsi dire formelle, mais sans évidence ." 46 Obviously if his proofs yield only necessary, but not evidently necessary truths, Scotus* conclusions regarding the existence , unity and infinite nature of God are simply credibilia. They are substantially on a par with the conclusions regarding God's immensity, ubiquity and absolute omnipotence. For Scotus, the last named attribute, Gilson assures us, is simply "une autre vérité nécessaire dont on ne peut prouver que la probabilité." 47 It is true that within the realm of credibilia we can speak of various degrees of probability accordingly as the various truths are more or less removed from evidence. But even that which is least removed —the existence of God—forces man to transcend his natural powers; hence 'notre connaissance métaphysique ne peut donc transcender l'être pour s'élever à Dieu, sans un secours de Dieu." ** In adopting this interpretation, we believe Gilson has been unduly influenced by the interpretation of the seventeenth century Scotists.49 But from what has been said, there is little justification <6 Les seize premiers theorem**», p. 63 47 Ibid. p. 61. i*Ibid. p. 67.. *9In his commentary on the Theoremata (Vives edit, V. 43), Maurice, the Irishman writes: "Non obstat his ea quae habet in tractatu de primo principio, quia illa disputato totalis praesupponit fidem, tß? saltern non procedit a priori et ex stmpliciter necessariis. Loquitur etiam de potentia creaturae et de facto, via attingentiae naturalis, non autem simpliciter de repugnantia capacitatis passivae, «Ii«e* 367 368ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. for relegating Scotus' proofs for the existence, unicity and infinity of God to the category of probationes probabiles simply because they are demonstrationes quia. As a historian, Gilson could hardly do so. As a philosopher, of course, he may; but then he would be condemning the arguments of St. Thomas even more severely; for based as the latter are on contingent premisses, they yield neither an evident (according to his assumption) nor a necessary conclusion. For that reason we prefer to keep the discussion on a purely historical level. And there we must confess our failure to see how Gilson has substantiated his position on the basis of any text from Scotus himself. As to the additional confirmatory reasons he adduces, the following should be noted: 1) Scotus does not refer to his arguments simply as "preuves nécessaires." He calls them categorially demonstrations . Only when this fact is admitted, does the opposition of his contemporaries and successors become historically intelligible. 2) He does not reduce them to substantially the same level as the probable proofs (or if you wish to use Richard of St. Victor's terminology , necessary though not evident proofs) for the absolute omnipotence of God. On the contrary, he insists on the sharp chasm that separates them. 3) Scotus did not regard our metaphysics as a disgruntled philosophy or a disinherited theology struggling to regain what was lost through the fall and reaching out for an object doubly transcending its natural powers like a child grasping for the moon. If words mean anything, Scotus believed he had true demonstrations ; not mere probable proofs. Assuring us he is seeking a contradiceret sibiipsi in quodlibet quaest. 7. et in Sententiis plerumque." Similiarly Wadding in his comment on the De Primo Principio (Vives edit. IV, 719) remarks: "Tractatus iste de primo principio veré aureus est, in quo Doctor, instar aquilae in ahum volantis, quantum humano ingenio possibile esse videtur, naturam primi rerum principa, seu causae supremae indagat et scrutatur; quod non propriis naturae viribus, sed specialibus ejusdem primi principa adjutoriis confortatum praestitisse, testantur et persuadent, pecularis ejus in hoc tractatu prae aliis devotio, et veluti mentis in Deum continua ascensio." But both these Scotists, like Gilson, were interpreting Scotus' theory of demonstration in the light of the non-authentic commentary on the Post. Andy, and on the assumption of the authenticity of the Tractatus De Creditis. However, the real reason for the divergence of opinion in the Theoremata aad the authentic works is not to be traced back to the difference of viewpoint between a pure philosopher and a philosopher-turned-theologian. It is a fundamental difference in Ae conception of the nature of essntially ordered causes, as we shall see later. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS369 knowledge of God, to which possit pertingere nostra ratio naturalis, and not with the credibilia, which he hoped to treat in a later work, Scotus claims he will demonstrate {demonstrabo) the existence of a First Being.50 And even though he realized that many oí his predecessors and contemporaries believed that the infinity and unicity of God are beyond the power of natural reason and are credibilia, Scotus professed his faith in the natural powers of the human intellect . Even in its fallen state, our reasoning faculty can establish God's unicity (which for Scotus presupposes a demonstration of God's infinity). Ad quod ostendendum non puto deficere rationem?1 The moment the demonstrative character of his proof is challenged , Scotus hastens to defend it. Ad secundam instantiam supra positam quae dicit quod ratio procedit ex contingentibus et ita non est demonstratio cum dico: aliqua natura veré est effecta ergo aliquid est efficiens. Respondeo quod posset sic argui: Aliqua natura est effecta, quod aliquod subjectum mutatur et ita terminus mutationis incipit esse in subjecto, et ita ille terminus vel compositum producitur sive efficitur; ergo est aliquod efficiens per naturam correlativorum et tunc potest esse secundum veritatem prima contingens sed manifesta. —Potest tarnen sic argui probando priraam conclusionem, sic: haec est vera: aliqua natura est effectibilis; ergo aliqua est effectiva. —Antecedens probatur, quia aliquod subjectum est mutabile, quia aliquod entium est possible, dimniendo possible contra necessarium et sic procedendo ex necessariis. Et tunc probado primae conclusionis est de esse possibili; non autem de existentia actuali, sed de quo ostenditur possibilitas ultra in conclusione tenia ostendetur actualis existentia .52 Curiously enough, Gilson tells us that Scotus merely means to defend his proofs as necessary and does not imply that they are evidently necessary. How he chanced upon this interpretation is difficult to see. First of all, it is a gratis assertion. Secondly, it ignores the meaning of words. Where does Scotus ever speak of probable proofs as demonstrations'*. He calls the absolute omnipotence of God a BO De Primo, c. 3. For "demonstrabo" the Mueller edition has "demonstrare," but the meaning is the same in either case. *l See note 49. The meaning of these passages are clear from the whole tenor of the De Primo, even if we did not have confirmatory evidence from the Commentaries on the Sentences and the Quodlibetum that he considered his proofs for the unicity of God demonstrations in the strict sense of the word. Scotus is obviously attacking the position of William oí Ware (Sent 1, d. 2, q. 1) and other contemporaries who denied that natural reason could demonstrate the infinity and unicity of God. 52 Cod. Assisiensis 137, f. 15vb-16ra. See also Opus Oxon. 1, d. 2, q. 2, a 15 VIII, 4l9ab. (quoted from Bettoni, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 370ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. verum necessarium sed non evidenter necessarium, but only because he believes it indemonstrable—, not merely by a propter quid but also by a quia demonstration. For both demonstrations, as he patiently explains by way of preface to the whole discussion, yield necessary truths that are mediately evident because based on evident principles.53 Thirdly, this explanation does not seem to take into account the real historical problem at issue. Every scholastic knew that the stria Aristotelian demonstration is based on evident and necessary premisses. To find evident premisses for a proof of God's existence caused no problem at all. But where find a premiss that is both evident and necessary? On the one hand, if something contingent exists, it necessarily implies the present or past existence of a cause. Some would admit that the propositions Quod sit contingens or sit aliquod ens aliud a Deo are somehow necessary. Philosophi dicerent quod hoc est necessarium propter ordinem essentialem causati ad causam ?* Scotus, however, protests that such propositions of fact, usam.5i Scotus, however, protests that such propositions of fact, based as they are, on the order of actual (contingent) existence are radically contingent propositions. This is clear from his criticism of the dubious principle: Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse.55 This Aristotelian dictum could be interpreted in such a way as to confer hypothetical necessity on the proposition, aliquod est effectum , but only at the expense of affirming the necessity of the creative act of God. However, Scotus insists, we can prove that God creates contingently and that in consequens, every such proposition sit contingens respectu Dei tarnen est contingens evidentissimum™ "I could begin with such contingent propositions of fact," Scotus tells us equivalently, "just as St. Thomas did. lllae de actu.....sunt contingentes, licet satis manifestae.51 But evident premisses are not enough, as every good Aristotelian knows, for tunc prima ratio esset secundum veritatem contingentis, sed manifesta.5* But we are seek53 Confer the text of Quodl. q. 7, n.3 cited above. 64 Prima Lectura, Cod. Wa, 1449, f. 8b. 55 Confer the discussion on this problem by Boehner in the Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of William Ockham, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., Franciscan Institute, 1945, pp. 70-88. M Prima Lectura, loe. cit. 57De Primo Principio, c. 3, n. 1, Mueller ed., p. 38. 58Oxon. 1, d. 2, q. 2, n. 15, Fernandez-Garcia ed., I, 195. