Kierkegaard and Descartes

Kierkegaard and Descartes RONALD GRIMSLEY KIERKEGAARD'SFIRST KNOWLEDGEof Descartes was probably not derived from a direct study of his work but from the lectures he attended as a student at the University of Copenhagen in the 1830's. The view of modern philosophy then current in Denmark was that of a continuous movement extending from Descartes to Hegel, although the enormous prestige enjoyed by the latter meant that Cartesian thought was interpreted mainly as the starting point for the investigation of problems upon which later philosophers were deemed to have shed much greater light. Later on, when he read Descartes himself, Kierkegaard regretted that he had not begun immediately with him instead of allowing himself to be influenced by Hegel's rather condescending attitude toward his French predecessor.1 Hegel certainly conceded to Descartes the great merit of having "extricated intellectual consciousness from that sophistry of thought which unsettles everything" and so of having comprehended the character of the "abstract idea," but he also implied that the Cartesian viewpoint was too naive, being "simple and as it were popular"--or as Kierkegaard expresses it "child-like"--in its approach to philosophical problems. Hegel speaks of Descartes, notes Kierkegaard, in a way that seems to mock at him, peremptorily closing his discussion with the remark that "mit ihm ist weiter nichts zu anzufangen." In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript of 1846, Kierkegaard recalled this judgement of Hegel's, for the latter is there described as a thinker who "with the help of the principle of identity of thought and being was emancipated from a more childlike manner of philosophizing, something which he himself calls attention to, for example in connection with Descartes." 2 During the years when he was supposed to be preparing for his theological examinations, Kierkegaard became increasingly interested in philosophy; he was for a time the pupil of a young teacher at the University of Copenhagen, H. L. Martensen, who later became a distinguished professor of theology and Primate of the Danish Church. In later life Kierkegaard was to see in Martensen an egregious example of "the Professor" who taught about Christianity instead of living it out: Martensen's academic attitude was, he believed, typical of the enervated values which were undermining the basis of contemporary spiritual life. Moreover, Martensen had come under the influence of Hegel, even claiming to be able to "go further" than the master himself. Yet in these student years Kierkegaard attended Martensen's lectures at the University and probably listened to him with respect. His papers contain notes on lectures which MartenCf . B~renKierkegaards Papirer, edited by P. A. Heiberg , V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting (20 vols.; Copenhagen: 1908-1948), IV B 13 (17). (Quoted hereafter as Papirer. The referenceis to volume,section,and entry-number.) Hegel's view of Descartes is to be found especiallyin Vorlesungen~ber die Geschichteder Philosophic (Werke, XV, 331-332). Concluding UnscientificPostscript, trans. D. E. Swensonand W. Lowrie (Princeton: 1941), p. 298, n,1. [31] 32 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY sen delivered in the winter of 1837-1838 and which were later published in book form under the title of Prolegomena to Speculative Dogmatics. On November 29, 1837, Martensen, who was primarily concerned with the impact of philosophy on theology, dealt with Descartes in the course of his review of the whole development of modern philosophy both in England and on the continent. (As well as discussing Spinoza and Kant, he dealt with Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.) 8 He followed Hegel in interpreting the Cartesian Cogito ergo sum as "the principle of the new Protestant subjectivity." The essential point about this was that it resulted from a method which did not cast doubt on particular things but upon everything. Ultimately, however, Descartes's intention was not to leave the issue in a "fluctuating condition," but to produce a rational certainty resting upon "the absolute identity of thought and being." More specifically still, this identity must first of all be associated with my own reality as a thinking being, because in every other case the "object" of thought remains outside me and so falls short of absolute certainty. The 'T' thus postulated by the cogito is no empirical self, but...