A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 (review)

A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail explores the Imjin War, a conflict— more commonly known in the West as the Hideyoshi Invasions of Korea—that embroiled Northeast Asia at the end of the sixteenth century. After sketching out motivating factors for the invasions as well as regional political structures and dynamics in the years leading up to the fighting,¹ the book examines major stages of the war in chronological order: the first Japanese offensive (1592), Ming China’s entry into the war and the Japanese retreat to the southeast coast of the Korean peninsula (1593), the temporary lull in fighting and peace talks (1593–96), and the second Japanese offensive (1597–98) and its consequences. The author, Kenneth Swope, provides a well-organized narrative of the war and addresses historiographical issues in a straightforward manner that should engage scholars and general readers alike. Thus, despite several criticisms outlined below, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail deserves to be recognized as one of the best English-language works on what Swope boldly calls “the First Great East Asian War.”

The book challenges many conventional interpretations of the war and its context. In contrast to most existing studies, which posit that Ming China was in gradual decline during the reign of the “impotent” Wanli Emperor and that the war accelerated this decline, Swope contends that the Emperor was in fact an effective administrator and Ming China remained strong enough during his reign to maintain Ming hegemony in East Asia. The author moreover presents a provocative central theme: the war should be called and understood as the First Great East Asian War because “the war was the single largest conflict in the world during the sixteenth century” (p. 3), and “hostilities were not confined to Korea, China, and Japan” but it “was a world war encompassing all of East Asia” (pp. 5–6). Diverging from many earlier studies on the war that usually highlight “victory” over the enemy, from the nationalistic standpoint of one country or another, he maintains that the war must be approached and viewed within a regional, transnational perspective. This seems like a sensible and edifying shift.²

Unfortunately, the book also contains many small but not insignificant shortcomings that Korea experts in particular will readily notice. First, the Romanization of Korean personal and place-names is not only inconsistent, but Chinese-style pronunciations are often given precedence over Korean ones. The name of the Korean Chosŏn Dynasty, to cite one notable example, is rendered as “Chaoxian” on maps provided on pages 14, 28, and 129. This nomenclature and the ambiguous boundary lines on the maps might mislead some readers into thinking that Korea was a province of Ming China in the sixteenth century.³ Second, the selection of sources raises some questions and doubts. Swope relies heavily on Chaejo pŏnbang chi (Record of a Rebuilt Tributary State) written by Sin Kyŏng (1613–53), whose maternal grandfather was King Sŏnjo and who praised Ming China more than any other contemporary Korean writer. This in itself may not be objectionable, but careful readers may wonder why there is no mention of the most critical Korean primary sources concerning the war: the volumes about Sŏnjo’s reign in the Chosŏn wangjo sillok (Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty). Another example of questionable sourcing is the author’s tendency to refer to Chinese or Korean sources when discussing the Japanese side of affairs, such as at the Battle of Chinju (pp. 175–76). These kinds of shortcomings suggest that the book falls short of delivering a truly regional and transnational history.⁴

In spite of these shortcomings, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail surpasses prior English-language works on...