Logistical Support of Federal Armies in the Field

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF FEDERAL ABMIES IN THE FIELD James A. Huston If Eubopean observers disagreed with some of the strategy and tactics of Federal commanders in the Civil War, they marveled at the organization and support which made it possible to maintain and move the great armies. Actually the logistical organization differed little in principle from that which had been used in the War with Mexico, or even in the Continental Army during the Revolution. But with the advantage of railroads and steamboats, broadened concepts of war, and imagination in application, commanders were able to get results which would be the envy of later generations using many times the numbers of staff officers and service troops. Normally a field army controlled its own supply base, and there was no intervening organization between the supply bureaus of the War Department and the geographic departments and divisions and armies. Preparatory to operations, an army ordinarily established a base or "grand depot" at a place accessible to transportation to the front and rear, and sufficiently remote from the battle areas to be relatively secure from hostile action. During offensive operations the army established advance depots where it could draw supplies without going all the way back to the base. Supporting the grand depots of the armies were the major depots of the Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments at such cities as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington , Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, and New Orleans; the twenty-eight arsenals and armories of the Ordnance Department; and the central depot for medical supplies at Philadelphia, with storehouses in various parts of the country. The Quartermaster General sent supplies of clothing and equipage from the general depots to quartermaster officers stationed with the troops. Company commanders drew these items from the quartermasters on requisitions approved James A. Huston, Professor of History at Purdue University, occupied for 1959-60 the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College. He is currently preparing a history of military logistics for the Department of the Army. 36 by the regimental commanders. In peacetime, ordnance was to be issued from the armories and arsenals only by authority of the Chief of Ordnancein Washington, butduring war any general or field officers commanding an army, garrison, or detachment could give an order for ordnance for his troops. Staff officers were expected to keep their immediate commanders as well as their bureau chiefs in Washington informed about their activities and the status of supply, and to pass on to the commanders information received from the bureaus. Railroads and river boats carried supplies as far forward as possible, but in getting the supplies up to the units the armies had to rely chiefly on wagons. The allowance of transportation for armies in the field was the subject of much discussion during the war. An almost continuous battle went on against the tendency of commanders to increase the size of their trains. In September, 1862, General Henry Halleck issued a general order calling the attention of all officers "to the absolute necessity of reducing the baggage trains of troops in the field. The mobility of our armies is destroyed by the vast trains which attend them, and which they are required to guard. This evil requires a prompt remedy."1 Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs thought it impractical to regulate the number of wagons in the general supply trains, for their need would increase with the distance of the army from its supply depot. But he did think that the headquarters and regimental trains— carrying the baggage and supplies always accompanying the units— could be regulated. In 1862 the allowance for baggage trains was set at four wagons for the headquarters of an army corps, three for the headquarters of divisions and brigades, six for a full regiment of infantry , and three for a squadron of cavalry or a battery of light artillery. In 1864 General Grant reduced these allowances for brigade headquarters and for infantry or cavalry regiments and artillery battalions to two wagons, and one wagon for an artillery battery in the armies operating against Richmond. At the same time he established allowances for the general supply trains. These included...