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The Washington Quarterly 24.1 (2000) 155-165



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The Eye of the Transitional Storm

Shahram Chubin


For a president coming to office with no experience or interest in foreign affairs, in an era of profound transitions in Russia, China, and the European Union (EU), without the simple and clear paradigm of the Cold War, President William Clinton's two terms have been remarkably successful. Though he has no famous victories or memorable doctrines, he leaves the United States with its alliances intact, its military and economic strength uncontested, and its confidence undiminished.

Although he could have done more, as critics allege, to educate and develop domestic support for a greater U.S. role in the world, it can be argued that many of the criticisms of how Clinton managed foreign policy--such as it being unfocused, too incremental in the use of military power, and not sufficiently geopolitical--are, in fact, attributable to the times and conditions, rather than the man.

Don't Rock the Boat

An assessment of Clinton's international legacy must separate the underlying political conditions and constraints, which would have occurred for any president, from the policies and conduct stemming from the particular leader. Clinton came to office after the end of the Cold War emphasizing the economy, not foreign affairs. His election suggested that the public shared his focus. He proposed no vision to undermine his predecessor's alleged deficit in this area: he stood for good management, consensus, and compassion.

The world after the Cold War was inherently more complex than it had been during that formative rivalry. Major changes were taking place as [End Page 155] states adjusted to the new environment, with Russia a declining power, China an ascendant power, and the EU defining its scope and purposes as a political and eventually military power. The United States remained strong, possessing hard and soft power, an unmatched economy, and stable alliances. It was in no mood to brook any peer competitor, even though no candidate was yet on the horizon.

The U.S. position indeed made it the indispensable power. As the richest and strongest state, the United States has not only the greatest stake in the maintenance of a stable and open international order, but also the greatest responsibility to ensure this.

In an era when the United States faces no existential threats, as one acute observer has put it, "The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices. A dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it." 1 This has meant that many policies and especially military interventions are more discretionary rather than essential to vital interests. This in turn has required the U.S. president to justify such interventions in terms that are palatable to the electorate. One recalls that even before Clinton's term, then-Secretary of State James Baker sought to justify the U.S. response to Iraq's blatant aggression in 1990 as an issue of "jobs."

Recently, however, the United States has rarely been able to translate its unparalleled power into successful diplomatic outcomes. In part, this is due to the nature of the new security issues in the international agenda: drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, the AIDS epidemic, and migration. None of these stem primarily from other states' policies or are intended as instruments against any particular state. By the same token, few of these issues lend themselves to unilateral solution, requiring cooperation among several states.

If global responsibility requires U.S. leadership, but interests appear more vague and less direct than in the past, and issues appear more resistant to unilateral solutions, then involvement naturally appears sporadic, reluctant, and hedged. In an increasingly connected world, it has been difficult to remain indifferent to issues concerning human rights, which are slowly becoming integrated into definitions of national interest. Yet to act on this basis, even in cases of massive violations, requires strong allied support; a legitimizing agency or mechanism; supportive public opinion; and a Congress that shares, or comes around, to this perspective. In...

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