Lincoln as Military Strategist

LINCOLN AS MILITARY STRATEGIST Herman Hattaway Archer Jones The thesis of this paper is that Abraham Lincoln was a conventional mid-nineteenth-century military strategist who fully shared the ideas of Henry W. Halleck, George B. McClellan, and his other West Pointtrained generals. These generals, like von Moltke in Prussia, analyzed operations in terms of lines of operations, believed in the superiority of the defensive over the offensive, and saw in turning movements the only way to overcomethe power ofthe rifle-strengthened defensive. Lincoln derived his ideas primarily from his generals and from military realities as exhibited in the course of the war. It is not material to the thesis whether ornotthe generals derivedtheir ideas fromJomini andwhether or not Jomini was an exponent of Napoleonic or eighteenth-century Austrian strategy. It is significant that Lincoln's ideas were realistic and workable. The president was early indoctrinated by McClellan with the concept ofthe power ofthe defensewhen, inJanuary, 1862, theGeneral-in-Chief explained that the "history of every former war" had "conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occupying strong positions." McClellan had found at the beginning of the war that "but few civilians in our country, and indeed not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation ofthat fact." If "veteran troops frequently falter and are repulsed with loss," then "new levies . . . cannot be expected to advancewithout cover" against the "murderous fire" of intrenched defenders. He would solve this problem by turning the enemy, for "the effect of this movement" to the enemy's rear "will be to reverse the advantages of position. They will have to seek us in our own works, as we sought them at Manassas." The strength of the defense meant that offensive battles against an enemy with his back to his communications implied a victory which "produces no final results, & may require years ofwarfare & expenditure to follow up. ' 1 McClellan to Stanton, Feb. 3, 1862, The War of the Rebellion: A Compihtion of the OfficialRecords of the Union andConfederateArmies (Washington, 1880-1901), V, 42-45 Civil War History, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 Copyright ß 1980 by The Kent StateUniversityPress«»9-8078/80/2604-0001 $00.50/0 294civil war history With the aid of McClellan and other generals, Lincoln early became fully at home with his generals' military conceptions. To the question as to why "the North with her great armies" so often faced the South in battle "with inferiority of numbers," the President explained "that the enemy hold the interior, and we the exterior lines." Along with understanding lines of operations he fully grasped the logistics of field armies and the significance of intrenchments and had learned to attach great importance to the turning movement or to any chance "to get in the enemies' rear" or to "intercept the enemies' retreat."2 The military sophistication which the President had acquired in less than a year and a half extended to a clear understanding of the significance of battles and appreciation of the limited degree to which the Confederates had defeated McClellan at the Seven Days Battles. Grasping that "the moral effect was the worst" aspect of those battles, he thought it probable that, "in men and material, the enemy suffered more than we in that series of conflicts; while it is certain that he is less able to bear it." Lincoln wrote that he saw the psychological "importance to us, for its bearing upon Europe, that we should achieve military successes; and the same is true for us at home as well as abroad." Yet, comparing western triumphs at Ft. Donelson, Shiloh, and Corinth with the popular fixation on the East, Lincoln felt that "it seems unreasonable that a series of successes extending through half-a-year, and clearing more than a hundred thousand square miles of country, should help us so little, while a half-defeat" at the Seven Days Battles "should hurt us so much" in morale.3 Often criticized for an exaggerated fear for the safety ofWashington, Lincoln had realized that "Jackson's game" in the Valley Campaign had been to "keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond...