Response to Corrine L. Patton

Elizabeth Fox-Genovese Response to Corrine L. Patton The determination t? rescue feminism for Catholics or, more portentously, Catholicism for feminists has produced a veritable smokescreen of ambiguity, which, at the extreme, comes dangerously close to outright deception. In responding to my essay on Catholicism and feminism, Corinne L. Patton adopts the familiar feminist strategy of stretching words to produce a desired result— in this instance, to prove the compatibility of Catholicism (properly understood) with feminism (again, properly understood).To this end, she queries my ascription ofmeaning to the words Catholicism and feminism. Professor Patton begins with feminism, but the core of her argument focuses upon Catholicism, which she demonstrably holds the more accountable for the apparent incompatibility between the two. Agreeing with me that everything turns upon the meaning one attributes to each ofdie terms, she explores the complexity ofmeaning with respect to both.This strategy permits her to avoid a candid description ofwhat she thinks Catholic feminism should represent, although readers are not likely to mistake her inclinations. Here, I shall touch briefly upon her discussion offeminism before turning to her more troubling arguments about Catholicism. LOGOS 2:4 FALL 1999 4° LOGOS Feminism, Patton argues, is always defined by some external principle, for "we cannot make sense ofthe term 'equality' without reference to something beyond feminism which itselfdefines equality ." (For present purposes, we may bypass the grammatical ambiguity of her sentence, which seems to present feminism as that which defines equality, although it is hard not to suspect that the ambiguity precisely captures her meaning.)Thus different strands of feminism invoke standards that exceed or modify the bald claim of equality between women and men. Indeed, they do. In practice, however, the infinite range ofmodifiers does not significantly dilute the basic demand for equality between women and men. At most, the modifiers propose different understandings of equality and different strategies for achieving it. More important for our contemporary situation, the various modified feminisms have not mounted a sustained challenge to mainstream, upscale political feminism as represented by NOW, die National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL), the Ms. Foundation for Women, the AAUW, Planned Parenthood Federation ofAmerica, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and other politically active groups. Consequently, for practical purposes, these groups have successfully staked a claim to define the public meaning offeminism. It is easy for any ofus to insist that our particular version offeminism differs in one or more respects from the "official"version, but so long as we refrain from a public struggle to transform that version—and, especially, its political tactics—we abdicate our right to anything more than private dissent. Here, the analogy with the Reformation springs to mind: By bringing the claims of private conscience into the public arena, Luther established a new meaning of the word Christian.To his credit, however, he did so in open struggle, accepting the consequences when the split proved irreversible. For better or worse, the public meaning of feminism stands. Feminism means whatever the leading political feminists say it means, and our laws and policies increasingly embody that meaning. response to corrine L. PATTON On one point, however, Patton and I concur: Public feminism is secular to its core. Its proponents may differ over tactics with respect to specific issues such as pornography, acquaintance rape, and affirmative action, but they agree on the fundamental goal ofpromoting an equality between women and men that defines and measures equality by secular criteria. They differ primarily over whether equality concerns opportunity or results: Should women be free to compete equally with men, or should die state guarantee women the same results as men? Patton, like many others, implicitly imports these secular concerns into her discussion of women's relation to Catholicism. Here, she bitterly reproaches me for espousing an "essentialist" view of woman's nature and, "following the lead of the current pope [sic]," for defining "the true nature of women from the perspective of reproductive issues." It is hard to miss the jibe in her reference to John Paul II as the "current pope," but, in case some readers do, please note that the adjective "current" signals her conviction that papal positions differ in...