Review of Triumph Forsaken

30 Historically Speaking November/December 2007 ployed to protect American airbases, not to engage the communist forces. Even at this late date, LBJ and his advisers did not anticipate a major war. They were unaware that North Vietnam had sent entire regiments into the South. When this became apparent , LBJ was under no illusions that the United States could win a quick military victory, but he believed that only the deployment of U.S. troops in major combat operations could save the South. LBJ's fateful decision to embark on a major military intervention in Vietnam had litde to do with domestic political concerns. Moyar rejects the notion that LBJ worried he would appear soft on communism ; rather, Johnson believed in the much maligned domino theory. If Vietnam fell to the communists , other Asian countries would follow suit. America's credibility and prestige demanded forceful action. Moyar argues that, contrary to the accepted historical wisdom, the domino theory was valid: "If the United States pulled out of Vietnam, Asia's leaders generally believed, the Americans would lose their credibility in Asia and most of Asia would have to bow before China or face destruction, with enormous global consequences." True, Vietnam itself was not vital to American interests, but the fate of Vietnam did affect nations like Indonesia that were. Moyar asserts that had the United States abandoned Vietnam in 1 965, the Indonesian military would not have ousted Sukarno and eradicated the nation's Communist Party. Politics limitedJohnson's thinking about how to prosecute the war. He would not call up the reserves or put the nation on a war footing. Moyar also faults the Johnson administration for not invading North Vietnam after the fall of Diem as the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised. He does not find convincing the conventional view that military action against the North would have invited Chinese intervention. The Chinese, Moyar argues, had no desire to repeat the heavy losses they suffered in the Korean War. LBJ might have taken the strategic initiative against North Vietnam in 1964 and early 1965. Instead, his cautious approach surrendered the initiative to the communists. No longer worried that the United States would attack the North, the Chinese deployed troops to North Vietnam, freeing a significant percentage of the North Vietnamese army for operations in the South. Similarly, Moyar criticizes LBJ for not sending troops into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, something the Joint Chiefs also recommended and something mat did not risk confrontation with China. Contrary to the conventional interpretation of the war, Moyar concludes that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States in die period under consideration. The United States had no choice but to intervene in 1965. It was "not an act of strategic buffoonery, nor was it a sinister, warmongering plot that should forever stand as a terrible blemish on America's soul. Neither was it an act of hubris in which the United States pursued objectives far beyond its means." But Moyar does find serious fault with American policy regarding Vietnam. In his view, the biggest mistake the U.S. made was to incite the November 1963 coup against Diem. The South Vietnamese leader had made significant gains against the communists, but these were lost in the chaos and instability that followed his overthrow. Further, the Johnson administration ruled out military actions that had a good chance of success. Instead, LBJ opted to fight a defensive war of attrition within South Vietnam's borders. Needless to say, Moyar's Triumph Forsaken is a sweeping critique of the conventional wisdom about die Vietnam War. Predictably, it is generating substantial discussion—some of it very animated— within military and diplomatic history circles. We asked a group of scholars and public intellectuals to comment on Triumph Forsaken. Moyar's rejoinder follows . -Donald A. Yerxa, Editor Review of Triumph Forsaken Qiang Zhai Mark Moyar's book provides a detailed treatment of the American involvement in Vietnam from the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 to President Lyndon Johnson's escalation of U.S. intervention in 1965. Unlike most other general accounts of the Vietnam conflict that tend to focus only...