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS371 ing a true demonstration, and therefore I have chosen premisses that are both evident and necessary." It is precisely here that Scotus manifests his ingenuity. In his classical refutation of Heracliteanism,59 he revealed how the mind can discover an element of necessity in even the most radical and changeable entities. Here again he indicates how it is possible to attain a necessary proposition from a contingent fact, quia ex contingenti sequitur aliquod necessarium, licet non econverso.60 This is done simply by shifting from the order of actuality to the order of possibility , from the order of existence to the order of essences. Such an inference is always legitimate according to the axiom ab esse ad posse valet illatio. But where, from the logical viewpoint, the actual existence of a fact is simply contingent, the possibility of such a fact is always necessary. If a man actually exists, it is, it always was and always will be true that he could exist at the time he actually did exist. Consequently Scotus uses as the premisses of his demonstration such a proposition de possibili as "Aliquod est effectibile." It is both necessary and evident. It is necessary, because istae de possible sunt necessariae.61 It is evident, because it can be immediately inferred from a contingent proposition which is evidentissimum, quia ex tali contingenti....sequitur aliquod necessarium. Hence Scotus ' statement in the Lectura Prima: Ad illud quod secundo arguitur contra positionem praedictam ex contingenti, scilicet quod sit contingens vel sit aliquod ens aliud a Deo, philosophi dicerent quod hoc est necessarium propter ordinem essentialem causati ad causam; dico tarnen primo sic: quia licet sit contingens respectu Dei tarnen est contingens evidentissimum ut qui negaret aliquod ens esse quod non sit aeternum, indiget sensu et poena si negaret sensus, et ideo ex tali contingenti potest ostendi aliquid necessarium, quia ex contingenti sequitur aliquod necessarium, licet non econverso. Item dico quod licet alia a Deo actualiter contingentia respectu esse actualis, non tarnen respectu esse potentialis unde ilia quae sunt contingentia tespectu esse actualis existentiae, respectu possibilis sunt necessaria; ut licet hominem esse sit contingens, tarnen ipsum possibile esse est necessarium, quia non includit contradicitionem ad esse aliquid; igitur possibile esse aliud a Deo est necessarium, quia ens dividitur in possible et necessarium; et sicut enti necessario est nécessitas, ita enti possibili ex sua quidditate est possibilitas: fiat igitur ratio quae ptior cum possibilitate essendi et erunt propositiones necessariae.62 59Oxon. 1, d. 3, q. 4, nn. 7-13; IX, 173-181. 60Prima Lectura, loe. cit. 61De Primo Prinfipio, loe. cit. 62 Prima Lectura, Cod. Wa. 1449, f. 8b (quoted from Bettoni, op. cit.) 372ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. Furthermore, we find Scotus constantly referring back to these proofs for God's existence, infinity and unicity as true demonstrations. They are to be differentiated from those probable, though necessary, proofs characteristic of the credibilia. For instance, he criticizes the statement that Angélus est causabilis cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, but is known certainly only because of revelation. Noting, first of all, that 'Angelum esse ens a se' sit non tantum falsum, sicut patet, sed etiam valde absurdum, quia oppositum patebit , he says: Dico ergo de ista minori: Ángelus est causabilis, duo opposita praedictis: Primum quod ilia est demonstrabilis; secundum, quod illud fuit ab Aristotele concessum. Primum probo sic, non possum esse duae naturae intellectuales simpliciter infinitae; sed quaecumque natura intellectualis si est a se sive incausata, ipsa est simpliciter infinita; ergo non possunt esse plures naturae intellectuales simpliciter incausatae, alioquin non esset prima; ergo quaelibet alia est causata. Prima propositio istius deductionis probatur diffusus in quaestione de unitate Dei.63 Whatever is to be said of the proofs themselves, it is beyond the shadow of a doubt that when Scotus wrote the above question, he was convinced he had demonstrated the existence, the infinity and the unicity of God. And only because he had done so, could he further demonstrate that all other natures must be dependent and causabiles, whether they actually existed or whether they were merely possible. He did not have to take it on faith. He did not have to rest content with a merely probable, though necessary, proof. IUa est demonstrabilis ! And why? Simply because the opposite is not merely false, but is evidently absurd (sicut patet). Even those of his followers or his admirers who felt constrained to differ with him, disagreed with him as philosophers. They did not make the historical error of reading their own view into his writings, much as they would have welcomed the support of his authority. Ockham, for instance, agreed with Scotus that the existence of a First Being or Uncaused Cause can be demonstrated. But Scorns, he contends, goes too far in insisting that the unicity and infinity are equally demonstrable, and even suggesting that Aristotle himself (unenlightened by any revelation! ) demonstrated the infinity of God considered intensive.**«&Quodl~q. 7, n. 38-39; XXV, 314a. 64 Ockham, Quodlibetum Septimum, q. 23. Besides the Commentaries on the Sentences of Scotus, see Quodl. q. 7, n. 27ss; XXV, 306ss. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS373 If one were to accept Gilson's interpretation of the essential conformity of the Theoremata with the authentic writings he would have to ignore the clear-cut and unmistakeable distinctions made by Scotus between what can be proved by reason and what can be known only by faith. Because Scotus lived in an age which was Christian enough to begin even a purely philosophical work with a prayer, Gilson tells us Scotus confesses the essential inadequacy of the human intellect unaided by revelation to discover any absolute proofs for the existence of God.65 Similarly, he believes that Scotus regarded the unicity of God to be beyond the natural powers of reason because of what is said in the De Primo Principio. Il est vrai que, pour Duns Scot, l'unicité, et Dieu est demonstrable, mais dans quelles conditions? Dans le De Primo Principio, il nous déclare soudainement : Ici finissent les vérités rationnellement démonstrables; dans le traité suivant, ponentur credibilia. Pourtant, ajoute-t-il, il y en a un que je veux poser de suite avant d'achever mon traité: "Unum tamen est, quod hic pono, et in quo hoc opusculum consummabo; quod scilicet unus Deus sis, extra quem non est alter, sicut per Prophetam dixisti." Voilà donc l'unicité de Dieu rangée parmi les credibilia.^ There is little doubt that Gilson was misled by the poor reading of the Wadding edition. For if we take the critical text of Mueller, it is quite apparent that Scotus did not regard the unicity of God as one of the credibilia. It reads as follows: Praeter praedicta, de te a philosophis praedicata, saepe te Catholici laudant omnipotentem, immensum, ubique praesentem, justum et misericordem, cunctis creaturis et specialiter intellectualibus providentem, quae ad tractatum proximum differuntur. In hoc quippe tractatu primo tentavi videre, qualiter metaphysica de te dicta ratione naturali aliqualiter concludantur. In sequenti ponentur credibilia, in quibus ratio captivatur, quae tamen eo sunt Catholicis certiora, quo non intellectui nostro caecutienti et in pluribus vacillanti, sed tuae soldissimae veritati firmiter innituntur. Unum tamen est, quod hie pono et in quo hoc opusculum consummabo: quod scilicet unus Deus sis, extra quem non est alter, sicut per Prophetam dixisti; ad quod ostendendum non puto deficere rationemP In the preceding paragraphs Scotus has beautifully sketched the score of attributes that can be established by reason in addition to what he has just demonstrated. There are many other attributes of God which Catholics know by revelation such as God's absolute 65Gilson, Les seize premiers theoremata, p. 63. 66Ibid. p. 70. 67De Primo Principio, c. 4, concl. 11, p. 130; confer Rep. Par. 1, d. 2, q. 4, n. 3; XXII, 75a: demonstrative probatur conclusio. 374ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. omnipotence, His imensity, and so on. In fact, Scotus tells us he intended to compose two tracts on God; one dealing with what can be proved by natural reason unaided by faith, the second treating those truths we know by faith alone. The first is the De Primo Principio. The second, apparently, was never completed.68 From history, we know that many of Scotus' predecessors, contemporaries and successors regarded the unicity of God as indemonstrable. It could be established by faith alone. Sed dicunt aliqui, quod haec conclusio non est demonstrabilis, sed tantum accepta per fidem, et ad hoc auctoritas Rabbi Moysi . . . quod unitas Dei accepta est a lege.69 But Scotus, though characteristically deferential to the weight of authority against him, disagrees. Videtur tamen quod ista Veritas possit ratione naturali ostendi. And this is precisely what he means in the De Primo Principio. Before concluding this opusculum, which treats of what natural reason can demonstrate, and taking up the credibilia in the treatise which is to follow, I wish - says Scotus - to demonstrate the unicity of God, for despite what others may think, I do not believe this is beyond the power of natural reason. Ad quod ostendendum non puto deficere rationem. It is also interesting to note the basis on which he demonstrates the unicity of God in the Opus Oxoniense. Primo ex infinito intellectu, secundo ex infinita volúntate, tertio ex infinita bonitate, quarto ex ratione infinitae potentiae, quinto ex ratione infiniti absolute, sexto ex ratione necesse esse, séptimo ex ratione omnipotentiae.70 But a distinction is made between these various proofs. The first six are demonstrable by reason, namely that God has infinite intellect , will, is infinite goodness, has infinite power (this is not the same as omnipotence, as we shall see shortly), etc. But when he comes to the last he says: De séptima via, scilicet de omnipotentia, videtur quod ilia non est per rationem naturalem demonstrabilis, quia omnipotentia (ut alias patebit) non 6* Some believe that the Theoremata represents this second work because of the Tractatus De Creditis (theorm. XIV-XVI) which it contains. Though the Wadding -Vives edition reads: "In sequenti, scilicet in Theorematibus, ponentur credibilia," this reading is found only in two third class 15th century manuscripts. But a cursory reading of the De Primo and the Tractatus De Creditis will convince one that this interpretation cannot be correct, since many of he attributes which the De Primo asserts can be proved by reason are included in the Theoremata among those which cannot be proved except by revelation.