Problems of Adjustment: The Gorbachev Effect in Eastern Europe

PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT: THE GORBACHEV EFFECT IN EASTERN EUROPE Otto Pick Tl ie myth of a monolithic Soviet empire in Eastern Europe exploded long before Gorbachev launched his program of reforms. Even in the years immediately after World War II Stalin's concept of a uniformly obedient ring of satellite states on the western periphery of the USSR did not last long. Although the establishment of communist control in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 seemed to complete the imposition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the defection of Yugoslavia shattered the monolith within weeks. Tito's success in maintaining his country 's independence exercised a profound influence on the communist leaders of the other East European countries. This effect was reinforced by Khrushchev's clumsy attempts to heal the breach between the two countries , affirmed in the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, which, in effect, proclaimed the right of each communist regime to seek socialist salvation in its own way. The East European purges, which had disfigured the closing years of Stalin's rule, had been in vain. After 1956 the USSR was reduced to propping up the ailing economies of its East European allies and protecting its own security interests. Perceptions of threats to Soviet security and stability, rather than any desire to impose the slavish ideological conformity that Stalin had sought, prompted the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and, more recently, the support of Jaruzelski's attempt to reimpose effective control in Poland. Within the parameters of the Soviet Union's security interests, the East European Otto Pick is emeritus professor of international relations at the University of Surrey in England and visiting professor at TheJohns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center in Italy. He also teaches in the Boston University overseas program and at Munich University. 57 58 SAIS REVIEW regimes were able to seek circumscribed degrees of autonomy in the belief that this might enhance their legitimacy within their countries. The relative weakness of the Soviet leadership during Brezhnev's last years and during the short tenures of the ailing Andropov and Chernenko only increased and enhanced East European flexibility and freedom to maneuver. Such was the situation that Mikhail Gorbachev inherited. Thus far, his approach has been cautious and deliberate. He certainly has no desire to undermine the precarious stability of the region by forcing the pace of reform. However, because it would be almost impossible for a reformed Soviet system to coexist constructively with neoStalinist regimes, such as that in power in Romania, Gorbachev seems determined to place Soviet-East European economic relations on an entirely new footing. His policy of restructuring the Soviet economy will impose a new order of priorities. For example, the USSR will not continue to support the East European economies by purchasing outdated equipment, and Gorbachev has made it quite clear that he expects partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)1 to improve the technical quality of the goods they send to the USSR. Because ofEastern Europe's almost total dependence on Soviet energy supplies, the USSR has a powerful instrument of persuasion at its disposal. About 60 percent of East European exports go either to the USSR or to other CMEA countries, and about 61 percent of their imports come from the same area.2 As Gorbachev told his Romanian hosts at a banquet during his visit to Bucharest in May: "It is not just a matter of exchanging goods. Trade must more and more be judged on whether it leads to production of higher quality."3 However, the USSR faces some difficulties in paying for East European goods, as the decline in world energy prices may reduce Soviet earnings from energy exports to Eastern Europe by 18 percent in 1986-90 in comparison with 1981-85.4 Gorbachev has tried hard to pressure the other CMEA countries to raise the technological standards of their exports to the USSR. At the 1985 CMEA session he urged his partners to implement CMEA's Comprehensive Program ofScientific and,Technological Progress up to the Year 1.The CMEA members are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. 2.In 1986 (totals...