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165 CORRECTIONS REGARDING "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence'" In my paper "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence" (Hume Studies, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 1-25) there were several corrections which should have appeared in the final printed version of the paper but which, unfortunately, were not inserted. In the version of my paper which has been printed in Hume Studies natural relations are misrepresented as being identical with connexions or associations of ideas whereas clearly they should be understood as those relations which produce or generate connexions or associations of ideas. While this defect in the paper does not affect the substance of my position (and is, I think, easily rectified) it may nevertheless generate some unnecessary difficulties and complications for the reader. In light of this I ask the reader to note the following specific corrections: pg. 12: lines 11-13 should read: This "connexion" is the product of a natural relation. It is an association which holds only between our perceptions and it cannot, therefore, be attributed to the objects (i.e, bodies) themselves, pg. 13: lines 23-5 should read: That is, the necessary connexion turns out to be an association between our perceptions, pg. 15: lines 5-9 should read: The gist of Hume's answer to this question seems to be that while we may attribute philosophical relations to physical objects we cannot attribute those connexions which are produced by natural relations to them (though he notes that we have a natural tendency to do this; cf. T 167). 166 pg. 15: lines 14-24 should read: But, as we have seen, he will not allow that the product of natural relations, that is, those "connexions" which hold between our perceptions of these objects, may also be "transferred" to these bodies. A natural relation is a "quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other after the manner above explained [sc. at I,i,4 — in terms of "the connexion or association of ideas"]. These effects of natural relations (viz. the generation of "connexions" among our ideas) must, obviously, be confined to our perceptions. However, we find philosophical relations wherever there are qualities "which make objects admit of comparison". (T 14 — my emphasis) pg. 16: lines 11-14 should read: Accordingly, as he is considering bodies he makes no mention of perceptions (i.e impressions and ideas), nor of the effects of natural relations (i.e. those "connexions" which relate only perceptions) . pg. 17: lines 9-12 should read: They attribute those connexions which exist in their imagination, that is those associations which connect our perceptions, to the bodies themselves. I should stress again, however, that the above corrections do not in any way affect the central theses of my paper (cf. pp. 1-2 and pp. 20-1). Paul Russell Sidney Sussex College Cambridge ...


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