«9 Oxon. 1, d. 2, q. 3, n. 2; VIII, 487b. 70 Oxon. ibid. p. 488. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS375 potest concludi ratione naturali, ut Catholici credunt omnipotentiam, nee concluditur ex ratione infinitae. Tamen ex omnipotentia crédita arguitur sic propositum: Si A est omnipotens, ergo potest faceré circa quodcumque aliud, ipsum esse vel non esse, et ita posset destruere B, et ita fieret B nullipotens ; ergo B non est Deus.71 Here as everywhere throughout his theological works, Scotus makes a clear distinction between the sphere of reason and of revelation. Significantly, in the De Primo, a purely philosophical work, the proof based on omnipotence is dropped.72 In view of Gilson's belief that Scotus places his proofs for the existence of God on a par with those for His absolute omnipotence, it may be well to see what Scotus has to say on this point. Do the proofs in the two instances differ merely in degree, but not in kind? Is omnipotence simply une autre vérité nécessaire dont on ne peut prouver que la probabilité? The eminent historian has based his interpretation on what Scotus says in brief discussion in the commentary on the Sentences.73 There he singles out a principle which he regards as a key to understanding Scotus, namely: non omne necessarium est evidenter necessarium . While we cannot see eye to eye with Gilson in regard to the importance of this principle, which is introduced simply to answer on objection based on the doctrine of Richard of St. Victor, this is of little moment. But the interpretation of this principle is important . And here it is necessary to read the seventh question of the Quodlibetum to discover its true significance. Incidentally there are few questions where Scotus displays the brilliance and precision of his logical mind to better advantage than in his careful treatment of the question: Utrum Deum esse omnipotentem possit naturali ratione et necessaria demonstran? (Quodl. q. 7, Vives,XXV, 283ss). Suggesting that the interested reader peruse this discussion for himself, we content ourselves here with sketching its contents in so far as they pertain to our problem. First of all, Scotus explains 71Ibid. p. 497-498. 72It is true that the argument for the unicity of God based on His omnipetence in included in some of the manuscripts, but it appears to be a late addition. Of the eight manuscripts which give the original text, according to Mueller, only two include the argument. In the Madrid manuscript (Bibl. Pal. Nat. 411; 14th cent.) It is found in the margin added by a second hand. The 15th century Merton College cod. 90 has it, but again with the marginal indication 'Extra.' 73Oxon. 1, d. 42, q. un.; X, 7l4ss. 376ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. the distinction between demonstratio quia and propter quid which we treated above. And as if anticipating Gilson's assertions, he reminds us that not only the propter quid but also the quia is based on evident premisses and not merely on necessary ones. Secondly, he distinguishes carefully between infinite power, which can be demonstrated by natural reason, and the Christian concept of omnipotence, which cannot be demonstrated.74 And again anticipating Gilson, he distinguishes what can be demonstrated absolutely speaking, that is, by any intellect, and what can be demonstrated by the human intellect which has not yet attained the beatific vision. And even in regard to the viator, he further distinguishes between a human intellect supernaturally illumined (e. g, St. Paul's ecstacy) and one that is not so (e. g. Aristotle and philosophi multt)?5 Remembering that the Christian conception of omnipotence implies that God can create all possible beings immediately and not merely through the agency of secondary causes, whereas omnipotence relatively speaking, or more exactly, potentia infinita intensive, asserts merely that God as the first cause can produce all things either immediately or mediately through the agency of the secondary causes He has produced, we can sum up Scotus' conclusions on omnipotence as follows:76 1)The omnipotence of God whether considered absolutely or relatively can be demonstrated propter quid, at least by an intellect that has intuitive knowledge of the divine essence, such as that of the angels or saints. 2)That absolutely speaking it is not impossible for one who is still in statu viae to demonstrate it propter quid, for God by His supernatural power could infuse in the human mind such knowledge 74Quodl. q. 7, n3; XXV, 284; see also Oxon. loc. cit. 75Ibid., nn. 5ss; XXV, 286. 76Ibid., ?. 3; 284b: De secundo articulo videndum est de demonstratione et primo de demonstratione propter quid; secundo de demonstratione quia. De demonstratione propter quid, sunt tres conclusiones: Prima est ista: Deum esse omnipotentem, utroque modo accipiendio omnipotentiam. est verum demonstabile in se demonstratione propter quid. Secunda conclusio, istud verum est demonstrabile viatori stante simpliciter statu viae. Tertia conclusio, istud verum non potest demonstran viatori ex notis sibi naturaliter et de lege communi. De demonstratione quia, sunt duae conclusiones : prima est ista: Deum esse omnipotentem omnipotentia respiciente immediate quodcumque possibile, licet sit verum, non tamen est a nobis demonstrabile demonstratione quia. Secunda conclusio: Deum esse omnipotentem omnipentia immediate vel mediate quodcumque possibile respiciente, potest demonstran a viatore demonstratione quia: sic ergo sunt quinqué conclusiones, ex quibus integratur solutio quaestionis. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS377 of Himself that from this concept the mind could demonstrate God's absolute as well as his relative omnipotence. 3 ) For one who has no such supernatutal revelations, but must rest content with his natural and ordinary intellectual powers, neither the absolute nor relative omnipotence of God can be demonstrated propter quid. 4) The absolute omnipotence of God (licet videatur probabilis) can not be demonstrated by a quia demonstration by natural reason (non tamen esset Philosophe demonstratio) .77 5 ) The relative omnipotence of God, namely, that He can create all possibles either mediately or immediately, can be demonstrated by us by a quia demonstration. What strikes one in this analysis is the distinction made between the demonstrability of God, His infinite power considered intensive on the one hand (relative omnipotence) and of His absolute omnipotence on the other. The first can be demonstrated by reason and further, was demonstrated by Aristotle and himself. Absolute omnipotence, on the contrary, cannot be demonstrated. Our proofs are merely probable from a philosophical viewpoint. We may even speak of them in the language of Richard of St. Victor as necessary proofs, But they are not evident - neither in themselves nor by reason of an evident connection they have with relative omnipotence. For many a philosopher admitted the latter, yet denied the former. Many protested that God was all powerful in the sense that He created all beings, yet denied Him the ability to do so directly. Ecce Avicenna! In the light of Scotus statements in the Quodlibetum, it is difficult to see how Gilson can assert that both the existence of God and ? Ibid., ?. 19; 300a: Ista ratio, licet videatur probabilis, non tamen esset Philosophe demonstratio. Contrast this with what he says of the next conclusion (n. 27, p. 306a) : Quinta conclusio principalis est ista, quod demonstrabile est viatori demonstratione quia, Deum esse omnipotentem mediate vel immediate, hoc est, quod possit causare quodcumque causabile, vel immediate, vel per aliquod medium quod subsit causalitati ejus. Haec conclusio probatur per hoc quod necesse est statum esse in causis efficientibus, et hoc probatur secundo Metaphysicae; et probatio Aristotelis, breviter nunc tangendo, stat in hoc: Tota universitas causatorum causam habet, non autem quae sit aliquid istius universitatis quia tunc idem esset causa sui; ergo aliquid extra totam universitatem illam. Si ergo in causis non ascendatur in infinitum, non solum quaelibet est causata, sed tota multitudo erit causata, et per consequens ab aliquo extra totam illam multitudinem; ergo in illo erit status, tanquam in simpliciter primo causante . . . 78 Ibid., nn. 29-32; 307b-309b. 378ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. His absolute omnipotence are merely established by necessary but not evidently necessary proofs. For even in the text quoted by Gilson from the Oxford Commentary, Scotus' position is clear.79 Before he asserts that proofs can be called necessary tamen non evidenter necessariae, Scotus points out that two sources of evidence must be excluded. Non sunt notae ex terminis nobis notis, neque ex immediatis nobis notis possibile est hoc inferre. Why does Gilson ignore the second alternative? For as we pointed out above, Scotus asserts we have contingent facts that are so evident that qui negaret indiget sensu et poena si negaret sensu. And from these immediately known facts potest ostendi aliquid necessarium, quia ex contingenti sequitur aliquod necessarium^ Furthetmore, Gilson's assumption that Scotus regarded metaphysics as a sort of disgruntled philosophy or disinherited theology warrants a re-examination. For it is based on a number of subordinate assumptions of dubious character. Scotus, we are told, was faced with the dilemma of Averroistic naturalism on the one hand and the Avicennian metaphysics on the other. The former made God the object of metaphysics but was constrained to prove his existence by physics, which established a prime or cosmic agent having no relation to the Christian God. To make metaphysics a science of being, however, is to admit that a higher science exists which deals with God as its object. In either case metaphysics never really deals directly with God.81 Certainly this last statement is misleading. What is meant by "directly"? The only correa meaning we can give it is that metaphysics is not a propter quid science of God. But quid ad rem? Gilson introduces this lengthy analysis of the nature of metaphysics and theology according to Scotus to throw light on the fundamental problem. It will show why Scotus could not demonstrate the existence of God. It will make it clear why his proofs for an infinitely perfect being have no absolute value. It will tell us why the theorem : in essentialiter ordinatis est dare primum, quod sit unicum et coaevum Uli coordinationi cannot be demonstrated but is at best probable. And what are we told? Scotus vehemently rejects the 79Gilson, op. cit., pp. 61-62. See Oxon. 1, d. 43, q. un. ?. 