Foreign Policy by Congress (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 175 makers at different stages of the decisionmaking process are briefly mentioned along with the familiar warning to be on guard against the general tendency of policymakers to misuse the lessons of history. As the author suggests, there is a need to understand what kinds oftheories are relevant to the policymaker and how such theories can be used by the policymaker. Alexander George has written a useful and quite necessary book that widens the perspective with which we must view the overall decisionmaking process. His material augments and expands the bureaucratic and organizational approaches suggested by authors such as Graham Allison and Morton Halperin. By focusing carefully on the human behavioral aspects ofthe decisionmaking process, George avoids the overly mechanistic, scientific, and quantitative approaches so often found in studies ofthe policymaking system. Although the work breaks little new ground and offers no radically new analysis, it does bring a wide range of cross-disciplinary study data together in a meaningful context. As such, it offers a starting point and a guide for future efforts to integrate information gathered from seemingly unrelated fields of inquiry into a better understanding ofhow foreign policy decisions are formulated and how we can improve that process. David T. Fuhrmann Foreign Policy by Congress. By Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, 357 pp. Even as we were digesting the concept ofan "imperial presidency," the fallout from the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal was shattering the public's confidence in the presidency. During this period of executive weakness, a revolt by the rank and file in Congress undermined the leadership system within the legislative branch. The result was a spate ofnew congressional controls over the foreign policy prerogatives of the president which profoundly altered the balance between the executive and legislative branches. Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband chronicle the events which produced new legislation on war powers, the budget, treaties, trade, intelligence, and arms sales. The authors also outline the measures Congress took to institutionalize its "revolution," including the rapid expansion of committee staffs as well as the information services available to it. Given the recency of these dramatic developments, this book is a valuable contribution to the study of legislative-executive relations. Franck and Weisband raise several interesting questions about the democratization of foreign policy. Although legitimacy is provided through "advise and consent" procedures, is there not a loss offlexibility 176 SAIS REVIEW and subtlety in an increasingly delicate and complex world system? The concept of "delivery," as the authors put it, is essential. Congress must organize itself better to provide for "informed, timely decisions"; otherwise, paralysis will set in and result in "non-determination" rather than the desired codetermination. Another issue raised is that of liaison activities between the executive and legislative branches. The case review of the Panama Canal Treaties (1978) is helpful in explaining the difficulties inherent in the new balance of power. Despite this valuable learning experience (and the optimism ofthe authors), the Carter administration failed to obtain ratification ofSALT II. Even though new executive-legislative relationships can be defined, codetermination can easily collapse in the face of unforeseen circumstances. The flareups over the Soviet brigade in Cuba, followed by events in Iran and Afghanistan during the early stages of an election campaign, buried the administration's best efforts and forced Carter to withdraw the treaty from consideration. Does the current status ofexecutive-legislative relations constitute a revolution or simply a pendulum swing in favor of Congress? The authors clearly believe the former. However, the outcome of the recent elections casts some doubt on this conclusion. A Reagan administration with a conservative Republican majority in the Senate and an intimidated and disorganized Democratic House could conceivably reverse the trend of the last ten years. This is not to say that the authors' case is weak or poorly presented. Rather, it suggests that the momentum ofthe post-Vietnam/Watergate power-shift is over. Despite the legislative or institutional changes, only the will to power on the part ofthe Congress will determine whether the "revolution" continues, or the pendulum swings back toward the White House. Noah R. Levy ...