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BOOK REVIEWS 559 and inductive argumentation (epag6g~). This same approach tends systematically to affect Woods's analyses and criticisms of particular passages. There is one inexplicable lapse at the very beginning of the commentary, where the author states that in 1. 1. 1214al-8 Aristotle "expresses his agreement" with the inscription at Delos, when in fact Aristotle cites the couplet just to disagree with it. The commentary is followed by a twenty-four page set of notes on readings of and emendations of the Greek text, which often is problematic. The very existence of this section supports the contention that this volume (and others in the series) cannot fulfil Ackrill's original hope that literal translations might "enable the Greekless reader to exercise his own judgement on questions of interpretation." Neither the translation nor the commentary can be read intelligently without constant reference to the Greek. Despite this unavoidable limitation, Woods's translation is valuable simply because it so often is superior to previous renderings, and his commentary may be even more valuable as a knowledgeable summary of recent scholarship, which has shown increasing interest in the Eudemian Ethics. Following the notes is a select but good bibliography, a brief glossary of Greek terms, and an index. There are a few typographical errors (pp. 62, 7o, 87, lOl, 134, ~89, 19o); only one is of consequence: the word 'voluntary' in one of its occurrences on p. 13o should read 'involuntary'. Roger J. Sullivan University of South Carolina, Columbia A. C. Lloyd. Form and Universal in Aristotle. ARCA Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs 4- Francis Cairns, School of Classics. Liverpool: 1981. Pp. vi + 89. s paper. The status of Aristotelian forms--are forms particulars or universals?--and the implications of Aristotle's conception of universals for his ontology have long been debated. In Form and Universal in Aristotle, Lloyd takes another look at these vexing questions. Paying scant attention to recent treatments of these problems, Lloyd frames his discussion in Medieval terminology. The central question for him is whether Aristotle ascribes to a realist 'in re' theory of universals or a conceptualist 'post rem cum fundamento in re' theory. The major contention of the book is that Aristotle is a conceptualist. Lloyd seeks to establish this by showing that Aristotelian forms are particulars, which when abstracted from matter by the mind become universals. The traditional view that Aristotle substituted an in re theory of universals for Plato's ante rem theory is questioned in the first chapter and the post rem theory championed by Lloyd is sketched. The second chapter cites texts in support of the claim that substantial and accidental forms are particulars. It also gives an account of thinking, according to which formsthought are concepts, i.e., universals. The third chapter is a discussion of matter and 560 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2~: 4 OCT ~983 substantial and accidental forms. The fourth chapter argues that the theory of universals worked out in the preceding chapters is the theory that the ancient commentators , most notably Alexander of Aphrodisias, attributed to Aristotle. The argument of the book is weak at several points. Lloyd must establish that (1) [orms are particulars which are identical with individual substances or quasi-substances and (2) forms-thought are concepts and universals. There are good reasons to doubt that Aristotle espouses (t). For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat the arguments that have been made against this reading of Aristotle in recent literature.' Let it suffice to say that Lloyd does not make a case for (1) that would override the objections to attributing (1) to Aristotle. There are also good reasons to question the philosophical cogency of a conceptualism based on (1) and (2). The difficulties inherent in this theory provide a further reason to doubt that Lloyd is right about Aristotle 's position. According to Lloyd, every characteristic of an individual substance is a particular form, which is either identical to the substance or in it. Socrates is a substance, a man, and possesses many attributes such as health and pallor. Thus, there is a particular form of man which is identical to Socrates and a particular form...


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