Nominalism and the Ethics : Some Remarks about Buridan's Commentary

Nominalism and the Ethics: Some Remarks about Buridan's Commentary JAMES J. WALSH AS EVERYONE KNOWS,in the later middle ages, philosophy and theology, in northern Europe at least, were polarized into the via antiqua and the via moderna usually characterized as Realism and Nominalism. Certain universities, especially east of the Rhine, were resolutely nominalist; certain others, resolutely realist; and a more or less bitter struggle developed at yet others, including Paris. I wish to take as the leading text for this paper part of a document sent to King Louis XI in protest at the prohibiton of nominalist doctrine at Paris in 1473. I shall call it, perhaps melodramatically, "The Nominalist Manifesto"; and I shall turn to it for criteria to guide the ensuing discussions. The nominalist masters defined their position thus: Those doctors are called Nominalists who do not multiply the things principally signified by terms in accordance with the multiplication of the terms. Realists, however, are those who contend on the contrary that things are multiplied according to the multiplicity of terms. For example, Nominalists say that divinity and wisdom are one and the same thing altogether, because everything which is in God, is God. But Realists say that the divine wisdom is divided from divinity. Again, those are called Nominalists who show diligence and zeal in understanding all the properties of terms on which the truth and falsity of a sentence depends, and without which the perfect judgement of the truth and falsity of propositions cannot be made. These properties are: supposition, appellation, amphation, restriction, exponible distribution. They especially understand obligations and the nature of the insoluble, the true foundation of dialectical arguments and of their failure. Being instructed in these things, they easily understand concerning any given argumentation whether it is good or bad. But the reahsts neglect all these things, and they condemn them, saying, "We proceed to things, we have no concern for terms." Against them master John Gerson said, "While you proceed to things, neglecting terms, you fall into complete ignorance of things themselves." This is in his treatise on the Magnificat; and he added that the said Realists involve themselves in inexplicable difficulties, since they seek difficulty where there is none, unless it is logical difficulty.1 "Ilh Doctores Nominales dicti sunt qui non multiplicent res principaliter signific~tao per terminos secundum multiphcationem terminorum. Reales autem, qui e contra res multiplicatas eme contendunt, secundum multiphcitatem terminorum. Yerbi gratia, Nominales dicunt, quod deltas et sapientia sint una reset eadem omnino, quia omne, quod est in Deo, Deus est. Reales autem dicunt, quod divina sapientia dividitur a deitate. "Item Nominales dicti sunt, qui dihgentiam et studium adhibuerunt cognoscendi omnes proprictates terminorum, a quibus dependet veritas et falsitas orationis, et sine quibus non protest fieri perfectum judicium de veritate et falsitate propositionum. Quae proprietates sunt: suppositio, appellatio, ampliatio, restrictio, distributio exponibilis. Cognoscunt praeterea obhgationes et insolubilem naturam, vera fundament~ argumentorum dialecticorum, et omnes eorum defectus. Quibus rebus instructi de unaquaque argumentatione facihter cognoscunt an [1] 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Manifesto gives us two defining characteristics of nominalism; the refusal to multiply entities, and the systematic practice of terminist analysis. We shall come back to this double criterion somewhat later. One of the interesting questions to ask about this great polarization of thought concerns its scope. Obviously there are nominalist and realist positions in metaphysics and logic, but what of other subjects covered in the standard medieval curriculum--and for the purposes of this paper, especially what of ethics? This question may seem naive, since a highly distinctive doctrine, sometimes called moral positivism or authoritarianism, is attributed to William of Ockham, the leading nominalist authority, and thus has a prima facie claim to the title of the ethics of nominalism. I do not want to go on at great length about Ockham's moral philosophy. There are extended studies by Garvens and Lagarde, and these are reasonably epitomized in the standard histories, for example, in the recent careful history by Armand Maurer, himself a considerable student of Ockham. The common claim is that Oekham's leading ethical notions follow consistently from his nominalistic view of man and of reality in general. What this means...