4; X, 716b. 80Prima Lectura, loe. cit. 81Gilson, op. cit., p. 58. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS379 position of Averroes and sides with Avicenna. Metaphysics is the science of being. Hence it cannot deal directly with God. And therefore, by implication, it cannot ptove the existence of God naturally by anything stronger than probable proofs. Now anyone acquainted with the first question of the first book and the foutrh question of the sixth book of Scotus* Quaestiones Metaphysicae will be mildly surprised, to say the least, at this conclusion . For the "principale propositum" Scotus sets for himself in the first question is to show quomodo scilicet Deus potest esse subjectum metaphysicae?2, And the first error which Avicenna and Averroes committed was to believe that nulla scientia probat suum subjectum esse?3 which in technical language means simply, they overlooked the fact that the scientia quia is a true science and the demonstratio quia is a true demonstration. And so Scotus goes on explaining how God can be regarded as a subject of metaphysics, sed aliter est ponendum quam ponit Averroes. Incidentally the very text Gilson quotes to prove that Scotus did not regard God as subject of metaphysics, Scotus himself adduces as a proof that he is.84 Gilson suggests, however, that Scotus is still undecided in this first question. Only in the sixth book is definite decision reached. Tenetur igitur MMetaphy, 1, q. 1, n. 39, VII, 31a. &3Ibid., n. 34; 28ab: Primo enim ostendetur quomodo peccavit Averroes et Avicenna in opinionibus suis . . . Circa primum sciendum, quod Avicenna et Averroes habent hanc propositionem communem: nulla scientia probat suum subjectum esse. S4 Gilson, op. cit., p. 60: Pourquoi, demande-t-il, la métaphysique ne pourrait elle pas au moins s'ordonner vers Dieu comme vers sa fin, tout en conservant l'être comme objet? Parce que, répond-il, la fin d'une science, c'est de connaître son objet principal, et non un autre: 'Materia, circa quam principaliter agit scientia, est finis ejus." Confer the context, Metaphy. loe. cit., ?. 45; p. 34b. It is true that Scotus apparently modified this stand, when he said that metaphysics should rather be called the science of being from the standpoint of its starting point. But even in the Oxoniense he made it clear that even if God was not the principal subject of metaphysics, no other natural science has a greater right to treat of his existence and essense. Oxon. Prol. q. 3, n. 20; VIII, 171a: Deus vero, etsi non est subjectum primum in Metaphysica, est tamen consideratum in ilia scientia nobilissimo modo quo potest in aliqua scientia consideran naturaliter acquisita. And similarly in the Reportata Parisiensia, prol. q. 3: Unde circa proprie notât circumstantiam causae finalis, sicut et causae materialis; unde Metaphysica est circa altissimas causae finaliter, ad quarum cognitionem terminatur scientia Metaphysicalis. What Gilson has cor*· sistently failed to do throughout his whole discussion is to distinguish between scientia in its primary meaning of the conclusion of a single demonstration and a body of conclusions that are related in some way among themselves. Metaphysics, considered as a body of conclusions, should properly be said to be the science of being. And the reason is simple. While it is true that the principle that no science proves the existence of its subject is not universally true, for otherwise the demonstratio quia would not be a science in any sense of the term, yet this principle is valuable in 380ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. Avicenna! But when we read this "decisive" question we receive another shock True, Scotus breaks with Averroes. Metaphysics is not a propter quid science of God. It is a science of being. But why does he side with Avicenna? Because only then can metaphysics demonstrate the existence of God (Primo, quia Deum esse probatur hic)!*& And not only his existence, but also something of his very essence (concluditur tarn esse quam quid est)?6 And why is Averroes wrong? Simply because he maintained that naturalis solus probat Deum esse?1 And further, the God whose existence he established was at best a prime mover. But once metaphysics is conceded to be a science of being, we can do much better than that. By natural reason we are empowered to prove the infinite perfection of God itself. Item perfectior conceptus de Deo possibilis Physico est primum movens, possibilis autem Metaphysico est primum ens. Secundus est perfectior, turn quia absolutus, turn quia requirit perfectionem infinitam, nam primum perfectissimum . . . Tenetur igitur Avicenna. Prima ratio ejus sic declaratur: si est praesupponitur de subjecto, non de actuali existentia, sed quod habet esse quidditativum, scilicet quod ratio ejus non est falsa in se. Tale si est ostenditur demonstratione quia a Metaphysico de primo ente. Ostenditur enim, quod primum convenit enti alicui, et ita quia ille conceptus, ens primum , qui est perfectissimus subject!, si esset hic subjectum, non includit contradictionem. Ergo si aliqua scientia supponeret istum conceptum pro subjecto alia esset prior de ente, quae probar« praecedentem de primo ente, quia conclusio demonstration» illius esset prior tota scientia de primo ente.88 Here we have the very opposite of Gilson's thesis. Because Scotus makes metaphysics a science of being, Gilson tells us, he cannot demonstrate the existence of God - his arguments are only probable. determining the principal subject of a science, in the sense of a body of conclusions. Rep. ibid.: Haec propositio nulla scientia probat suum subjectum esse . . . vera est propter primitatem subject! ad scientiam. But this does not say that none of the conclusions of the science oí being qua being establish the existence of God and his attributes, and that these particular demonstrations of God are true syllogism* facientes scire and their conclusions scientiae in the primary sense of the term. MMetapby. 6, q. 4, n. 1; VII, 348a. 86 Ibid., 1, q. 1, n. 41; 32a; ibid., a. 39; 31a: Similiter potest esse [Deus] subjectum primo modo in scientia quia. Supposito enim quid dicitur per nomen, si tale est causa talis effectus, ex effectu potest concludi tale et esse ex esse, et hoc ex hoc tarn quantum ad essentialia quam quantum ad proprietates, et hoc demonstratione quia. For Scotus, our demonstrations of God not only terminate in his existence but give us something of his very essence or quiddity. Hence Scotus insists that our concepts of God are also quidditative. Oxon., 1, d. 3, q. 2, n. 5; IX, 16b-17a. WMetapbys. 6. q. 4, n. 1; VII, 348a. Si Ibid., 348-349. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS381 And Scotus himself says, because I make metaphysics the science of being I can demonstrate the existence of an infinite God. And this not because of any special illumination, revelation or supernatural theology. For this is metaphysica nostra - quidquid sit de notifia naturali beati vel in statu innocentiae. Igitur sic potuit tradi a Philosopho. It is the prima scientia possibilis homini per rationem naturalem acquiri?9 Furthermore, Gilson's description of metaphysics as struggling upwards for an object doubly beyond its natural powers puts Scotus in a false light. First of all the distinction of metaphysics nostra and metaphysica in se is not something over and above the distinction between theologia in se and theologia nostra. The first distinction is on the supposition that metaphysics be considered as a science which has God for its proper subject. Hence it is taken as theology. Metaphysics in se and theology in se are one and the same thing, both based on an intuitive knowledge of God as a supernaturally motivating object. But theologia nostra and metaphysica nostra are not identical. The former is not a stria science (neither propter quid nor quia). The conclusions it reaches are necessary but not evidently necessary truths, since the premisses are based on revelation. Metaphysica nostra, however, is a true science, but a scientia quia. It seeks to establish the existence and nature of God and is the prima scientia possibilis homini per rationem naturalem. Secondly, this view pictures our metaphysics reaching out for the object of theologia nostra and through it to theologia in se. Having neither revelation nor intuition, it is doubly handicapped. This means in simple language that our metaphysics has its natural object, something that is beyond its natural powers. This is all very interesting, but it ignores the fundamental difference between a scientia quia and propter quid. The first establishes the existence of its natural object; the latter, presupposing both the si est and the quid est, demonstrates attributes of its subject. Theologia nostra truly reaches beyond itself simply because it has the form of a propter quid science, just as theologia in se has. But it fails to be a true science and does not yield demonstrative conclusions because its premisses are not evident. But metaphysics, as a scientia quia of God, is based on both evident and necessary premisses, and its pures ;*^., 1, q. 1, n.41; 32a. 382ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. pose is to establish the existence and nature of God in so far as these can be known from creatures, a task which in Scotus' eyes is fully within its competence as a natural science. Thirdly, it supposes that since revelation is required to know that being qua being is the adequate object of our intellect, revelation is somehow required to have a metaphysics of being. Hence as a science of being, metaphysics needs revelation to attain a proper concept of its object. Gilson's argumentation here is not clear to us. Why does the second assertion follow? As we have pointed out elsewhere,90 the ptoblem of the object of the intellect and the subject of metaphysics are distinct in Scotus' mind. Despite the fact that natural reason is impotent to solve the problem of what the precise object of our intellect qua intellect is (It is very important to note the two ways in which an object may be said to be "natural" to a faculty!) 