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  • The Cyprus File: Washington, D.C.; A Diary of the Cyprus Crisis in the Summer of 1974
  • Constantine P. Danopoulos (bio)
James G. Pyrros : The Cyprus File: Washington, D.C.; A Diary of the Cyprus Crisis in the Summer of 1974. New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 2010. 316 pages. ISBN 0-918-61895-9. $30.00.

Bookshelves overflow with memoires, diaries, and "kiss and tell" books of varying quality and value. Although some of these books provide interesting and invaluable insight into important events and key personalities, the overwhelming majority of them tend to be shallow and self-serving, intended for publicity or financial gain. Occasionally, however, one runs across a volume authored by a well-placed, selfless, and thoughtful insider who provides invaluable and tantalizing insights into surrounding developments that have affected the lives of millions. James G. Pyrros's The Cyprus File is one of these rare works.

The book deals with the dramatic developments surrounding the Cyprus crisis of 6 July to 27 August 1974. A talented and meticulous note taker, Pyrros sees "the diary form as a natural means to develop a narrative and tell a story," and credits his immigrant mother as well as known diarists like William Shirer and James Boswell "for pointing the way." What makes his contribution unique is the fact that he was intimately connected with both sides of the Atlantic during the crisis. As top assistant to Congressman Lucien N. Nedzi and as a Greek American versed in Greek affairs who was an active participant in the struggle against the Greek junta, Pyrros was a skilled insider with an unparalleled vantage point. As a result, he has produced a first-hand narrative that records in revealing detail and clarity a very sad moment in the long history of Hellenism.

In this relatively short but momentous period, a series of interconnected developments took place that affected the lives of millions of southern Europeans and others. It began with the Greek military junta's overthrow of the legitimate president of a sovereign [End Page 84] country, the Republic of Cyprus. It was followed by Turkey's reaction. Invoking the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey invaded the island republic ostensibly to restore the status quo ante. The Turkish invasion helped sweep away the weak but brutal Greek dictatorship and paved the road for the return of civilian democratic rule in Greece. Sensing the weakness of the Greek side and the tolerance, if not outright encouragement, of the United States, Turkey unleashed a second offensive, which led to the occupation and the de facto partition of the island, which remains in effect to this day.

Pyrros's narrative can be divided into three phases. The first deals with the warning signs of a coup that the Greek junta was preparing against President Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus, the activities surrounding the coup, and the Turkish invasion of the island that followed. In clear and methodical fashion, the author points to the numerous and unmistakable signs that the despotic and directionless praetorian Athens regime, dominated by strongman Dimitrios Ioannidis, was preparing to move against the archbishop. Pyrros also notes the strenuous efforts of the small but dedicated group of antijunta activists in Washington—which included, among others, professor Nikolaos Stavrou (now editor of Mediterranean Quarterly), journalist Elias Demetracopoulos, and Pyrros himself—to alert authorities on both sides of the Atlantic to the brewing trouble. Yet State Department officials, the United Nations, key members of the Cypriot embassy, and the Voice of America—victims of the paralysis gripping Washington by the Watergate crisis—stayed idle. As such, they misread or deliberately ignored the warning signs and did nothing to prevent the coup, or totally failed to see the coming storm and chose to go on vacation instead. This state of numbness, confusion, neglect, or inaction was evident during the coup itself as well as during its immediate aftermath. It took several days before it could be ascertained whether the overthrown Cypriot leader had survived the putsch against his life but took no time at all for Henry Kissinger to demote Makarios from "president" to "beatitude." The policy and diplomatic vacuum was evident in the near...

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