Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001 (review)

The political and economic reforms attempted by developing countries have led in different directions, often unexpected. Zambia is such a case, and this book attends to the question of why Zambia seems to have had such political and economic difficulty in the 1991–2001 timeframe, despite pursuing what appeared to be an impressive set of political and economic reforms. For Zambia, the question is "why a government committed to reform, with a wide mandate for change from its population, and with donor finances to support it, achieved so little in terms of growth" (p. 79).

The author does an impressive job of leading us through the progression of reforms, players, layers, and processes involved, and the problematic outcomes for industry, agriculture, labor, and business. The lessons are important for future attempts by governments, donors, and academics that must tangle with the possibilities and implications of liberalization policy. Particularly relevant in this regard is that

The Zambian case suggests that the political practices associated with one-party rule, such as centralization of power in the presidential office and extensive use of state patronage for political gain, may prevail within the formal structures of democracy and a market economy.

(p. 16)

Reforms as window dressing then? The lesson is significant. Attention to reforms by those who seek change must involve more than the laws, institutions, and procedures of liberalization. Institutional and bureaucratic culture (within and outside of government) is also important, but perhaps more difficult to change in some cases, and while the relevant members of the international community would appear to have the opportunity to apply corrective pressure to such a situation (e.g., conditioning assistance), the Zambian case reveals forces that militate against this, such that the donor community can be "powerless in terms of providing checks" (p. 18).

Governmental commitment to reform is highlighted in several places in the book. That Zambia experienced a marked decline in this commitment during the decade covered is perhaps obvious, but the descriptions of the actions that led to this decline, and the repercussions they engendered, are the result of a solid unpacking of Zambian reality by the author. The book charts the progress of this decline through changing interest-group influence, interactions between the government and interest groups, interactions between the government and donors, and interactions among the government and business, agriculture, popular politics, and industry.

The sections on "The Partial Reform Syndrome in Africa," "Dual Conditionalities as a Response to Reform Failure," and "The Failure of Conditionality" are highly useful, as these capture the aspects of the problem and what can be (but was not) done about it. Thus, while the focus of the book is on the apparent failure of reforms in Zambia during the 1991–2001 period, the book points out inadequacies on the part of donor policy in response to the "partial reform syndrome," which seems to afflict a large part of the continent.

The book is extremely well researched, written, and referenced, and as such will have considerable utility with academic and policy audiences. The table of contents, bibliography, three appendices covering the informant interviews, and chronologies of major political and economic developments are quite useful tools for navigating the wealth of information contained in the book. Unfortunately, however, the index is not well elaborated.

The repercussions from the Chiluba government (in the period covered by the book) continue to unfold in Zambia, and while the particulars of the Zambia case are interesting, they perhaps illustrate a broader question: does the "partial reform syndrome" as currently experienced by several African countries suggest that political and economic reform is a long-term process? or does it suggest that a diversion from the anticipated trajectory, or an ongoing state of partial reform, are also possible outcomes?