91, we cannot say, therefore metaphysics as a science of being requires the support of revelation. The univocal concept of being which can be predicated of God and creatures, substance and accident, is not the result of any supernatural revelation ot natutal illumination in the Augustinian sense. It is something naturally acquired by the abstractive powers of the intellect in statu viae. In fact, Scotus constantly insists that the concepts of the believer and unbeliever are not different. It is only that one gives his consent to certain propositions on the strength of God's authority whereas the other, lacking evidence, refuses such an assent. Metaphysicus infidelis et alius fidelis eumdem conceptum habent?2 Any science based upon the concept of being, as is Scotus' metaphysics , is an autonomous and purely natural science. And then Scotus' makes the surprising assertion - the very opposite of Gilson's interpretation - because we possess a natural concept of being qua being and a natural science of metaphysics, we have grounds from reason alone for suspecting the Aristotelian thesis that ma90 Transcendental and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, St Bonaventura N. Y., Franciscan Institute, 1946, pp. 73ss. Even from early times Scotistic commentators like John Canonicus and others have insisted that this distinction be kept clear. 910*o»., prol. q. 1, n. 20; VIII, 48ss; Quodl, q. 14, nn. 2, 11; XXVI, 2-3, 40. MQuodl. q. 7, n. 11; XXV, 293b. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS383 terial being is the proper and adequate object of the intellect.93 What we do not know certainly from reason alone, and what revelation can answer definitively, is that anything of which being can be predicated, be it God or angels or the human soul, can directly motivate the human intellect to an act of simple apprehension - for this is what is meant by being qua being as the adequate object of the human intellect. This is what Avicenna discovered because he was a good Mohammedan. But this problem has not the slightest bearing on the principal problem of the validity of Scotus proofs for the existence of God. Consequently we believe Gilson's entire interpretation of the validity and the significance of Scotus' metaphysics , based as it is on this confusion of two distina problems, needs a thorough re-examination. III. Can a creature create? The third assumption upon which Gilson bases his theory is the different viewpoints of the Theoremata and the authentic Scotistic works. The author of the Theoremata views the problem of God's existence from the standpoint of a mere philosopher unaided by faith. The authentic Scotus treats the same problem from the standpoint of an enlightened philosopher, who has based his arguments on the data of revelation (theologism). Without revelation the pure philosopher is stranded. But where he fails, the other succeeds. It is quite true that in his theological works (and we mean here supernatural theology) , like all the medieval theologians, St. Thomas included, Scotus employs metaphysics as the ancilla theologiae. But to suggest that he did not admit the autonomy of metaphysics as a natural science, or that he considered that metaphysics by its nature was destined solely to serve a supernatural theology is quite unwarranted. It ignores the distinction between practice and theory. 93 Reportata Par. 1. d. 3, q. 1, n. 3; XXII, 93b: Si dicas quod hoc est creditum . . . arguitur per rationem naturalem sic: Nulla potentia cognitiva potest cognoscere aliquid sub ratione illimitatiori, quam sit ratio sui primi objecti, quia si sic, illud non esset objectum primum, et sibi adaequatum; sed intellectus viatoris potest cognoscere ens quod est illimitatius quidditate material», aliter non posset habere cognitionem metaphysicalem, ergo, etc. 384ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. Scotus was primarily a theologian and consequently used philosophy to serve the ends of the theologian. But he recognized the essential independence of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. And even in his theological works, he clearly distinguishes what the philosopher can prove by reason alone. And apart from his commentaries on the philosophical and logical works of Aristotle, he has even essayed to determine just what the philosopher, using natural reason alone can know about God. When the De Primo Principio is stripped of the additions which well-meaning but theologically minded disciples contributed to the original draft, we see that Scotus has excluded any argument that supposes revelation or supernatural theology in any way. And then the meaning of the opening prayer becomes clear. He is not praying for a special illumination that reason may surpass its natural powers. Scotus is praying that God keep away any such special helps, that he may determine precisely how far natural reason can go toward approximating that picture God has given us of himself through revelation. Adjuva me, Domine inquirentem ad quantam cognitionem de vero esse, quod tu es, possit pertingere nostra ratio naturalis ab ente, quod de te praedicasti, inchoando?* Catholics, he reminds us, are certain of a great deal more than the unenlightened philosopher, but these truths he leaves for another work. In hoc quippe tractatu primo tentavi videre qualiter metaphysica de te dicta ratione naturali aliqualiter concludantur?5 And from all we have said above, it is clear that Scotus was convinced that even in its fallen state a human intellect devoid of all revelation—even as that of pagan Aristotle— could demonstratively prove the existence of a unique Infinite Being , the first cause of the universe, coexistent with His creation. To say, therefore, that "les Theoremata sont la contre-éprouve expérimentale de l'Opus Oxoniense: la même raison, qui échoue sans 94De Primo Principio, c. 1; pp. 1-2. 95Ibid., c. 4, concl. 10; pp. 129-130. The "aliqualiter" does not mean that these conclusions made by the metaphysician are merely "probable," as is clear from the context of the De Primo and of the other authentic works as Gilson, Wellmuth, Heiser, etc. have inferred. A more simple and obvious interpretation is this. Scotus is contrasting the imperfect and partial, though valid knowledge we have of God in the present life with the perfect knowledge possible in the next. See for instance, Oxon., 1, d. 3, q. 1 where he discusses the imperfect character of our natural knowledge of God. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS385 la révélation, réussit avec elle," % is to go contrary to the clear statements of Scotus himself. Gilson, it is true, believes his assumption is confirmed by what Scotus says of the possibility of a aeature creating. In order to reconcile the doctrine of the Theoremata with that of the authentic writings, it is of paramount importance to prove that the latter admit the possibility of a creature creating independently of the First Cause, or at least that such a possibility cannot be excluded by reason alone. The author of the Theoremata suggests that the first efficient cause may cease to exist after it has produced a second cause. Consequently it is impossible to demonstrate by reason that in genere causae efficientis est dare unicum primum efficiens, quod nunc est in rerum natura. If we could prove from reason that no created cause can create or aa in any way without the cooperation and consequent co-existence of its creator, it is obvious that the assumption of the Theoremata could not be maintained. Now just what does Scotus say on this matter? He is very clear and precise—both in the Reportata, which Gilson quotes in part, and especially in the parallel passage in the Oxoniense. Adverting to the difference between an instrumental and principal cause, Scotus states that to act or create as a principal cause can be understood in a twofold manner: Uno modo excludendo omnem causam superiorem agentem ut sic agere principaliter sit agere independenter a causa superiore agente. Alio modo potest intelligi agere principaliter, scilicet per formam propriam et intrinsecam agenti, licet in agendo per earn sit subordínala causae superiori agenti.97 And in the Reportata we read: Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem, quod creatio dupliciter potest accipi, uno modo proprie, excludendo a creante omnem aliam causam concreantem praeter causam finalem . . . Alio modo accipitur creatio solum excludendo causam materialem concausantem, et isto modo creatio est productio alicujus de nihilo quia de nulla materia.98 Note, therefore, that to create in the first way implies that the actual exercise of the creative power is not dependent upon a higher cause. Scotus is clearly speaking here of a higher cause in an essential order of causes. If this were not already evident from the 96Gilson, op. cit., p. 69. 97Oxon., 4, d. 1, q. 1, n. 26; XVI, 85b. 98Rep., 4, d. 1, q. 1, n. 12; XXIII, 539a. 386ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M very use of the term causa superior (a charaaeristic of essentially ordered causes), the explicit statement that dependency is excluded in actione sua leaves no doubt in the matter. For only in a series of essentially ordered causes is the posterior dependent in agendo or in causando?* Is it possible for a aeature to create in this first manner? It is clear, Scotus answers, that God alone can act independently of any higher cause. Patet quod nihil aliud a Deo potest principaliter agere in quacumque actione . 