Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft, and: Die Philosophie des Rechts, and: Philosophie des Rechts (review)

304 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 25:9 APRIL 1987 world which is a product of his freedom and self-development. Marx distinguishes three moments in this moral freedom: (1) freedom as the ability to begin, productivity , or spontaneity (as in the 18oo system), (2) freedom as voluntary binding of oneself to a necessity, self-determination or Spinozistic freedom, (3) the freedom Kant ascribed to pure will, autonomy, or 'personality'. White's account of Schelling differs from Marx's in that he offers a chronological overview of the whole of Schelling's long career. He correctly sees that it is problems, not solutions, that predominate in Schelling's thought, that the problem of freedom is primary and abiding. He also appreciates how Schelling's early systems founder on the the problem of the derivation of the finite. If on some hyperempirical level, everything is deeply and marvelously one, how did we get here? That we in fact are here is not a good answer. The limitations involved in individuality and finitude must be systematically derived. MICHAEL G. VATER Marquette University G. W. F. Hegel. Vorlesungen iiber Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft, Heidelberg 1817/x 8 mit Nachtr~gen aus der Vorlesung 1818/a 9. Nachgeschrieben von P. Wannenmann . Herausgegeben von C. Becker, W. Bonsiepen, A. Gethmann-Siefert, F. Hogemann, W. Jaeschke, Ch. Jamme, H.-Ch. Lucas, K. R. Meist, H. Schneider, mit einer Einleitung von O. P6ggeler. Ausgew~hlten Nachschriften und Manuscripte , Band I. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, a983. Pp. liii + 3Ol. G. W. F. Hegel. Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/x8) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19). Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und erl~mtert von Karl-Heinz Ilting. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983. Pp. 399. G. W. F. Hegel. Philosophie des Rechts. Die Vorlesungen von 1819/2o in einer Nachschrift . Herausgegeben von Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983. Pp. 389 . Ever since the first World War there have been those who have accused Hegel of fathering 'Prussian~sm'/ and, since the second World War, even National Socialism,~ in spite of arguments to the contrary of such writers as Bernard Bosanquet, John Muirhead, and Sir Malcolm Knox. 3 He has also been accused of servility to the Prussian authorities of his time. But, to say nothing of the earlier writers I have 1 Cf. F. Carritt, Morals and Politics (Oxford, 1935), lo7, and Proc. ofArist. Soc. (1935-36): u3o. Cf. S. Hook, From Hegel to Marx (London, 1936), 19; Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means (London, 1938), 58, 171; E. A. Mowrer, Germany Puts the Clock Back (Harmondsworth, 1938), 38-39; Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (London, 1945-1966). 3 Cf. B. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the State (London, a93o), 23off; J. H. Muirhead, German Philosophy and the War (London, 1915); T. M. Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism," Philosophy 15 (194o): 51-63 9 BOOK REVIEWS 305 mentioned, Knox, as long ago as 194o, in an admirable article in Philosophy, marshalled a convincing body of evidence, both historical and textual, to demonstrate the contrary. Nothing later is required for this than the text of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts itself, which shows plainly that Hegel argued consistently for the rights of the individual and against what we now call totalitarianism, that he favored Monarchy only in its constitutional and limited form, and that he did not aggrandize war for its own sake. Now we have three new editions of earlier versions of the Rechtsphilosophie, delivered as lectures in the three years prior to the publication of the Grundlinien, to confirm what ought to have been sufficiently evident before. These new editions of transcripts of Hegel's lectures in the years just prior to the publication of the Grundlinien provide fresh evidence to support Knox's thesis, and each of the authors of the three introductions, in his own way, addresses the issue (among others), all coming to much the same conclusion, which leaves little room for further questioning of Hegel's liberal, rather than conservative, attitudes. P6ggeler, outlining the historical background of Hegel's intellectual development, in effect corroborates what Knox had demonstrated, that as his theoretical ideas advanced his political attitudes never materially changed, beginning with...