L'Europe et l'Otan face aux défis des élargissements de 1952 et 1954. Organisation internationale et Relations internationales. Actes du colloque organisé par le Centre d'Études d'histoire de la défense et l'Université de Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris, 22â24 January 2004. (review)
Oberammergau, Germany
Oberammergau, Germany
The purpose of this volume is to bring together and present the different papers discussed during an international colloquium organized by the CEHD (Centre for Defence History Studies) in partnership with the University of Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of January 2004. The colloquium addressed reflections on the early rounds of NATO enlargement, the role and place of those processes in the international arena, and their influence on the development of the European Union.
The book is divided into three parts. The first reviews and analyzes the decisionmaking process among the founding members, while the second focuses on the reception given to enlargement by candidates, NATO members, and outsiders. The third part, which looks at internal adaptation of Alliance forces and defence policy, is divided into two sections: the first on economic and political issues related to armament, and the other on armed forces and enlargement.
Before the Korean War, the U.S. considered the Soviet threat largely as political and social. The perception that the Korean scenario could be applied to Europe, raising a military threat against Turkey or Germany, served to strengthen NATO's role among the Alliance. Furthermore, it influenced debates on NATO expansion to Greece, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Political and political-strategic relations among Allies are also examined in the various papers included in the book. These include French opposition to the revival of German armed forces; the plan of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the West through the European Defence Community (EDC) rather than NATO; European reservations towards Spanish-American agreements and discussions with Yugoslavia; U.K. disagreement with the U.S. over Middle East security structures and Europe's role there; [End Page 277] and Italy's reaction towards Turkish and Greek applications for NATO membership.
However, the EDC's failure in the French Parliament on 30 August 1954 left only one option: the rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany within NATO and not within a common European force structure. From that moment, NATO became a more effective collective security organism, dedicated not only to resisting a third-party aggressor but also to maintaining peace between member states.
Conclusions drawn from the papers are the following: the enlargement process was successful for the stabilisation of the strategic situation in Europe, for the acceptance of the division of Germany and Europe, and for the establishment of a new security system in Europe.
One of the objectives of the colloquium was the confrontation between past and present—to analyse the way in which debates from yesterday could serve those of today, in the context of a new enlargement. Although an appendix explaining the more obscure agreements discussed in the papers would have been helpful, the book is highly recommended for historians, researchers, scholars, politicians or military professionals as it presents issues that transcend a specific historical moment: NATO still plays an effective role as the primary organism of collective defence and cooperation between western countries, and its prospective enlargement remains an ever-continuing process.