10° Et isto modo concedo quod Deus solus creat. Licet enim quodcumque aliud a Deo posset aliud producere de nihilo, necessario tamen praesupponeret aliud agent in actione sua, ut primam causam, et ita non est possibile isto modo aliquam creaturam creare aliquid.101 But we can understand "creation" in another way, namely, a produaion in the absence of a material cause; for creation after all is defined as a productio ex nihilo sui et subjecti. If a secondary and created cause were to receive from its Maker creative powers and were to exercise them with the cooperation and consequent coexistence of the fitst cause, it could still be said to cteate so long as it did not make use of any pre-existing matter. Note, this is a radically different assumption from that of the Theoremata. What is to be said ofthe possibility of a aeature creating in this sense? Et hoc modo accipiendo earn [sc. creationem] difficile est prohibere quin possit creatio competeré agenti creato respectu multorum ut respectu formarum subsistentium, cujusmodi sunt Angeli, si sunt formae simplices, et etiam respectu formarum quae non educuntur de potentia materiae ut animae intellectivae, sive respectu formarum accidentialium, ut sunt fides, spes, intelligere , velle et hujusmodi.102 Here is the text quoted by Gilson to prove that Scotus held the same opinion as the author of the Theoremata. What a difference it makes when read in its context. But let us go on. Why is it difficult to exclude absolutely the possibility of a creature creating in this second manner? If we read the Oxoniense, the answer becomes clear. There is no dispute regarding the impossibility of a creature creating independently of 99Oxon., 1, d. 2, q. 2, n. 12ss; ViII, 415bss. 100Oxon., 4, d. 1, q. 1, n. 27; XVI, 86b. 101Rep., loc. cit. 102ibid., 539b. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS387 the cooperation of a co-existing First Cause. The medieval schoolmen are agreed on its patent absurdity. They are likewise in agreement on the faa that a creature cannot create in the second way also. But—and here is the difficulty—can the impossibility of a creature creating in dependence upon a first cause be proved from reason alone. Some theologians, like Henry of Ghent, maintain that Avicenna's position can be disproved only by means of the data of revelation. Reason unaided is impotent to do so. A second gtoup of theologians believe that reason alone suffices to show its absurdity. Scotus, after carefully weighing the two opinions, advances a third which, in a sense, mediates between the other two. Ideo dici potest tertio modo quod creatura non potest creare principaliter modo 'praedicto, scilicet per formam intrinsecam activam respectu termini in suo ordine agendi et hoc probatur per rationem, sed non communem omni creaturae sed per plures de diversis creaturis speciales.103 Scotus then proceeds to show by reason alone that: 1) a pure intellectual created nature, such as that of an angel, cannot create another substance, for intelleaion and volition in a creature are accidental. Only where these acts are substantial can they terminate in the creation of a substance. 2 ) No material form can be created by a aeature. At most, creatures can cause a mutation of forms but not their creation or annihilation. 3) No material form, whether it be accidental or essential, can be a principle of aeation. For if it depends on matter for its being, it will be dependent also in its causality on matter. Otherwise the term of its aaion would be of a more absolute charaaer then the form and its aaivity itself. From these three», conclusions, Scotus proceeds to prove that no angel can create a substance. Neither can it aeate any accidental form. No material substance can create anything, since it acts by reason of its form. It cannot produce matter alone nor create a form nor create the total effea ex nihilo sut et subjecti. We are not particularly interested in the validity of Scotus' proofs as such. Our concern is the value he himself attributed to them. What did he think of Avicenna's position? He believed it could be disproved demonstratively and from reason unaided by faith. Not indeed by disproving in general the impossibility of a creature creating even in dependence on a First Cause, but by showing the 103 Oxon., loc. cit., ?. 26; XVI, 85. 388ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. impossibility for specific kinds of creatures. The impossibility, in other words, arises not because they are creatures but because they are this or that kind of creature. Hence his conclusion that reason finds it difficult to establish the universal impossibility of a creature creating. But the important item to note is that this whole discussion of the competence or incompetence of reason arises only in regard to creation considered in the second way (et hoc modo accipiendo earn difficile est prohibere quin possit creatio competeré agenti creato). In other words, only where the existence of a higher co-existing and cooperating cause is not excluded, is there any question, on a purely philosophical plane, of a creature creating. Necessario tamen praesupponeret aliud agens in actione sua, ut primam causam. Here we have the very opposite of the position in the Theoremata which assumes the possibility of a creature creating independently of the existence of the first cause. Yet Gilson assures us they are substantially the same. To say that Scotus speaks here as a philosopher enlightened by faith while the Theoremata are written from the standpoint of a mere philosopher can hardly be justified by any sound ,principle of hermeneutics. If reason alone could not prove the impossibility of a creature creating independently of the existence of its own cause, a fortiori it could not do so in the second way. Why then does Scotus take such pains to make clear what reason can prove and cannot prove in regard to the latter, while dismissing the first as a patent absurdity? It is only because he has previously established the absurdity of an infinite series of either accidently or essentially ordered causes in his demonstrative proof for the existence of God—a proof, as we have seen, based on reason unaided by faith.104 We could point out other instances where Gilson has seemingly misinterpreted Scotus' thought. This, however, should suffice to show that the inner compatibility of the Theoremata with the authentic Scotus has by no means been established by the eminent historian, at least in regard to the proofs for the existence of God. 104 Oxon., 1, d. 2, q. 2, n. 12ss, VIII. 415bss; De Primo Principio, c. 3 conclusio secunda. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS389 Theologism with its incipient scepticism is foreign to that portion of his metaphysics. The Theoremata We have not directly touched on the problem of the authenticity of the Theoremata. While the ultimate solution of this problem is one of the tasks of the Scotistic Commission, a few remarks may not be out of place. The arguments of Longpré, De Basly, and Balic pro and con are too well known to be repeated here.105 Father Bettoni sums up the present status of the question very well, pointing out that external evidence unanimously favors the authenticity, while the doctrinal incompatibility is the strongest evidence against it.106 As is clear from what has been said so far, Gilson's attempt to mitigate the doctrinal differences does not appear to be satisfactory . And the same can be said, more or less, of Baudry.107 As far as we can judge, a very strong and definite opposition exists between the position of Theorems XIV-XVI and that of the Oxoniense, Quodlibetum, and De Primo Principio. This in itself, however, is no proof against the authenticity of the Theoremata. There is always the possibility that Scotus changed his views on the matter in the course of time. Balic, however, argues for a late date of composition for both the Theoremata and the De Primo. When Scotus wrote the 7th question of his Quodlibetum, he was obviously still convinced of the demonstrative charaaer of his proofs. Yet the Quodlibetum is one of his latest works, dating to the year of his regency as a Parisian Master of Theology. Even if we grant the Theoremata in general are authentic, the additional problem still remains of determining how much of the present text given by Wadding and Vives is original and how much represents the later interpolations. The Ragusa manuscript, for instance, contains only the first 13 theorems. While we can say 105Longpré, La philosophie du Bx. Duns Scot, Paris, 1924, pp. 2949; 289-291; De Basly, "Les Theoremata de Duns Scot," Archivum Franciscanum Historicum. XI (1918), 331; Balic. Joannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Mariant, Theologia Marianae Elementa , Sibenici, 1933, pp. cxxi-cxlv., etc. 106Bettoni, VenfAnni di Studi Scotisti (1920-1940), Milano, 1943, pp. 19-22; L'Ascesa a Dio is Duns Scoto, Milano. 1943, c. 6, p. 104ss. 107L. Baudry, "E lisant Jean le Chanoine," Archives d'hist. doct. et litt, du moyen age, X, 175-197. 390ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. with Balic that the Theoremata in general are little more than excerpts taken from the Oxoniense, this does not hold for the controversial tractatus de creditis (theorems XIV-XVI). Balic offers a fruitful suggestion when he writes: Tractatus de Primo Principio et Theoremata nihil aliud sunt quam duo excerpta ex Opere Oxoniensi quae Duns Scotus delineavit et alii perfecerunt.108 While in the case of the De Primo we have no reason to doubt that the final work received the approval of the master, the same cannot be said for the Theoremata. In faa, so far as the latter is concerned, valde nunc difficile est stabilire quamnam partem in opusculi confectione Duns Scotus habuerit. Non solum interest inter codices magna discrepantia, non solum saepius in variis codicibus elementa veluti per transennam posita, infecta apparent; verum etiam ubique deest quaevis adnotatio indicans Duns Scotum manu sua ad expoliendum' et perficiendum hoc opus adlaborasse, cum haud paucae istiusmodi adnotationes occurrant in Ordinatione, quodlibet et in Metaphysica.109 Consequently we are faced with the problem of how much of the Theoremata is really Scotus'—granting the authenticty of the work as a whole. How much of the text in our present editions represents the additions of the scribe? How many marginal notes have been incorporated? Did Scotus ever see and approve the final draft? How can we rule out the possibility that the work itself was left unfinished at Scotus' death and completed by one of Scotus' seaetaries? And if such be the case, would the latter have hesitated to amend those points where he believed his master had spoken less wisely?"