Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922 (review)

This is a compact yet comprehensive study of the creation and spectacular expansion of the Imperial Japanese Navy from the Meiji Restoration until the Washington Naval Conference treaties. As the author states at the outset, his focus is not on the navy's hardware but rather the politics, particularly the budgetary politics, of these years. To a remarkable degree, the navy built those politics. In doing so, it not only "made waves." In a real sense, it was a vital architect of the entire Meiji polity. Consequently, this study will be of interest to any scholar who understands that the construction of the Meiji state was hardly preordained and that its success, against domestic or foreign obstacles, was not automatic.

In many respects, the literal and figurative construction of the Imperial Navy mirrored the construction of that Meiji state. As Schencking observes, Japan in 1868 was economically poor, politically unsettled, and had a people with little sense of nation. These were poor prospects for the creation of a successful state, but they posed even more daunting difficulties for the construction of a national navy. Unhappily for Japan, navies were expensive, demanded long political commitments, and were the embodiment (and usually consequence) of strong national feelings. In Japan's case, there was the further problem of a virtual absence of any naval tradition and, therefore, naval-minded elites to provide the core of the Imperial Navy in its infancy. Even worse, unlike the navies of every single great power of the nineteenth century, the Japanese navy did not even enjoy service autonomy.

Autonomy was acquired easily, thanks in no small part to the maritime threat offered by those great powers. Funding, ironically, required a domestic threat. As has been long known, Chōshū's dominance within the Meiji oligarchy sparked opposition from several sources. One was the well-known popular rights (minken) movement. Another came from the rival domain of Satsuma. As Schencking makes clear, Satsuma elites saw naval autonomy as the perfect way to counter Chōshū within the new regime. Likewise, the new autonomous navy saw alliance with those in the Diet who advocated popular rights as a useful way to find funding. The rise of a strong Chinese navy, and Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea, ensured the creation of a small but modern fleet for its first trial in the war of 1894–95 with China.

By the time victory was assured in that war, the Imperial Navy was no longer Satsuma's. In part, the nationalization of the navy occurred simply by moving the naval academy entrance examinations to Tokyo. But it was also due to an influx of young officers who joined literally to see the world. The creation of the first professional officer corps is a vital story, one that this study could not devote sufficient attention toward, but Schencking deserves credit for highlighting its importance. As he points out, surely the most important of those young officers was Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, who swept out Satsuma admirals with astonishing boldness and forged an alliance with Diet party men that lasted far beyond the 1890s.

Yamamoto was not just politically shrewd. He understood the importance of mass opinion and the role of the press in shaping it. Schencking's description of naval propaganda is worth the book's price alone: elaborately arranged maneuvers, carefully orchestrated public exhibitions of warships, cultivation of journalists—nothing escaped Yamamoto's attention. Japan's victory over China was itself a tremendous public relations boost for the Imperial Navy, but even its effect paled in comparison to the navy's crushing triumph at Tsushima to effectively close the Russo-Japanese War a decade later. The navy's alliance with the swiftly rising Seiyūkai party marked the high tide of the navy's fortunes—and budgets—in this period.

Success had its price. Just as...