The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Control Summitry—A Skeptic's Account (review)

248 SAISREVIEW Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament. By Valerie Adams. Bloomington , Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990. 276 pp. $29.95/cloth. Reviewed by Ricky Aberle, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. The Soviet Union and the United States are dramatically revising their military postures in Europe and around the world in a climate of reduced threat. It was within this climate that the treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces was negotiated, with its sweeping elimination of an entire category of weapons and its highly intrusive verification regime. Hopefully, this climate will breathe new life into negotiations on chemical weapons, which in the past have been frustrated by verification concerns. For those studying chemical weapons, Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament is an excellent text. Valerie Adams has produced one of the most comprehensive books available on the subject. The extensive up-to-date bibliography provides a useful reference guide for further research. Adams begins by defining chemical warfare and clearly explaining the functions and classifications ofvarious chemical agents. Her conversational style allows her to flesh out drier topics while holding the reader's interest. The approach is casual and informative, and provides data in an organized, comprehensible fashion. Adams divides her book into consumable sections covering the history of chemical weapon use from Ypres to Iraq, superpower perspectives, and a chronology of arms control negotiations. On controversial issues such as Agent Orange and yellow rain, Adams delivers the facts, allegations and statements from all parties involved and lets the reader decide. Her personal accounts help liven the narrative. She presents the long history ofchemical arms negotiations chronologically, highlighting the salient issues and decisions. This approach gives readers a basic grasp ofthe negotiations process without engulfing them in a quagmire of detail. Adams avoids moral issues till the end of the work, where she addresses whether chemical weapons should be banned, the political implications of weapons production, and the threat of chemical proliferation. The balanced, factual treatment gives the work its unbiased quality, and readers arrive at this final chapter well-versed enough in the history and effects of chemical weapons to judge these issues for themselves. The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Control Summitry—A Skeptic's Account. By Kenneth L. Adelman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. 366 pp. $19.95/cloth. Reviewed by Bill Mikhail, Center for Strategic and International Studies. U.S.-Soviet summits, says Kenneth Adelman, lead to better relations "in sentimental ways, by warming the atmosphere." In The Great Universal BOOK REVIEWS 249 Embrace, the former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reimposes his position as a leading summit skeptic. Adelman provides strong opinions on many important issues which affect superpower relations and the dynamics of arms control. The book includes discussion of the U.S.-U.S.S.R summits at Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington, as well as debates over SDI, the INF treaty, and SALT II. Adelman is critical of the fact that arms control has become the focal point of Soviet-American summits. The ideal agenda for the two superpowers' relations, according to Adelman, must also encompass regional issues, bilateral relations, and human rights. He argues that summits do not deter Soviet aggression; rather, the Soviets become even more aggressive after these summits. The Kennedy -Khrushchev summit did not stop the Soviets from deploying their missiles in Cuba in the Fall of 1962, nor did the Johnson-Kosygin summit prevent the Soviets from invading Czechoslovakia in 1968. Adelman writes of the Reagan-Schultz syndrome in negotiations with the Soviets during the summits and the Foreign Ministers' talks, charging that "[w]hile the President prided himself on his abilities as a negotiator, the Secretary prided himself on his prowess as an arbitrator." According to Adelman, "traditional arms control has reached a dead end." Reduction in only first-strike nuclear weapons is difficult to achieve, and fifty percent cut in strategic arms will only eliminate older weapons while leaving the new ones. To Adelman, arms control neglects strategic crisis management. Fewer nuclear weapons, the goal of the START negotiations, may even heighten the prospects of a nuclear exchange. Fewer numbers can make nuclear weapons more usable in a "use 'em or lose them situation." Moreover, any strategic accord will...