Reply to Mierzejewski and Greenfeld

28Historically Speaking · January 2004 certain that the attack on Pearl Harbor, with its consequences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was a directresultofthat globalizing episode. So these are the facts. The history ofthe modern economy offers no evidence ofthe existence of a secular trend of globalization: whateverglobalizingtookplace inthe last 500 years tookplace because ofhuman decisions, reflecting particularistic (even when "collectivist ") interests ofspecific actors which were opposed to the particularistic interests ofother actors. Nor does history support the related idea thatthe world is composed ofsome kind of natural economic center and periphery, betweenwhich exists an equallynatural, permanent , and self-evident division of labor: human reality being a constructed reality, human labor (whether within a family or the world) is usually divided bythose who do the construction. The facts also do not warrant the conclusionthatthe principles offree trade, cosmopolitanism, economic liberalism, and open markets are progressive (in the sense of being conducive to economic growth and development), while protectionism, nationalism , stateregulation, and similar expressions of"collectivism" are reactionary(in the sense ofarresting such development and growth). The opposite conclusionis much closerto the truth: themodern—namely, constandygrowing —economy emerged in the firstplace as a resultofnationalism, and specificallythanks to the profoundly collectivistic national sentiment of the economic actors involved. The Industrial Revolution, which began in England two centuries after the birth ofthe modern economyand should, therefore, be considered as only its later stage in every great economybut one—the United States—owed its start, ifnot the entire course, to the paternal cares ofthe state and its mercantilistpolicies . Contrary to contemporary American opinion, the United States was not a leader in industrialization and by no means a particularlyfast developer; neitherwas it for most of its history a champion offree trade and economic liberalism; given the "agriculturalist" persuasion ofour foundingfathers, on the one hand, and the identification ofregular mercantilism as "the American System" from 1820s to 1940s, on the other, itmight be with greater justice called a leader in the "Industrial Counterrevolution." Policies of free trade and economic liberalism have on occasion served the interests ofthe strongest competitor in any given set ofeconomic circumstances (i. e., when, no matter what the spin, theseideaswere deployed pragmatically). But the only historical example of a principled commitment to these central expressions of economic rationality, the only case ofconsistendyrational economic action, untainted by collectivist considerations—in other words, the example ofthe Dutch Republic—proves that such commitment is antithetical to sustained economic growth. Liah Greenfeld is University Professorand professorofpoliticalsaence andsociology at Boston University. She is the author o/The Spirit ofCapitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth (Harvard University Press, 2001), which in 2002 was awarded the Historical Societys DonaldKagan Best Book in European History Prize. Reply to Mierzejewski and Greenfeld Brink Lindsey In "The Origins and Progress of the Industrial Counterrevolution" I aimed to shed light on the decline and collapse of the global economythatarose in the late 19th century. Specifically, I argued thatwidespread beliefin the virtues of centralized economic decision-making—inspired, in part, by the example of the giant new industrial enterprises ofNorthAmerica and Europe—played a crucial role in propelling this train ofevents. I called this intellectual and political backlash against market competition the "Industrial Counterrevolution." The concept of the Industrial Counterrevolution is a big, sweeping generalization. It is therefore susceptible to the charge that it oversimplifies and omits. To which charge I can onlyrespond: ofcourse it does. All history consists ofleaving things out—oftellingsome stories but not others, and spying some patterns but not others. I would never presume that the thesis I have advanced is the story of the period in question. At best it is a valid story: one that is correct, as far as it goes, and that enriches our understanding ofa particular slice ofthe past. Neither ofthe two commenters is particularlyfond ofmythesis. With all due respect, I do notbelieve thateitherhas strucka telling blow against it. Let me start with Alfred Mierzejewski. After making some initial, complimentary observations, he contends that the main thrust ofmy argument is a "misrepresentation of the origins of centralized government ." Focusing on the story ofGerman collectivism , he makes the point that "centralizing tendencies grew out ofnon-economic sources that existed long before the Industrial Revolution began." On that pointMierzejewski is surely...