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  • Is Economic History a Neglected Field of Study?Final Thoughts
  • Robert Whaples

There is considerable good sense in the comments of my four colleagues. I certainly didn't mean to suggest that economic history is "ready for hospice care" and "doomed to extinction," or to deliver a "eulogy." Rather, my fundamental point, which all seem to agree on, is that, despite manifest evidence that economic historians continue to produce a high-quality product that more historians and economists should go out and read, the current amount of output in the economic history industry is below the social optimum. The demand is too low.

I don't blame economic historians for this. Collectively, we are not as haughty as some of my quotes may suggest. And although we may not have all the breadth, polish, and ability to marshal evidence suggested by my commentators, economic historians are immensely practical. If it works, we're open to it; if it doesn't, why should we bother? We love numbers because they are practical. Despite Frank Knight's dismissal of Lord Kelvin, economic historians think numbers can and do tell us a lot. If we convert temperature into a number (be it in degrees Fahrenheit, Celsius, or Kelvin), a little experience will soon tell us whether it's better to wear a long-sleeved shirt or a jacket and whether the roads will ice over—useful information. If we convert economic performance into a number, say, GDP, we've got a much better sense of whose economy is performing better: is it Puerto Rico or Cuba; the U.S. or the USSR; East or West Germany? Because of this practicality, the field is "adaptive and protean" and has welcomed a wide range of interlopers. Just present your case, and we'll give you a fair shake (especially if you've got a telling number or two). But too few take the bait.

Why so few? I find Troesken's analysis especially insightful. Perhaps historians' disregard for axiomatic reasoning is the key to why they don't see gains to trading with economists. (Perhaps it's more.)

Why, then, don't economists demand more economic history? Is it sheer and sneering ignorance, as McCloskey argues? I don't think so. Rather I believe it's another case in which "institutions matter." Economists have learned that the most successful hires are clever people, especially those who are good at math, modeling, and econometrics. They are the most successful because they publish a lot and in highly ranked journals. Hiring such candidates is beneficial because they can be useful coauthors and colleagues, and they will elevate the department's stature. But the most successful scholars by this measure need not be the best from the broader social perspective. From this broader perspective, the best scholars are those who add the most value—who discover and propagate ideas that make society better off and deepen our understanding of important issues. In pursuing this task, underappreciated giants like Alexander Gerschenkron "used all the evidence." Using all the evidence is another example of the most inescapable microeconomic logic: pushing all margins until the returns are approximately equalized. Economists have failed to push the history margin far enough because they simply don't capture enough of the gains. Because we can't be sure that the young scholar who has discovered important historical facts is "clever" enough to publish in the right journals and elevate the stature of the department, he or she falls to a lower-tier institution. Accordingly, young (and old) economists have less incentive to do history. Until we align society's interest and self-interest in this market, economists will continue to make some room, but not enough room, for history. What a pity. [End Page 27]

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