The False Binary Choice between Unilateralism and Multilateralism

On January 20, 2009, a new administration will take office and unless dramatic developments occur in the coming months, the next American president will undoubtedly face a daunting set of international challenges. On that day, eight years will have passed since George W. Bush entered office promising a humbler and less expansive foreign policy. Hopes for such a path, however, were not to be, especially in the face of 9/11 and subsequent war on two fronts. Today, the United States’ relationships with many of its allies, let alone adversaries, are strained. Ask the opinion of a random policy maker on Capitol Hill, a public intellectual in Paris, or an international bureaucrat in the halls of the United Nations, and the likely reaction might be visceral, the condemnation of apparent American arrogance unmistakable. The pressure is strong for the next American president to ‘choose’ multilateralism over unilateralism as both a policy as well as an ideational imperative in foreign affairs. But for the United States, no such binary choice exists. While renewed vigor in diplomacy may indeed be in order, the next administration should be wary of engrossing itself in semantic battles over simplistic decision nodes or imagined pasts. The United States, regardless of which candidate is elected, will likely continue to pursue a policy of strategic flexibility that is grounded in historical precedent and driven by America’s unprecedented leadership role.

The False Binary Choice

Venomous voices have abounded in deriding the George W. Bush administration’s supposed “immersion in irresponsible unilateralism.”¹ In doing so, both domestic and foreign observers have cited cases from the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to the prosecution of war in Iraq as examples of the administration’s unilateralist lunge. The remedy, many of these detractors would argue, is for the next president to actively defer to international organizations. The major Democratic and Republican presidential candidates have voiced agreement, if conditional, with aspects of this position. Indeed, some scholars have deemed many current U.S. policies to be temporary aberrations—somehow projections of neoconservative influence or even Bush’s own evangelical Christian leanings.² The implied expectation, then, is for the next president to simply ‘return’ to the supposed multilateralism practiced by past administrations. However attractive this may appear, the suggestion of a mathematical “1 or 0” binary choice for U.S. foreign policy appears is exaggerated for two basic reasons.

First, American presidents have always maintained a policy of strategic flexibility. Foreign policy initiatives have been multilateral if possible, but unilateral if necessary. This has been the historical precedent. The assertion that any one administration is “unilateralist” while others have been “multilateralist” is grossly overdone. In fact, the administrations of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have each acted unilaterally. In 1989, George H.W. Bush unilaterally ordered American forces to invade Panama and capture Manuel Noriega. The Clinton administration bypassed the UN Security Council and intervened in Kosovo with military force. Later, Bill Clinton authorized the unilateral bombings of sites in Afghanistan and Sudan after Al-Qaeda’s 1998 terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa. Even the George W. Bush administration’s much derided aversion to the Kyoto Protocol and International Criminal Court (ICC) has followed similar attitudes held by the Clinton administration.

Also important is the fact that presidential preferences do not absolutely dictate foreign policy. Deference for maximum maneuverability resides not only in the Executive Branch, but also in Congress and in wider public opinion. U.S. democracy requires the consideration of domestic political forces that sometimes prefer unilateral prescriptions even more than the administration. Treaties have to be ratified and budgets must be passed by members of Congress representing a diverse patchwork of constituent and interest groups. Indeed, the traditional bipartisan consensus affirming unilateral optionality is unlikely to change, especially in the face of grave threats from terrorism and rogue regimes. Even in a world of international organizations and regional alliances, the Westphalian centrality of sovereign nation-states has not changed. To ensure state survival, foreign policy naturally should be shaped by national interests. Thus, when faced with threats...