?,,5? In this conneaion, we would like to point out an interesting parallel between the doctrine of the Tractatus de creditis in the Theoremata and that of John de Bassolis, one of the earliest Scotists and perhaps even one of Scotus' seaetaries. This comparison is of particular interest first of all, because it indicates a fundamental divergence of opinion among the immediate followers of Scotus regarding the demonstrative charaaer of his proofs for the existence of God; secondly, because it indicates very clearly what the more aitical group regarded as the weak point in the proofs of the master. 108Balic, 'Oe Critica Textuali Scholasticorum scriptis accommodata," Antonianum, XX (1945), 289. 109Ibid., pp. 295-296. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS391 John de Bassolis Let us take for instance, John's criticism of the argument for the threefold primacy of efficiency, finality and eminence. To show that all three concur in the First Being, is Scotus' first step in demonstrating the infinity and unicity of God. Theorem XV challenges this position for it asserts: In essentialiter ordinatis est dare primum quod sit unicum et coaevum illi coordination!. In omni genere causae est ordo essentialis.—Istae duae propositiones petantur; quarum prima tres partes continet, secunda est simplex; utraque licet sit probabilis, tamen difficile esset, vel forte nobis impossibile earn simpliciter necessaria ratione et mere naturali probare.110 In his commentary on the Sentences, John de Bassolis raises the question: Utrum in tota universítate entium sit dare aliquod ens simpliciter primum actu existens? U1 Prefacing his answer with a disucussion of the meaning and mutual implications of essentially and accidentally ordered causes, he cites the arguments aduced ad probandum quod est dare primum ens in universo. They are simply a summary of the arguments given by Scotus in his authentic works. Then follows his personal evaluation of the latter. Tertio dicam quid mihi videtur de rationibus utrum demonstrent vel non. And what does he say? Et videtur mihi quod sunt valde probabiles et magis quam quaecumque rationes quae possum adduci ad oppositum et quod difficile est ad eas responder é. Secundo videtur mihi quod non sunt demonstrationes, et quod possunt solvi probabiliter, ita quod non cogant intellectum ad negandum processum in infinitum in causis per se et essentialiter ordinatis.112 Here, in essence, is the position of the Theoremata. And there is no indication that the master himself agreed with his disciple's evaluation of his proofs. On the contrary, the mihi videtur would seem to indicate that he is differing with others on this matter. For we know that others, like Peter of Aquila, upheld the demonstrative charaaer of Scotus' proofs.113 In all probability, John is differing KOTheor. XV, 1, V, 51a. Hl Opera Joannis de Bassolis in Sententiarum Libros Áurea, Pariis, Francisais Regnault et Joannes Frellon. 1517, liber 1, d. 2, q. 1. f. 45va. (N.B. The second book was published in 1516). ™ Ibid., 41th.____________________ 113 Commentarium in 4 libros Sententiarum I, d. 2, q. 2; Levanti, Conventus S. Assumptionis , 1905, 1. 1, p. 55. 392ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. with Scotus himself. Certainly he disagrees with the position expressed in the authentic works at least. Now why does this disciple differ with the master? Why does he challenge the absolute validity of his proofs? Not for any of the reasons suggested by Gilson. No, he attacks the very point Ockham was to seize upon later—the validity of Scotus' distinction between essentially and accidentally ordered causes. For essentially ordered causes, he insists, can be understood in two ways. But only in one of the two can we argue to aliquid simpliciter et perfectissimum . In the other, the possibility of an infinite series cannot be excluded. Hence no basic difference in regard to accidentally and essentially ordered series exists on this count. What holds for the one holds for the other. Ideo diceretur quod staute processu in infinitum in causis per se ordinatis stat in ordinatis per accidens.11* Non est demonstratum aliquod ens esset incausatum?15 Like the author of the Theoremata, John de Bassolis believes we cannot exclude the position of Avicenna. Potest dici quod non est demonstratum quod omnes causae causarent effectum , sed tantum causa immediata, licet ilia causaretur ab alia superiori, et ita solum referretur effectus ad causam immediatam non ad omnes, sicut etiam nee est demonstratio apud eos quod deus causet omnia immediate sed quod secundam intelligentiam sibi demonstratam. Sed contra hoc est quia tunc non essent causae essentialiter ordinatae in causando; quia non omnes simul concurrerent ad causandum; sed de hoc non est vis facienda.116 The proofs for the existence of God have no greater validity than the proofs for His omnipotence. And what is said of the primacy in the order of efficiency holds for the order of finality and eminence as well. Ideo etiam eodem modo potest ad alias rationes de fine et de eminentia quia per idem incedunt. Et ita diceretur vel posset dici quod non est demonstratum esse aliquod ens simpliciter primum in universo, sed sola fide videtur hoc tenendum.117 Another interesting parallel between this disciple of Scotus and the position of the Theoremata is in regard to the possibility of a creature creating. After criticizing the position of St. Thomas, he takes up that of Scotus. H4 Op. cit., i. 47vb. "? Ibid., f. 50rab. 116 Ibid. in Ibid. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS393 Adducuntur ergo aliae rationes ad probandum eandem conclusionem, scilicet quod creatura nullo modo possit creare nichil presupponendo ex parte effectus quia planum est apud omnes et philosophos et theologos quod non potest creare nihil praesupponendo ex parte causae agentis quia sua actio inititur necessario actioni primi agentis eo ipso quod creatura est et agens secundum. Adducuntur ergo primo rationes in generali. Secundo in speciali . . .n* Then citing what are obviously the arguments of Scotus, plus some additional ones—probably of other Scotists—he concludes with this comment. Si istae rationes valent valeant. Non puto tamen quod demonstrent. Tamen dico quod creatura creare non potest. Ad hoc est auctoritas Augustini . . . Ad hoc est auctoritas Damasceni ... Ad hoc etiam est doctrina et sententia ecclesiae quia hanc conclusionem approbat.119 And he adds further: Dico quod non est demonstratum ad creationem necessario requiri infinitatem virtutis. Nee ex hoc probatur demonstrative quin creatura potest creare, licet probabiliter.120 On a number of other points, John de Bassolis differs with the position adopted by Scotus in the authentic writings and sides with the author of the Theoremata. For instance, in the De Primo, the Opus Oxoniense, the Reportata and the Quodlibetum, Scotus indicates his conviaion that God's infinity, simplicity, unity, intelligence and free will are demonstrable by reason. Theorems XIV and XVI, on the contrary, place them among the credibilia. Here again, John argues against the position of Scorns on the grounds that non est demonstratum an Deus aliquid intelligat extra se vel, si aliquid, non tamen nisi per ea quae sunt praesentis universi et quae possunt constituere unum ordinem vel unum Universum cum eis; non autem ad Universum cui possideret alter deus, nee Deus ipsius, tunc solutum esset argumentum. Et similiter de causalitate et potentia et volitione diceretur.121 The proofs of Scotus for the infinity of God, therefore, are without foundation, based as they are on the fact that God knows all intelligibles . Similarly the proofs for the unicity of God are invalid since they presuppose in addition the infinite power of God, the faa that God possesses free will, and so on. Of free will, John insists that si autem quod non est demonstratum Deum non velle de necessitate tunc non valet argumentum?2''2' 11» Op. cit., liber 2, d. 1, q. 2, lOra. 119Ibid., lOva. 120Ibid. 121Ibid., lib. 1, d. 2, q. 3, f. 52rb. 122Ibid., i. 52va. 394ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. If we insist that God possesses intellection, then we cannot demonstrate His simplicity, or if we assume His simplicity we cannot prove that God possesses intelleaion. Non est demonstratum aliquod ens cujus substantia sit unum intelligere.123 Of the reasons adduced by Scotus for the existence of an ens primum simpliciter infinitum actu intensive in perfectione et vigore, de Bassolis has this to say: Dico igitur quia licet demonstrari non possit, sicut dicam infra, quod Deus sit simpliciter infinitus, nee istae rationes adductae hoc demonstrant, licet sint multo probabiliores quam aliorum rationes probant quod sit finitus.124 Hence his conclusion: Videtur mihi dicendum quod licet Deus sit infinitus secundum scripturam et sanctos, quia magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis ejus non est finis, et sapientia ejus non est numerus, tamen non videtur mihil hoc demonstratum ex apparentibus demonstratione cogente intellectum ex evidentia rei sic quod necessarium sit intellectum tali demonstration! vel tali rationi propositae assentire.125 It is interesting to note that he uses the impersonal form in answering Scotus' arguments, creating the impression that others, like himself, were dissatisfied with their demonstrative charaaer. Ad primam diceretur quod non est demonstratum quia infinitum actu non repugnet enti, et per consequens cuilibet enti ... Ad secundum diceretur quod non est demonstratum quin infinitum sit modus intrinsecus vel passio omnis entis . . . Infinitas actualis intensive non est demonstratum . . . Non est demonstratum quin Deus sit in genere aliquo . . . Demonstrative non potest probari quod sit infinita [natura] . . . 