Soviet Policy toward the United States: A Fork in the Road?

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES: A FORK IN THE ROAD? Bruce Parrott oday the makers of Soviet policy toward the United States face problems they scarcely dreamed about during the 1970s. During the 1970s the Soviet regime followed a two-track policy that combined elements of cooperation and competition with the United States, and the policy served Soviet interests reasonably well. In conjunction with America's embroilment in Vietnam, the rapid accumulation of Soviet military might brought the Soviet Union to a position of strategic parity with the United States and won American recognition of the Soviet Union's equal standing as a superpower. Ongoing Soviet-American arms negotiations reduced the likelihood that the Soviet strategic buildup would be undercut by a new American military buildup and allowed Soviet policymakers to slow the growth of Soviet military spending substantially in the second half of the 1970s.1 In Europe, détente brought essential American backing for a postwar diplomatic settlement Soviet decision makers had long sought. On the Soviet Union's eastern flank, it promised to prevent the United States from moving into an anti-Soviet alliance with the People's Republic of China. Détente also generated valuable infusions of Western economic inputs and strengthened the material stake of Western "reasonable circles" in maintaining conciliatory 1. "Soviet Defense Trends." Staff study prepared for theJoint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, September 1983. Bruce Parrott is associate professor and director of Soviet studies at SAIS and author, most recently, of Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union. Professor Parrott wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Raymond Garthoff and ProfessorJonathan Haslam for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. 107 108 SAIS REVIEW policies toward the Soviet Union. Finally, the new policy improved the outlook for low-risk successes in the Third World. After a brief period of restraint from 1972 through 1974—restraint exemplified by a moderation of Soviet policy in the Mideast and an interruption of arms shipments that delayed North Vietnam's final offensive against South Vietnam—the Soviet Union adopted a more assertive policy that brought significant gains in Africa and Southeast Asia.2 Since the late 1970s, however, the Soviet Union's two-track policy has collided with serious new obstacles. Elected on a platform calling for restoration of American military superiority over the Soviet Union, President Reagan has sharply accelerated the major defense buildup begun in the second half of the Carter presidency. Reagan administration spokesmen have proclaimed that past strategic arms control agreements harmed U.S. security, and they have been willing to consider new agreements only on the condition that such understandings codify a substantial change of the strategic balance in America's favor. Since the late 1970s U.S. policymakers have moved closer to China and sought to build it up as a potential military counterweight against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, given the failure of negotiations to reduce the number of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear rockets, the nato allies have begun to deploy new American nuclear missiles in Europe. In addition, Soviet economic relations with the West have been strained by Western embargoes and other economic measures precipitated by Soviet policies toward Afghanistan and Poland. The Kremlin oligarchs face the challenge of a resurgent America at a time when they must cope with vexing new internal problems. The era of remarkably stable political leadership under Brezhnev has given way to a period of rapid turnover among the elite and succession struggles. The economy, despite a slight upturn in 1983, is experiencing a longterm loss of momentum that poses painful choices among the goals of increased domestic consumption, the expansion of military power, and investment in future economic growth. A malaise has spread through Soviet society and has made some party leaders fearful that policies which neglect the consumer could spark domestic upheavals like those in Poland. Such domestic difficulties might conceivably compel the Soviet Union to adopt a more accommodating line toward the United States Yet in a period of heightened superpower tensions, conciliatory diplomatic gestures and reduced defense budgets also strike many Soviet leaders as 2. George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967...