The First Domino--International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 (review)

Johanna Granville's book purports to rebut theories concerning the monolithic nature of Soviet decision-making: "This study has shown that both the October 23 and October 31 decisions to invade were not completely unanimous" (p. 203). But long before Granville published her book, numerous scholars had already demonstrated that Soviet leaders agonized over the best course to take in the resolution of the Hungarian crisis—scholars whose work remains largely unacknowledged by Granville.

In the first chapter Granville fleshes out the origins of the 1956 crisis and locates it in "Hungary's distinctly anti-Soviet past" (p. 10). Her claim that "Hungary had never been under direct Soviet rule" (p. 4) is fallacious. In reality, the establishment of a Communist regime in Hungary was the direct result of Soviet occupation. This, and not linguistic and cultural factors, or "long historical rivalry," explains Hungarian hostility toward the Soviet Union after 1945. Granville's reference to "intrinsic anti-Slavic sentiments" in Hungary is a sweeping generalization that cannot be substantiated. She describes the power struggle within the Soviet Union and Hungary itself, and she points out that Soviet misperceptions of the Hungarian scene led to flawed responses, which contributed to the uprising. But this should not be overemphasized. Tension in Hungary was so acute and its causes were so complex that it is questionable whether more prudent actions could have avoided the conflict.

Granville's presentation of Soviet perceptions of Imre Nagy and Mátyás Rákosi is generally sound, but it is not clear why the Soviet statement that "in light of the 'subversive activities of the imperialists,' Rákosi should be retained" would "suggest" to Granville that "the Soviet leaders' misperception of the Hungarian situation resulted directly or indirectly from U.S. and Western intelligence activities in East Central Europe." There is no evidence that foreign intelligence activities had an appreciable effect on Soviet perceptions or actions in the East-bloc countries. Granville goes to great lengths in trying to demonstrate that Hungarian leaders were able in a "subtle way" to "influence" Moscow. What seems more likely is that Hungarian leaders sought to curry favor with the Soviet Union in order to enhance their own power positions at home.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the roles of Yugoslavia and Poland. Granville claims that "in addition to Yugoslavia, Hungarians also looked to Poland as the model of national communism" (p. 45), but this assertion contravenes her earlier claim about the Hungarians' alleged "anti-Slavic sentiments." Because we know that the Soviet decision to crush the Hungarian revolution was taken before the Soviet-Hungarian military talks began, it is curious why Granville "wonders how much the course of history might have been altered had Warsaw been chosen instead [of Tököl] for the negotiations" (p. 58).

Chapter 3 is supposedly devoted to the first Soviet intervention in Hungary on 23–24 October, but the discussion becomes confusing because in this same chapter she also covers the decision-making process that led to the second, much larger invasion on 4 November. Her analysis is based mainly on the Malin notes, but in the footnote devoted to the origins of the notes Granville might have mentioned that besides appearing in Hungarian and Russian they were also published in an extensively annotated English translation by Mark Kramer as far back as 1997, along with his elaborate discussion of their role in understanding the way decisions were made in the Kremlin. Similarly detailed interpretation is found in the 1996 Hungarian edition of the Malin notes (though Kramer's version is more authoritative because it corrects some errors in the published Russian and Hungarian editions). Granville's interpretation of the Soviet decision on 31 October to intervene is problematic. She lays heavy stress on Nagy's discussion of neutrality but underestimates the significance of the Suez crisis, an event that must have contributed to the volte...