126 Since Scotus' arguments for the unicity of God presuppose a demonstration of God's infinite perfeaion, John de Bassolis is consistent in denying the demonstrability of this perfeaion also. Here again he cites Scotus' reasons, adding the significant comment quorum aliquae reputantur demonstrationes.12,1 Then follows his personal 123Ibid., q. 2, f. 50ra. 124Ibid., í. 49ra. 125Ibid., f. 49va. !26 Ibid., i. 50rss. 127 Ibid., q. 3, f. 51ra; see also q. 2, f. 49va where John after citing Scotus' arguments for infinity adds: "Istae sunt rationes valde probabiles quantum ad aliquas quibus secundum aliquos ostenditur Deus vel primum ens actu existens in universo esse actu infinitum intensive in perfectione et vigore: quarum aliquas multi reputant demonstrationes ."—Scotus himself alludes to the different value of the various proofs for infinity. The argument based on the intellect of God he seems to have considered the strongest. In the De Primo he writes: "Infinitatem igitur tuam, si annuas ex dictis de intellectu tuo, primo conabor inferre; deinde alia quaedam adducam, an valeant vel non valeant ad concludendum propositum, inquirendo." (c. 4, concl. 9, p. 90). Confer also his proofs in the Ordinatio. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS395 verdia. Dico quod non videtur mihi demonstratum quod sit tantum unus Deus, sed videtur hoc habetur ex fide, sicut dicit Rabbi Moyses.12* And what is even more interesting, he attempts to argue that Scotus implicitly denied the absolute validity of these proofs from what he says in the Quodlibetum, quaestio quarta, regarding relatio and infinity. One wonders why John did not quote from the Tractatus de creditis where it is explicitly denied. In Conclusion We have, then, a curious parallel between the position of John de Bassolis and that of Theorems XIV-XVI. It is in sharp contrast with that expressed by Scotus himself while he was yet a Magister Regens in Paris. For the seventh question of his Quodlibetum clearly indicates his firm conviaion that a mind with no more supernatural aid than that which Aristotle possessed could demonstrate the unicity and infinity of God. His reference to his previous treatment of this problem in the Sentences manifestly proves he has not altered the position taken in the unfinished Ordinatio. We have no alternative, then, but to súpose that even at this late date he regarded his proofs of the triple primacy, the intellection, free will, unicity and infinity as valid demonstrations in the Aristotelian sense of the term. As such, they were not to be confused with such truths as could be established only on the basis of premisses given by revelation . And if the De Primo Principio represents an even later work, then we must perforce maintain that at the time of its composition he had full confidence in the validity of his distinaion between essentially and accidentally otdered causes, and consequently in his proofs for a being simpliciter primum. There is not the slightest evidence that he was at all aware of the distinaion in essentially ordered causes made by his successors, a distinaion that underlies the reasoning of the Theoremata. For Theorem XIV, we know, assumes a conception of essentially ordered causes that is wholly foreign to the mind of the author of the Oxoniense and the De Primo Principio, for it assumes the possibility of a creature creating independently of the coexisting "first" 128 ibid., q. 3, f. 5Ivb. 396ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. cause and declares we have no more reason for a status in an essential series than we have in an accidentally ordered one. No distinction is made by the author of the Tractatus de creditis between proofs for the omnipotence, immensity, etc. on the one hand and those of the unicity, intelleaion, free will, etc. on the other. John de Bassolis, however, is in essential agreement with the Theoremata. Scotus' proofs are, in his opinion, valde probabiles but not demonstrations. Neither the proofs for the triple primacy, nor those of the infinity and unicity have any absolute validity. Yet this disciple does not challenge Scotus' argumentation on any of the grounds suggested by Gilson. It is not because we must be content with quia and a posteriori demonstrations. Neither is it because metaphysics has an object transcending its natural powers. Nor do Scotus' difficulties in determining the proper objea of the intellea by reason alone enter into the discussion. It is Scotus' notion of the interrelation of essentially and accidentally ordered causes. When Scotus wrote, apparently the greatest challenge to a demonstrative proof of God was the requirement of premisses that were necessary as well as evident. With painstaking care he developed his demonstration to meet this demand. Yet, significantly, this whole aspect is ignored by John de Bassolis. The only objections alluded to center round the problem of ordered causes. In this early disciple, the beginnings of that opposition movement which culminated in Ockham is already in evidence. For it was this very point which caused the Venerable Inceptor to shift the argument for God's existence from the thorny field of causality to the Christian concept of conservation. In so doing he emphasized the very point which Scorns sought to establish by his distinaion of essentially and accidentally ordered causes, namely, that the first cause must be coexistent with the whole series of secondary efficient causes, be they essentially or accidentally ordered among themselves. Nulla enim difformitas perpetuatur, nisi in virtute alicujus permanentis , quod nihil est successionis?29 What conclusions can we draw from all this? Is John de Bassolis himself a likely candidate for the co-authorship of the Theore129 De Primo Principio, c. 3, concl. 2, p. 43. THE "THEOLOGISM" OF DUNS SCOTUS397 mata or, perhaps, for the sole authorship of the Tractatus de creditis at least?130 At the present writing, we are not inclined to think so. There appears to be a very marked general doctrinal agreement, it is true. On the other hand, however, certain differences appear. For instance, though de Bassolis has the twofold distinction of esessentially ordered causes, it does not seem to be completely identical with that which underlies the reasoning in Theorem XV. Further, it is not clear whether John would maintain that reason cannot exclude the possibility of a aeature creating if the first cause ceased to exist. His criticism seems pointed specifically to the special reasons Scotus brings against Avicenna. For in introducing the arguments against the creation hypothesis, he says: Qua planum est apud omnes et philosophos et theologos quod non potest creatura creare nihil praesupponendo ex parte causae agentis quia sua actio inititur necessario actioni primi agentis eo ipso quod creatura est et agens secundum.13! However, this statement seems to be simply a statement of Scotus' stand rather than his own, particulary if we consider what he says elsewhere.132 The importance of John de Bassolis, however, would seem to lie rather in this. He indicates the existence of a divergent strain of thought among the early Scotists. Unlike Peter of Aquila, who accepted unquestioningly the validity of Scotus' demonstrations for the unicity of God, John falls back to the position of William of Ware and Moses Maimonides. From de Bassolis we learn the voice of opposition is already being raised and the position of the Tractatus de creditis was adopted by at least some of the earliest followers of the Subtle Doaor. But what is even more important from the standpoint of this study, the source of the difficulty is not to be found along the lines suggested by either Baudry or Gilson. And the consequent theologism Gilson reads into the authentic Scotistic proofs for the existence of God seems to be without foundation. If any reconciliation between the Theoremata and the definitely authentic works is to be achieved, it would seem to be along the fol13O Boehner has suggested de Bassolis as a possible author of the Theoremata in the Tractatus de Praedertinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of Wm. Ockham. St. Bonaventure, N. Y., Franciscan Institute, 1945, p. 84?. 131Op. cit., lib. 2, f. lOra. 132Confer note 115. 398ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M. lowing lines. Perhaps the de creditis represents a later addition by one of the more aitically or sceptically minded Scotists. It may even have been that the work was originally planned by Scotus but, being left unfinished, was "amended" according to the mind of the collaborator or saibe. This would explain why so many points contained in the de creditis are definitely placed by Scotus himself among the metaphisica dicta ratione naturali in his De Primo Principio. Mayhap the view oí John represents an opinion which was already adopted by some of Scotus' disciples and was a topic of discussion by the master in his last years. Perhaps too, the whole treatise may be simply an example of the ars dialéctica as the petitiones in Theorem XV would imply. Be that as it may, we should not distort or pervert the clear statement Scotus gives in his authentic works of his position in regard to the proofs for the existence of God. No other medieval philosopher , to our knowledge, has taken such pains and devoted such care to establishing a proof for the existence of God that would meet the striaest requirements of Aristotelian demonstration. If he differs with Averroes and sides with Avicenna, it is because the latter leaves room for a rational metaphysics to demonstrate the existence of God. If he challenges the theory of the analogy of being, bred as it was in an Augustinian illuminationism, it is again because it places an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any Aristotelian demonstration of God. As philosophers we are at perfect libetty to disagree with Scotus on any of these points. But as historians we should not try to read theologism with its incipient scepticism into the thought of one who made such an effort to exclude this very position from his natural theology. What Gilson once said of Scotus' reputed ontologism, might well be applied here to theologism. When we consider how often he has been accused of this, we might come to despair of any effort to be clear, since we see him saddled with that very theory . . . which most of all he detests and which his own metaphysics shows to be radically false.133 Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, NY. 133 Gilson, Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, New York, Scribners' Sons, 1936, p. 257. ...